Commons Ignorance: The Failure of Environmental Law to Produce Needed Information on Health and the Environment by Wagner, Wendy E.
WAGNER FINAL.DOC 2/9/2005 11:06 AM 
 
 
Duke Law Journal 
VOLUME 53 APRIL 2004 NUMBER 6 
COMMONS IGNORANCE: 
THE FAILURE OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW TO 
PRODUCE NEEDED INFORMATION ON  
HEALTH AND THE ENVIRONMENT 
WENDY E. WAGNER† 
ABSTRACT 
 One of the most significant problems facing environmental law is 
the dearth of scientific information available to assess the impact of 
industrial activities on public health and the environment. After 
documenting the significant gaps in existing information, this Article 
argues that existing laws both exacerbate and perpetuate this problem. 
By failing to require actors to assess the potential harm from their 
activities, and by penalizing them with additional regulation when 
they do, existing laws fail to counteract actors’ natural inclination to 
remain silent about the harms that they might be causing. Both theory 
and practice confirm that when the stakes are high, actors not only 
will resist producing potentially incriminating information but will 
invest in discrediting public research that suggests their activities are 
harmful. The Article concludes with specific recommendations about 
how these perverse incentives for ignorance can be reversed. 
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“Picture a pasture open to all.”1 In contrast to Professor Hardin’s 
simple scenario, this commons has cows, but the land managers are 
not sure whether the cows number 12 or 120, and they do not know 
where or how much they graze. They are also not sure how much 
waste the cows produce, or how much of their grazing, waste, and 
traffic the land and surrounding surface waters can tolerate. Cattle 
owners, who have the best information about these questions, are 
disinclined to share it, much less invest resources in developing a 
more accurate measure of the damage that their cattle inflict on 
common property. In fact, these owners maintain that their cattle 
are not damaging the pasture but fertilizing it and discredit all 
information to the contrary. Now, how should one characterize the 
“tragedy of the commons”? 
INTRODUCTION 
Rational choice theory and the large body of laws premised on it 
understand that those who inflict invisible and costly harms on others 
are disinclined to document the problems, much less take 
responsibility for them.2 Indeed, rational choice theory predicts that if 
wrongdoers are going to invest in research at all, they will dedicate 
resources to concealing and contesting incriminating information and 
producing exculpatory excuses and alibis. The criminal justice system 
is certainly familiar with this natural reaction to culpability.3 Yet, for 
some reason, environmental law has largely failed to come to grips 
with this inescapable feature of human nature. Instead, 
environmental law innocently assumes that information linking actors 
to resulting invisible harms will arise serendipitously, and, even more 
surprising, that the actors will either volunteer or accept this 
 
 1. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243, 1244 (1968). 
 2. See, e.g., JOSEPH J. SENNA & LARRY J. SIEGEL, INTRODUCTION TO CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
85–90 (6th ed. 1993) (discussing rational choice theory, which underlies criminal law’s 
commitment to both general and specific deterrence); see also Part I.A. infra. 
 3. In fact, there is a facet of criminal law that focuses specifically on issues arising from the 
use of alibis. See, e.g., Jack P. Friedman, Note, Criminal Procedure—Alibi Instructions and Due 
Process of Law, 20 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 343, 351 (1998) (discussing whether the Due Process 
clause requires the trial court to provide jury instructions on the burden of proof for an alibi 
defense). 
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incriminating information without fuss or fanfare.4 Perhaps most 
remarkable, leading theorists in environmental law often repeat these 
same errors, ignoring the problems that incomplete and contested 
information about the causes of environmental harm present to their 
idyllic assumptions.5 
The inattention of environmental law and its scholars to the large 
gaps in information and regulated actors’ incentives to perpetuate 
these gaps has been a costly oversight. Despite the enormous growth 
in environmental law and regulation since the 1970s, much of the 
scientific information needed to ensure environmental protection is 
 
 4. See infra Parts II–III. 
 5. Many of our nation’s most prominent scholars, including Professors Cass Sunstein, 
Bruce Ackerman, and Richard Stewart, as well as many of the nation’s leading environmental 
economists, presume that much of the information needed to set regulations is readily available 
and fail to consider the possibility that those engaging in externalities might enjoy superior 
information and have reasons to conceal it. See infra Part IV.A. Professor Garrett Hardin’s 
classic article, “The Tragedy of the Commons,” similarly assumes that the needed information 
on externalities is readily available and makes no mention of the inclination of his herders, 
polluters, and despoilers of public lands to cover and contest this incriminating evidence. See 
Hardin, supra note 1, at 1244–45. Hardin’s classic is excerpted in the introductory chapter of 
every leading environmental law casebook and treatise in the United States. See, e.g., ROGER 
W. FINDLEY & DANIEL A. FARBER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 42–44 
(5th ed. 1999); ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE, 
AND POLICY 58–60 (3d ed. 2000); THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM & RONALD H. ROSENBERG, 
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND LAW: PROBLEMS, CASES, AND READINGS 46–50 (3d ed. 1996). 
Even the Coase theorem, a model widely used to understand externalities regulation, 
erroneously assumes that any missing information can be discovered easily or at least with some 
investment, and this investment is simply counted as a cost of negotiation. See R. H. Coase, The 
Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 15 (1960) (arguing that a frictionless market produces 
perfect outcomes, but lumping all information costs in the category of “transaction costs”); 
Joseph Farrell, Information and the Coase Theorem, 1 ECON. PERSP. 113, 117 (1987) (arguing 
that “[p]roperty rights and negotiation will not yield first-best outcomes when there is important 
private information, and that case is the one that should be examined”); Pierre Schlag, The 
Problem of Transaction Costs, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 1661, 1664 (1989) (arguing that Professor 
Coase’s “concept of transaction costs does not have the sort of theoretical intelligibility and 
operational applicability necessary to make the market-based transaction cost approach 
plausible”). If critical information on externalities resists discovery because it is known only to 
actors and remains stubbornly undiscoverable to others even with incentives and payments, or if 
the information is essential to initiate bargaining (because an externality is invisible and a party 
does not even know it is harmed), then categorizing incomplete information as simply a 
transaction cost is fatally oversimplistic. However, to the extent that Coase intended to show 
that information problems are one of the challenges to determining the appropriate point for 
government intervention, and that assuming them away makes all institutions work perfectly, 
the fact that some information resists discovery may be partly what Coase hoped to convey with 
his theory. See NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN 
LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 109–10 (1994) (taking this position with regard to 
Coase’s intended argument). 
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still missing.6 The quality of most air, water, and land in the U.S. is 
unknown, even though the country has devoted hundreds of pages of 
laws to regulating activities that threaten the environment. No one 
knows when industrial and manmade activities stress ecosystems 
beyond the breaking point or how to help the ecosystems recover, 
even though the effectiveness of some federal programs depends on 
this information. Scientific knowledge is insufficient to identify, much 
less test for, a variety of invisible hazards associated with household 
products, pesticides, food additives, and biotechnology products. 
Ignorance prevails in spite of elaborate licensing requirements that 
purport to protect the public health and environment from these 
hazards.7 
This void in scientific knowledge is not inevitable. Science cannot 
answer all of the questions put to it, but modest investments in 
environmental monitoring and basic scientific research can make 
headway in isolating environmental and health problems that need 
attention. For example, research could determine the extent to which 
an oil refinery is polluting the air or a paper mill is polluting a river 
and the possible consequences of that pollution. Yet objective, 
reliable information vital to informing regulatory policy is generally 
unavailable. 
These significant deficiencies in scientific knowledge result in 
large part from the failure of the environmental laws to require the 
production of basic information about the harms caused by polluting 
activities and hazardous products. Regulated actors, despite creating 
most of the need for this information, are excused under most 
environmental laws from providing any more than a partial inventory 
of their activities and are not required to track the resulting impact on 
public health and the environment.8 In fact, in many circumstances 
 
 6. These problems are elaborated in notes 10–24 and accompanying text, infra. 
 7. See infra Part II.A. 
 8. Contrary to what currently occurs, responsibility for producing information on 
externalities should fall on the very actors who create and profit from externalities. See infra 
notes 31–33 and accompanying text. The notion that wrongdoers can best calculate the social 
costs of their accidents (or externalities) and decide whether to bear them through increased 
liability in light of private benefits is also a fundamental premise of Professor (now Judge) 
Calabresi’s well-known theoretical analysis of tort liability. See GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS 
OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 166–73 (1970) (discussing the wisdom of 
placing accident costs on the cheapest cost avoider in product-related accidents). 
This Article sidesteps the philosophical question of who originates an externality by 
assuming that the party who engages in polluting or manufacturing insufficiently tested toxic 
products imposes a nonreciprocal risk and is thus the party responsible for the externality. See 
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the laws actually deter regulated parties from volunteering 
information on the adverse effects of their activities. Regulators are 
more likely to greet such information with fines and increased 
restrictions than with regulatory rewards and letters of 
commendation.9 
This Article documents the pivotal role that responsible actors 
play in perpetuating the scientific uncertainty that impedes the 
progress of environmental law. The Article begins in Part I by 
providing a considerable body of theory and practical evidence that 
identifies a number of remediable gaps in the body of scientific 
knowledge needed for regulation, but that also reveals that actors will 
actively conceal and contest the information necessary for regulation 
when it is in their interest. Part II then identifies multiple ways that 
the environmental laws fail to address remediable scientific 
uncertainties or require regulated actors to produce information 
within their superior control. Part III uncovers even more legal 
dysfunction, documenting the ways in which the laws not only excuse 
actors from responsibility for producing information regarding their 
activities, but actually provide wrongdoers with added legal 
opportunities for concealing adverse information and contesting the 
information produced by others. Part IV concludes by offering a 
series of reforms that could begin to counteract some of the most 
unnecessary problems in the current legal approach to addressing the 
information deficiencies that afflict environmental law. 
I.  THE IGNORANCE EQUILIBRIUM 
Virtually every prominent expert panel convened to consider the 
effects of industrial activities on health and the environment 
expresses alarm at the dearth of research and basic information.10 At 
 
George P. Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L. REV. 537, 543–51 (1972) 
(“[U]nexcused nonreciprocity of risk is the unifying feature of a broad spectrum of cases 
imposing liability under rubrics of both negligence and strict liability.”). This assumption is fully 
consistent with the environmental laws’ intention to assign responsibility for assessing the harm 
produced by activities on the actor. See infra notes 154–55 and accompanying text. 
 9. See infra Part III.A. 
 10. See, e.g., COMM. ON ENVTL. RESEARCH, NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, RESEARCH TO 
PROTECT, RESTORE, AND MANAGE THE ENVIRONMENT (1993); COMM. ON GRAND 
CHALLENGES IN ENVTL. SCIS., NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, GRAND CHALLENGES IN 
ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCE (2001); COMM. ON RESEARCH OPPORTUNITIES AND PRIORITIES 
FOR EPA, NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, BUILDING A FOUNDATION FOR SOUND 
ENVIRONMENTAL DECISIONS (1997) [hereinafter NRC, BUILDING A FOUNDATION]; COMM. TO 
REVIEW THE EPA’S ENVTL. MONITORING AND ASSESSMENT PROGRAMS, NAT’L RESEARCH 
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present, only rudimentary models are available to estimate the effects 
of large-scale pollution on ecosystems,11 and the validity of these 
models is only sporadically evaluated—if at all—using actual data.12 
Although scientists have progressed in developing a mechanistic 
 
COUNCIL, REVIEW OF EPA’S ENVIRONMENTAL MONITORING AND ASSESSMENT PROGRAM: 
OVERALL EVALUATION (1995) [hereinafter NRC, ENVIRONMENTAL MONITORING AND 
ASSESSMENT PROGRAM]; 1998 WORKSHOP ON EMERGING DRINKING WATER 
CONTAMINANTS, NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, IDENTIFYING FUTURE DRINKING WATER 
CONTAMINANTS (1999); STEERING COMM. ON IDENTIFICATION OF TOXIC AND POTENTIALLY 
TOXIC CHEMS. FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE NAT’L TOXICOLOGY PROGRAM, NAT’L 
RESEARCH COUNCIL, TOXICITY TESTING: STRATEGIES TO DETERMINE NEEDS AND 
PRIORITIES (1984) [hereinafter NRC, TOXICITY TESTING]. The National Science Foundation 
has recognized the dramatic undersupply and undersupport of environmental research relative 
to needs. See generally NAT’L SCI. BD., NAT’L SCI. FOUND., ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCE AND 
ENGINEERING FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: THE ROLE OF THE NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION 
(2000), available at http://www.nsf.gov/pubs/2000/nsb0022/reports/nsb0022.pdf. The General 
Accounting Office (GAO) has produced narrower reports highlighting the substantial 
deficiencies in the available information on various environmental externalities. See generally 
U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFFICE, TOXIC SUBSTANCES: EPA’S CHEMICAL TESTING PROGRAM HAS 
MADE LITTLE PROGRESS (1990); U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFFICE, MAJOR MANAGEMENT 
CHALLENGES AND PROGRAM RISKS (2001). The president of the American Association for the 
Advancement of Science has bemoaned the rampant ignorance surrounding anthropogenic 
effects on health and the environment and, in her presidential address, called upon fellow 
scientists to assist in conducting desperately needed research on human impacts on the 
environment. See Jane Lubchenco, Entering the Century of the Environment: A New Social 
Contract for Science, 279 SCIENCE 491, 495 (1998) (urging fellow scientists to contribute to “the 
urgent need for improved understanding, monitoring, and evaluation to protect, manage, and 
restore the environment”). 
 11. See Guidelines for Ecological Risk Assessment, 63 Fed. Reg. 26,846, 26,851 (May 14, 
1998) (presenting an expanded flowchart of the EPA’s ecological risk assessment framework 
that illustrates the simplistic state of environmental modeling). The EPA’s struggle to develop 
an environmental monitoring and assessment program highlights parallel problems that arise in 
scientists’ efforts to identify basic features of ecosystems, like indicators and endpoints, that can 
be used to understand the larger system. See NRC, ENVIRONMENTAL MONITORING AND 
ASSESSMENT PROGRAM, supra note 10, at 31 (questioning whether the monitoring program’s 
primary goal—to be able to detect a 20 percent change in a ten-year period—has any scientific 
or policy relevance). One of the National Academy of Sciences’ reports details the gaps in 
understanding for specific areas of environmental research, including research on the movement 
of contamination through soil, NRC, BUILDING A FOUNDATION, supra note 10, at 20, the effect 
of particulates on public health, id. at 22, balancing the risks in disinfecting drinking water, id. at 
44, climate change, id. at 24, the ozone hole, id. at 42, synergies between large-scale 
environmental problems, id. at 56, and coastal waters, id. at 38. 
 12. See K. H. Reckhow & S. C. Chapra, Modeling Excessive Nutrient Loading in the 
Environment, 100 ENVTL. POLLUTION 197, 206 (1999) (discussing problems in water quality 
modeling, much of which stem from inadequate data, and concluding that “it should not be 
surprising that theoretically based improvements in a model often cannot be supported with the 
limited available observational data”); see also NRC, ENVIRONMENTAL MONITORING AND 
ASSESSMENT PROGRAM, supra note 10, at 64 (expressing “very serious doubts” as to whether 
the EPA’s data collection system is “an appropriate solution to the long-term data and 
information processing requirements” for environmental assessments). 
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understanding of cancer, they have made only limited progress in 
determining how to assess, much less screen, hazardous substances 
for other harms, such as reproductive, neurological, hormonal, and 
developmental effects,13 or how to account for variability in human 
susceptibility.14 Regulators essentially cross their fingers and hope 
that current primitive carcinogenic assessments protect against these 
other harms, while toxicologists struggle to develop tests for 
amorphous changes in neurological and endocrine function.15 
 
 13. See infra notes 202–06 and accompanying text. Two of the largest barriers to assessing 
these types of risks are the lack of understanding of the mechanism of action for many of these 
effects, see, e.g., COMM. ON HORMONALLY ACTIVE AGENTS IN THE ENV’T, NAT’L RESEARCH 
COUNCIL, HORMONALLY ACTIVE AGENTS IN THE ENVIRONMENT (2000) (identifying great 
scientific unknowns for hormonally active agents, including mechanisms of action, and 
identifying several major areas for needed future research), and scientists’ continuing struggle to 
identify appropriate endpoints (specific types of harms or changes) to measure in experiments 
and studies, see, e.g., John Ashby et al., The Challenge Posed by Endocrine-disrupting 
Chemicals, 105 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 164, 165 (1997) (observing considerable confusion 
among scientists in defining an “endocrine disrupter,” a definition that is obviously an essential 
first step to identifying appropriate testing strategies). 
The EPA has promulgated guidelines for assessing neurotoxicity, Guidelines for 
Neurotoxicity Risk Assessment, 63 Fed. Reg. 26,926 (May 14, 1998), developmental toxicity, 
Guidelines for Developmental Toxicity Risk Assessment, 56 Fed. Reg. 63,798 (Dec. 5, 1991), 
and reproductive toxicity, Guidelines for Reproductive Toxicity Risk Assessment, 61 Fed. Reg. 
56,274 (Oct. 31, 1996), but even a nonscientist will quickly appreciate that these guidelines are 
only a starting point for assessing those harms. For example, after noting the preliminary nature 
of the guidance for neurotoxicity assessments, the EPA closes by noting the guidance’s basic 
assumptions and some of the more substantial areas in need of research: 
Research to improve the risk assessment process is needed in a number of areas. For 
example, research is needed to delineate the mechanisms of neurotoxicity and 
pathogenesis, . . . develop improved animal models to examine the neurotoxic effects 
of exposure during the premating and early postmating periods and in neonates, 
further evaluate the relationship between maternal and developmental toxicity, 
provide insight into the concept of threshold, develop approaches for improved 
mathematical modeling of neurotoxic effects, improve animal models for examining 
the effects of agents given by various routes of exposure, determine the effects of 
recurrent exposures over prolonged periods of time, and address the synergistic or 
antagonistic effects of mixed exposures and neurotoxic response. 
Guidelines for Neurotoxicity Risk Assessment, 63 Fed. Reg. at 26,950. The EPA is still 
struggling to develop tests for assessing endocrine disrupters. See ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 2000 
ENDOCRINE DISRUPTER SCREENING PROGRAM REPORT TO CONGRESS 1 (discussing the 
EPA’s continuing struggle to develop screening tests for endocrine disrupters), available at 
http://www.epa.gov/scipoly/oscpendo/docs/reporttocongress0800.pdf. 
 14. See NRC, BUILDING A FOUNDATION, supra note 10, at 28–29 (discussing the 
substantial variability in susceptibility and observing that “[u]sually there are no data on human 
variability in toxic response to regulated chemicals, and a one-size-fits-all default value is used 
instead”). 
 15. See ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 13, at 4 (noting that although some industrial 
chemicals and many pesticides “may have already undergone extensive toxicological testing, 
conventional toxicity tests may be inadequate to determine whether these substances interact 
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Even if scientists had a strong theoretical understanding of how 
hazardous substances impact health and the environment, available 
information is insufficient to apply these theories to assess ecosystem 
and human health.16 As of 1996, water quality testing had been 
conducted on only 19 percent of all water miles in the United States,17 
and only a fraction of this data was collected by reliable methods.18 
 
with specific components of the endocrine system and whether additional testing is needed for 
the EPA to assess and characterize more fully their impact on both human and ecological 
health”); Thomas O. McGarity, Politics by Other Means: Law, Science, and Policy in EPA’s 
Implementation of the Food Quality Protection Act, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 103, 142–43 (2001) 
(discussing how the EPA requires neurotoxicity testing only on a subset of pesticides because of 
the expense of these types of tests); infra notes 198–205 and accompanying text; cf. MARK R. 
POWELL, SCIENCE AT EPA: INFORMATION IN THE REGULATORY PROCESS 30 (1999) (reporting 
that “[a]ccording to a former senior EPA official, the pesticides program is the only regulatory 
area that routinely considers noncancer health effects”); Status of Administration’s Response to 
NAS Recommendations Released to NACA, Daily Env’t Rep. (BNA) No. 209, at A-8 (Nov. 1, 
1993) (reporting that a National Academy of Science committee found the EPA’s toxicity 
testing guidelines for pesticides inadequate in some areas, including with regard to assessing 
effects of pesticides on neonate and adolescent animals). 
 16. See NRC, BUILDING A FOUNDATION, supra note 10, at 34 (“While in the past the 
federal government has monitored human disease outbreaks and has collected data on the 
weather, stream flow, and tides as basic information needed for societal planning, no similar 
data collection effort has ever been implemented and funded to monitor the condition of the 
broader environment.”); see also id. at 25, 31 (discussing in concrete terms the drastic need for 
basic monitoring and citing other EPA and NRC studies similarly concluding that there is a 
need for better environmental monitoring). Insufficient data on basic features of environmental 
quality, in turn, prevent scientists from evaluating the accuracy of their theories and models and 
from developing new ones. 
 17. NAT’L ADVISORY COUNCIL FOR ENVTL. POLICY & TECH., REPORT OF THE FEDERAL 
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON THE TOTAL MAXIMUM DAILY LOAD (TMDL) PROGRAM 3 (1998) 
(citing the EPA’s Final National Water Quality Inventory Report to Congress for 1996), 
available at http://www.epa.gov/owow/tmdl/faca/facaall.pdf; see also ROBERT W. ADLER ET AL., 
THE CLEAN WATER ACT 20 YEARS LATER 33 (1993) (observing that the “[l]ack of federal 
leadership has resulted in the complete absence of monitoring in some states and in substantial 
variations in testing methods and closure standards” and noting that “[o]nly four states use 
EPA’s recommended testing method.”); U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFFICE, NATIONAL WATER 
QUALITY ASSESSMENT: GEOLOGICAL SURVEY FACES FORMIDABLE DATA MANAGEMENT 
CHALLENGES 1 (1993) (describing the difficulties of developing a national assessment because 
“efforts to collect, analyze, and store data are expensive and labor-intensive”); Katharine Q. 
Seelye, U.S. Report Faults Efforts to Track Water Pollution, N.Y. TIMES, May 27, 2003, at A1 
(reporting that an EPA inspector general harshly criticized the EPA for using a computer 
system that was “obsolete, full of faulty data and [did] not take into account thousands of 
significant pollution sources” needed to track and control water pollution). 
 18. See PUB. EMPLOYEES FOR ENVTL. RESPONSIBILITY, MURKY WATERS: OFFICIAL 
WATER QUALITY REPORTS ARE ALL WET (1999) (concluding in an executive summary that 
“an unfortunate mix of politics, bureaucratic inertia and bad science means that conflicting, 
erroneous and manipulated sets of water quality data containing little accurate information on 
the actual condition of the nation’s rivers and streams are routinely reported by States and 
dutifully compiled by EPA for presentation to Congress and the public”), available at 
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Air is monitored for eight general pollutants, but the remaining 189 
toxic air pollutants are rarely monitored regularly and in many areas, 
including industrial centers, have never been monitored at all.19 
Federal law requires testing of groundwater only as a condition for 
operating active municipal dumps or hazardous waste sites, or when 
groundwater is a source of public drinking water.20 Otherwise 
groundwater contamination is discovered purely by accident.21 Land is 
rarely sampled, even when it is routinely covered with pesticides, 
fertilizers and other wastes; generally, this sort of sampling occurs 
 
http://www.peer.org/execsum.html; Oliver A. Houck, TMDLs IV: The Final Frontier, 29 Envtl. 
L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,469, 10,475–76 (1999) (discussing the problem of inconsistent 
techniques in water quality monitoring and citing Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) and 
GAO studies that make these same observations). The National Research Council review of the 
EPA’s monitoring program provides some important guidelines (again based on the EPA’s own 
errors) on how to ensure that monitoring data is collected in a representative and helpful way. 
See NRC, ENVIRONMENTAL MONITORING AND ASSESSMENT PROGRAM, supra note 10, at 32–
35 (discussing the problems of summarizing the EPA data by regions). 
 19. See Lynn Blais et al., Enforcement Against Concentrations of Toxic Air Pollution in 
Texas: A Report to the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality and United States 
Environmental Protection Agency 12 (Aug. 5, 2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the 
Duke Law Journal) (“[C]urrent laws rarely require facilities to directly monitor the hazardous 
air pollutants that are emitted from their facility or to contribute resources to this important 
effort.”). The information picture is still more bleak if one is concerned with useable 
information. A considerable amount of the baseline data that have been collected as described 
above is not in electronic form and remains effectively inaccessible to all but the most 
determined analysts. Cf. U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFFICE, AIR POLLUTION: NATIONAL AIR 
MONITORING NETWORK IS INADEQUATE 2 (1989) (discussing impediments to implementing a 
national air monitoring network, including insufficient funding at national, state, and local 
levels). 
 20. See 42 U.S.C. § 300g-7 (2000) (laying out general requirements for monitoring public 
drinking water under the Safe Drinking Water Act; to the extent the source of drinking water is 
groundwater, the required monitoring thus provides some information on the quality of that 
groundwater); 42 U.S.C. § 6924(p) (2000) (generally requiring groundwater monitoring for 
operation of treatment, storage, and disposal units under the Resource Conservation and 
Recovery Act (RCRA)); Solid Waste Disposal Facility Criteria, 56 Fed. Reg. 50,978, 51,009 
(Oct. 9, 1991) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 257–58) (requiring regular groundwater 
monitoring for active solid waste landfills by 1996). 
 21. See, e.g., JONATHAN HARR, A CIVIL ACTION (1995) (recounting a neighborhood 
group’s discovery of contaminated groundwater in their effort to understand the cause of an 
unusually high number of leukemia cases in neighborhood children). In Austin, for example, the 
unexplained decline of an endangered salamander in Barton Springs, which has historically also 
been used as a spring-fed, municipal swimming pool, led to water quality testing of the pool 
sediments, which then led to the discovery of contaminated subsurface waters suspected to enter 
the public pool from land contamination. See Kevin Carmody, City Didn’t Provide All Data 
Needed to Assess Pool Risks, AUSTIN AM. STATESMAN, Feb. 4, 2003, at A1 (reporting that an 
inquiry began when a city biologist got a rash after being immersed in Barton Springs while 
looking for sick salamanders). 
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only when there is a suspected hazardous waste disposal site.22 As of 
1984, no toxicity testing existed for more than 38,000, or eighty 
percent, of all toxic substances used in commerce.23 As of 1998, at 
least one third of the toxic chemicals produced in the highest volumes 
failed to satisfy minimal testing standards recommended by an 
international expert commission.24 Of course, it is naive to expect 
comprehensive information, but existing information falls far short of 
what one would reasonably expect, even after factoring in the costs of 
producing it. 
So, what accounts for this pervasive commons ignorance in the 
United States? The complexity of the systems is an important 
 
 22. The EPA will typically conduct or require soil sampling if cleanup is needed at an 
active hazardous waste disposal facility, 42 U.S.C. § 6924(u)–(v) (2000), or sometimes when the 
site has been reported to the National Response Center under the Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) reporting provision, 42 
U.S.C. §§ 9603 and 9604 (2000). State laws might require the sampling as a condition to land 
transfer, although concern about CERLCA liability produces strong incentives for voluntary 
sampling by purchasers of land suspected of containing significant hazardous waste 
contamination. See Brownfields Revitalization and Environmental Restoration Act of 2001, 
Pub. L. No. 107-118, § 223, 115 Stat. 2360, 2372–74 (2002) (amending 42 U.S.C. § 9601) 
(providing immunity from Superfund liability for “innocent landowners” who make “all 
appropriate inquiries” into potential contamination at a site). At the same time, Superfund 
liability may cause current owners who suspect high levels of contamination to retain the land 
and remain ignorant of possible contamination in the hopes that the problem will not be 
discovered. 
 23. Considerably more baseline toxicity information is available on other potentially toxic 
substances such as drugs, food additives, and pesticides, although data gaps remain even for 
these much more heavily regulated substances. NRC, TOXICITY TESTING, supra note 10, at 118. 
Particularly significant data gaps exist for products in existence prior to passage of these 
regulatory statutes (products that were “grandfathered” into the much more rigorous licensing 
schemes). Thus, there remains a dearth of baseline toxicity data for pesticides in use prior to 
1976. As of the NRC’s report in 1984, for example, there was still no toxicity information 
available for 38 percent of available pesticides, and toxicity testing was complete for only 10 
percent of the universe of pesticide products. Id. 
 24. The one-third estimate is the lowest estimate produced in three separate efforts to 
estimate the percentage of untested chemicals. This low estimate was produced by a trade 
association, the Chemical Manufacturers Association. See ENVTL. DEFENSE FUND, TOXIC 
IGNORANCE 15 (1997) (concluding that 71 percent of the high production volume chemicals in 
commerce did not have toxicity data available in the major databases that met the minimum 
data requirements set by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD)); Office of Pollution Prevention & Toxics, Envtl. Prot. Agency, What Do We Really 
Know About the Safety of High Production Volume Chemicals?, 22 Chem. Reg. Rep. (BNA) 
261 (May 1, 1998) (concluding that basic safety information is unavailable for roughly half of the 
chemicals produced in the highest amounts); CMA More Optimistic than EDF On Lack of Data 
for 100 Chemicals, Daily Env’t Rep. (BNA) No. 230, at A-4 (Dec. 1, 1997) (reporting that thirty-
three out of one hundred of the Chemical Manufacturer Association’s chemical samples had 
insufficient screening data). 
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impediment to producing better information.25 But this is not the 
whole explanation. Research in other fields is also complex, and yet 
discoveries in health care and technology greatly outpace the minimal 
advancements in assessing man’s impact on health and the 
environment.26 
Much of the blame belongs to industry’s rational and vigorous 
resistance to producing information about the damage that it may 
cause to the commons. In other areas of scientific inquiry, private 
actors contribute substantially to advancements in public knowledge 
because the research promises to provide simultaneous private 
gains.27 No equivalent benefit attaches to research on the adverse 
effects of human activities on health or the environment. Rather than 
presenting the opportunity for private profit, these questions pose the 
opposite equation for private actors generating externalities.28 These 
actors vastly prefer ignorance over research because most 
documentation of externalities will ultimately affect them negatively.29 
 
 25. See, e.g., NRC, BUILDING A FOUNDATION, supra note 10, at 6–10 (discussing the vast 
complexity of studying natural systems). 
 26. Federal spending on medical sciences, through the National Institutes of Health, 
increased 33 percent from 1993 to 1999, reaching a total almost thirty times the research budget 
of the EPA. BD. ON SCI., TECH., AND ECON. POLICY, NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, TRENDS IN 
FEDERAL SUPPORT OF RESEARCH AND GRADUATE EDUCATION 122–23 tbl.B-1 (2001) 
[hereinafter NRC, TRENDS IN FEDERAL SUPPORT] (NIH’s budget in 1999 was about $13 billion; 
the EPA’s was about $500 million). In terms of end products, contrast also the rapid 
developments in genetics (including cloning), aerospace, and computer technologies with the 
developments in ecological modeling and basic toxicity testing discussed above. 
 27. See id. at 4 (noting that “data show that corporations’ spending on research has been 
increasing but is concentrated in a few sectors such as the pharmaceutical industry and the 
information technology sector,” and observing that within this funding “only a small fraction . . . 
is basic research”). In fact, the private sector’s increasing reliance on academic researchers has 
created a crisis in diverting the resources for basic science towards the advancement of 
technological innovations that can produce a profit. See Eyal Press & Jennifer Washburn, The 
Kept University, in AAAS SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY YEARBOOK 293 (Albert H. 
Teich et al. eds., 2001) (commenting that a major concern is that “as university-industry ties 
grow more intimate, less commercially oriented areas of science will languish”), available at 
http://www.aaas.org/spp/rd/ch26.pdf. 
 28. See infra Parts I–III. Amazingly, however, this simple strategic incentive for ignorance 
has generally been missed in both economic and legal scholarship on the regulation of 
externalities. See infra Part IV.A. For example, in surveying the justifications for introducing 
regulation to correct problems of inadequate information, Justice (then Professor) Breyer 
provides four separate rationales, none of which consider the perverse incentives for ignorance 
that attach to externalities. Instead, he focuses on public good problems and the costs associated 
with individual policing of fraud. See STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 26–28 
(1982). 
 29. See infra Part I.A.1. 
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Thus, rather than contribute to enlightenment, actors seem more 
willing to contribute to, and even invest in, the perpetuation of 
ignorance.30 
Although it is rarely noticed, ignorance regarding the harm that 
private actors are causing health and the environment is just another 
external cost of their activities that they are able to pass on to 
society.31 The common law courts have sometimes appreciated this, 
requiring actors to disprove that they caused harm when they are best 
situated to know how their activities might affect others.32 Similarly, 
externality theory supports requiring actors to internalize the costs of 
researching an externality, because these costs are imposed on society 
by the actor’s conduct.33 As long as there are predictable, nonobvious 
 
 30. It can be argued that the public should not bear any of the burden of financing 
assessments of the harm caused by private activities; rather, actors should be required to fund 
this research themselves. Nevertheless, there is general recognition that government testing will 
be needed to fill in the gaps. Ironically, though, the federal government dedicates more than 
nine times the funding to the medical sciences, a field in which the private sector is already 
contributing a great deal of resources, than to environmental biology, where there is no 
indication that the private sector contributes in any meaningful way. NRC, TRENDS IN 
FEDERAL SUPPORT, supra note 26, at 129 tbl.C-2. The computer sciences, another industry 
enjoying an influx of significant private research and development funding, enjoys twice the 
federal funding of environmental biology. Id.; see also id. at 144–45 tbls. F-1, F-3 (providing 
tables of nonfederal and corporate spending). 
 31. In the economics literature, externalities are broadly defined as those activities in which 
an actor does not “bear all of the consequences of his or her action.” TOM TIETENBERG, 
ENVIRONMENTAL AND NATURAL RESOURCE ECONOMICS 45 (2d ed. 1988); see also Mary L. 
Lyndon, Information Economics and Chemical Toxicity: Designing Laws to Produce and Use 
Data, 87 MICH. L. REV. 1795, 1799 (1989) (recommending that “public research costs” of testing 
hazardous chemicals should be linked to their “private economic origins”). 
 32. See generally Fleming James, Jr., Burdens of Proof, 47 VA. L. REV. 51, 66 (1961) 
(arguing that “[a]ccess to evidence is often the basis for creating [such] a presumption” on 
grounds of convenience, fairness, and public policy). Specifically, common law courts shift the 
burden of proving negligence under the res ipsa loquitur doctrine, in part when defendants have 
superior information regarding their conduct. Stephen A. Spitz, From Res Ipsa Loquitur to 
Diethylstilbestrol: The Unidentifiable Tortfeasor in California, 65 IND. L.J. 591, 599 (1990). 
Courts also shift the burden of proof to disprove specific causation to defendants under limited 
circumstances, based again in part on their superior access to information. See, e.g., Summers v. 
Tice, 199 P.2d 1, 4 (Cal. 1948) (shifting the burden to the defendant hunters to disprove 
causation of harm to the plaintiff’s eye, in part because the defendants enjoyed information over 
the cause of the injury). Finally, courts shift the burden of proof for both causation and 
negligence to a defendant when the defendant has negligently or intentionally destroyed 
medical records or other evidence central to a plaintiff’s case. See, e.g., Sweet v. Sisters of 
Providence, 895 P.2d 484, 491–92 (Alaska 1995). 
 33. Although theorists appear not to have identified separate categories of externality-
related social costs, one can imagine at least three separate categories of social costs that arise 
sequentially from an action that creates an externality. First are the costs and related harms of 
identifying and measuring the externality (costs most theorists ignore by assuming perfect 
WAGNER FINAL.DOC 2/9/2005 11:06 AM 
2004] COMMONS IGNORANCE 1633 
harms that flow from an activity, it is the actors’ duty to investigate 
and disclose these harms before taking action. Otherwise, the 
externatility and the ignorance surrounding it will be self-
perpetuating. 
This Part explores, at a preliminary level, the reasons why actors 
who produce significant amounts of pollution or potentially 
dangerous products are unlikely to assist in documenting the adverse 
effects of their activities. In many cases, the disincentives created by 
the marketplace and tort law may cause actors to be content simply to 
avoid documenting the harm. In a more limited set of cases, however, 
it might be in an actor’s financial interest to actively discredit and 
obfuscate damaging information. Thus, even when the public is 
willing to subsidize research on the harms that various externalities 
impose on society, the research may be subject to unwarranted 
challenge. Public research becomes both more expensive and less 
fruitful when powerful actors profit from ignorance. 
A. Actors Will Generally Resist Documenting the Adverse 
Consequences of Their Activities and Products 
Actors do not generally welcome information about the adverse 
effects of their activities and products on public health and the 
 
information). Second are the damages to society resulting from the externality. Third are the 
costs needed for society to engage in collective action to address the problem, often referred to 
as “administrative” costs. Each of these three categories of costs results from the externality. 
Society would not incur any of them if the externality did not exist. To internalize the costs of an 
activity in a pure sense, one would need to add these three categories of costs up, subtract any 
positive spillovers that an activity might produce, and require actors to internalize the 
remainder. 
In considering what actors should internalize, however, both academics and regulators 
traditionally focus only on the second category of costs that flow from an externality. Cf. 
Richard O. Zerbe Jr. & Howard McCurdy, The End of Market Failure, REG., Summer 2000, at 
10, 13 (arguing implicitly that the transaction costs involved in responding to externalities—
when the social benefits are less than the social costs of a polluting activity—are a collective 
responsibility and should not also be assigned to the actor engaged in the externality). Yet in 
ignoring the other two categories, especially the first, one misses a large set of external costs. As 
long as rational actors pay for the reasonable radius of external costs that they impose on 
society, including the costs of developing information, they will identify the socially optimal type 
and level of activity to undertake. Assigning the costs of information production to actors gives 
them a more complete accounting of the harm that their activity causes and improves their 
decisionmaking in this regard. See, e.g., John S. Applegate, The Perils of Unreasonable Risk: 
Information, Regulatory Policy, and Toxic Substances Control, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 261, 317 
(1991) (“Indeed, one justification given for data call-ins [a regulatory demand for more testing 
of pesticides and chemical substances] is that owners of marginally useful registrations will 
discontinue the product rather than pay for expensive research.”). 
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environment. Economic theory reinforces this simple intuition: it 
suggests that producing new information will be optimal only if its 
expected value is greater than the costs of its production.34 For actors 
whose activities or products create externalities, conducting research 
on potential harms is not only costly but may yield bad news.35 
1. Reasons to Remain Ignorant about Negative Externalities. In 
Professor Mary Lyndon’s classic article about the lack of safety 
research on toxic products, she details the ways in which the market 
discourages manufacturers from conducting research on the long-
term safety of potentially toxic products.36 Professor Lyndon’s 
analysis reveals that the market penalizes, rather than rewards, actors 
who document the negative effects of their products when the effects 
are neither obvious nor visible and immediate.37 Although Professor 
Lyndon focuses on the disincentives for manufacturers to research 
long-term product safety, her analysis applies even more forcefully to 
actors who discharge pollution, whose responsibility for downstream 
effects is even more difficult to discern. 
According to Professor Lyndon, there are at least three reasons 
that actors will not find it in their interest to document the potential 
harm from their products or polluting activities.38 First, the out-of-
pocket (direct) costs associated with conducting safety research are 
 
 34. See Steven Shavell, Liability and the Incentive to Obtain Information About Risk, 21 J. 
LEGAL. STUD. 259, 263 (1992). 
 35. Mass toxic tort cases provide the most dramatic illustration of when companies learn 
this lesson the hard way. In several cases, corporations voluntarily undertook safety research, 
only to have that research produce bad news. Rather than recall the products and risk liability, 
however, the corporations decided to conceal adverse testing. See, e.g., Tetuan v. A.H. Robins 
Co., 738 P.2d 1210, 1240 (Kan. 1987) (awarding punitive damages based on corporate 
misconduct, including evidence that A.H. Robins “commissioned studies on the Dalkon Shield 
which it dropped or concealed when the results were unfavorable” and “consigned hundreds of 
documents to the furnace”); PAUL BRODEUR, OUTRAGEOUS MISCONDUCT: THE ASBESTOS 
INDUSTRY ON TRIAL 145 (1985) (chronicling a number of concealment efforts by the asbestos 
industry, including executive decisions to develop “a corporate policy of not informing sick 
employees of the precise nature of their health problems for fear of workmen’s-compensation 
claims and lawsuits”); PHILIP J. HILTS, SMOKESCREEN: THE TRUTH BEHIND THE TOBACCO 
INDUSTRY COVER-UP 10–11, 20–22, 23–41, 129 (1996) (documenting, in an early exposé, the 
tobacco industry’s concealment of adverse, in-house health studies). 
 36. See Lyndon, supra note 31, at 1813–17 (“Ignorance will tend to prevail.”). 
 37. See id. at 1813 (“As long as no way exists for buyers to identify the toxic effects of 
specific chemicals, there is no commercial incentive for chemical producers to identify and 
publicize them. Sellers will not willingly reveal negative characteristics of their products.” 
(citations omitted)). 
 38. Id. at 1810–17. 
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not only expensive but also may not produce definitive results. 
Indeed, even after protracted testing, the results generally cannot 
completely exonerate a product or activity, nor do they enable the 
manufacturer to quantify risks in a definitive way.39 Given the lack of 
inexpensive screening tests, actors will rarely be able to obtain 
information about the harms created by their product or activity at 
low cost.40 Thus, financial realities and lack of research efficacy 
combine to explain why long-term safety testing is generally not an 
attractive investment for actors. 
Second, virtually no market benefits accrue to actors who 
produce research on the long-term safety of products or activities. 
Professor Lyndon demonstrates that when safety representations 
cannot be easily validated or compared, consumers are unlikely to 
make purchasing or investment decisions based upon a 
manufacturer’s self-serving statements about safety.41 Moreover, 
given that the results are rarely determinative, even thorough safety 
research will seldom provide a clear market signal of “safety.”42 Even 
if research results were definitive and comparable between different 
products and activities, advertising that a product or activity did not 
cause cancer in animals might not impress consumers or be received 
positively in the marketplace. 
 
 39. The most extreme example is the cost of safety and efficacy testing for drugs under the 
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. Testing a single drug was estimated to cost $231 million in the 
early 1990s. Veronica Henry, Problems with Pharmaceutical Regulation in the United States: 
Drug Lag and Orphan Drugs, 14 J. LEGAL MED. 617, 617 (1993). At the same time, a recent 
study reports that 20 percent of all new drugs are found to have serious or life-threatening 
adverse effects within the first twenty-five years of use that were either unknown or undisclosed 
at the time of drug approval. Karen E. Lasser et al., Timing of New Black Box Warnings and 
Withdrawals for Prescription Medications, 287 JAMA 2215, 2216 (2002). 
 40. In critiquing tort reform proposals designed to incentivize greater safety testing, 
Professor Pierce emphasizes false positives resulting from early screening tests and expresses 
the concern that “there is no finite limit on the amount of testing that can enhance our 
understanding of the potential risks that are posed by a substance.” Richard J. Pierce, Jr., 
Causation in Government Regulation and Toxic Torts, 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 1307, 1324–25 (1998). 
 41. See Lyndon, supra note 31, at 1816 (discussing how information on chemical safety 
produced voluntarily by manufacturers might be discounted because of its commercial context); 
see also id. at 1813–14 (“Comprehensive and accessible toxicity rating systems would support 
affirmative advertising, but without a developed information context, there is no incentive to 
study a chemical: the long-term health effects remain invisible for one’s own products and for 
those of one’s competitors.”); John Leland, Is Organic Shampoo Chemistry or Botany?, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 18, 2003, at 9-1 (discussing the enormous variability in products that use the 
“organic” label and the lack of federal oversight to ensure uniformity in labeling for 
consumers). 
 42. See supra note 39. 
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Third, for toxicity and safety testing, there are few guarantees 
about what the testing will reveal.43 Any possible good news, 
moreover, is always tempered by looming uncertainties. Most 
screening tests produce false positives by design.44 Yet even when “no 
effect” is observed in a toxicity study, the testing cannot ensure that 
the product is safe—only that it did not cause a few types of adverse 
effects (e.g., cancer) in one exposure setting (e.g., ingestion by rats).45 
On the other hand, a bad result is almost always definitive in the 
following sense: When a substance does cause cancer in laboratory 
animals, uncertainty about how those results could or should be 
extrapolated to humans does not materially diminish the impact of 
the adverse result.46 The best that can be said is that bad news 
encourages more testing to refine and improve the outlook for the 
product or activity.47 
Beyond the lack of market incentives for developing information 
on externalities, actors also have legitimate concerns about increased 
 
 43. One of the most recent surprises is research by a Berkeley biologist who discovered 
that low levels of atrazine, a widely used herbicide, are associated with a statistically significant 
increase in the percentage of hermaphroditic frogs. Tyrone B. Hayes et al., Hermaphroditic, 
Demasculinized Frogs After Exposure to the Herbicide Atrazine at Low Ecologically Relevant 
Doses, 99 PROC. NATL. ACAD. SCIENCE 5476, 5476 (2002). This discovery led the manufacturer 
of atrazine to contest the use of the findings in the risk assessment for the herbicide, see Center 
for Regulatory Effectiveness et al., Request for Correction of Information Contained in the 
Atrazine Environmental Risk Assessment, Docket No. OPP-34237A (Nov. 25, 2002) 
[hereinafter Center for Regulatory Effectiveness, Request for Correction], available at 
http://www.thecre.com/pdf/petition-atrazine2B.pdf, and to fund other scientists to conduct 
reanalyses of the study, see James A. Carr et al., Response of Larval Xenopus Laevis to 
Atrazine: Assessment of Growth, Metamorphosis, and Gonadal and Laryngeal Morphology, 22 
ENVTL. TOX. & CHEM. 396, 404 (2003) (acknowledging that the authors are funded by atrazine’s 
manufacturer, Syngenta). See also NRC, BUILDING A FOUNDATION, supra note 10, at 10 
(discussing the inevitability of surprises in environmental research as a “consequence of the 
complexity of environmental systems” and underscoring the need to limit these surprises with 
additional research). 
 44. See Pierce, supra note 40, at 1323–24 (discussing the combined false positive rate of the 
simple Salmonella assay and the rodent carcinogenicity test). 
 45. See supra note 13 (discussing the limited endpoints capable of being studied in toxicity 
testing). 
 46. See David Roe, Toxic Chemical Control Policy: Three Unabsorbed Facts, 32 Envtl. L. 
Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,232, 10,232 (2002) (using empirical evidence to argue that the 
additional disclosures required by Proposition 65 in California, which requires industries to 
disclose chemicals in their products and polluting activities that cause cancer in animals, led 
California industries to reduce these carcinogens significantly relative to the rest of the country). 
 47. Although actors can attempt to secret away bad news to prevent its dissemination (in 
other words, disseminate only the good and hide the bad), history suggests that “this strategy is 
risky.” See supra note 35 (listing some case studies that surfaced through toxic tort litigation). 
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tort liability that could result from producing incriminating 
information about the harms caused by their products or activities. 
Common law tort liability is generally imposed only after injured 
parties prove that the defendant’s activity caused their harm.48 
Producing and publicizing internal research on such harms is, 
therefore, a risky proposition. Once plaintiffs’ attorneys seize on a 
firm’s internal research suggesting that harm may result from the 
firm’s products or activities, catastrophic liability may follow.49 Under 
such information-triggered common law regimes, actors benefit from 
knowing nothing, in part because it deprives plaintiffs of the evidence 
that they need to bring their case.50 
That remaining ignorant about the impact of their products and 
activities is an effective strategy is evident in practice. Industries do 
not volunteer information on the long-term safety of their products 
and activities, and they lobby against laws requiring them to share 
even basic internal information.51 The dearth of information available 
 
 48. See PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 41, at 270 (W. Page Keeton et al. 
eds., 5th ed. 1984) (discussing that, when proving causation, a “plaintiff must introduce evidence 
which affords a reasonable basis for the conclusion that it is more likely than not that the 
conduct of the defendant was a cause in fact of the result”). 
 49. See, e.g., Robert F. Blomquist, Emerging Themes and Dilemmas in American Toxic 
Tort Law, 1988-91: A Legal-Historical and Philosophical Exegesis, 18 S. ILL. U. L.J. 1, 43 (1993) 
(noting that one of a toxic tort plaintiff’s obstacles was “inadequate toxicological 
information . . . and the enormous expense of trying to gather whatever information or expertise 
is available”); Frank J. Macchiarola, The Manville Personal Injury Settlement Trust: Lessons for 
the Future, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 583, 583–84 (1996) (describing the Manville Trust, established 
as a result of Johns-Manville Corporation’s bankruptcy, which was caused by asbestos liability); 
Francine Schwadel, Robins and Plaintiffs Face Uncertain Future, WALL ST. J., Aug. 23, 1985, at 
1-4 (reporting that Robins filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy because of plaintiffs’ claims in 
Dalkon Shield litigation). 
 50. See Margaret A. Berger, Eliminating General Causation: Notes Towards a New Theory 
of Justice and Toxic Torts, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2117, 2135–40 (1997) (arguing that the current 
common law causation standard provides perverse incentives for defendants to remain 
ignorant); Heidi Li Feldman, Science and Uncertainty in Mass Exposure Litigation, 74 TEX. L. 
REV. 1, 41 (1995) (arguing that underdeterrence will occur under current toxic tort liability rules 
because “placing the burden of proof on the plaintiff creates a perverse incentive for actors to 
foster strong uncertainty about general causation”); Wendy E. Wagner, Choosing Ignorance in 
the Manufacture of Toxic Products, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 773, 796 (1997) (“The common law 
requirement that plaintiffs assume the entire burden of proving causation in toxic tort cases . . . 
creates inappropriate incentives for long-term safety research . . . .”); see also Pierce, supra note 
40, at 1308–10 (agreeing that the common law requirements present a problem but disagreeing 
with the Berger and Wagner proposals for reform). 
 51. See Addition of Reporting Elements; Toxic Chemical Release Reporting; Community 
Right-To-Know, 61 Fed. Reg. 51,322, 51,326 (Oct. 1, 1996) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 372) 
(recounting and responding to industry’s objections to an addition to the toxic release inventory 
requiring an accounting of materials to the toxic release inventory); Roe, supra note 46, at 
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on environmental quality, waste streams, and the safety of products 
speaks volumes about the disincentives to producing this 
information.52 But case studies reveal that ignorance is not merely a 
byproduct of a market system that fails to offer incentives to provide 
this information; ignorance actually represents a willful, strategic 
choice. Makers of the Dalkon Shield,53 high-absorbency tampons,54 
 
10,234 (discussing industries’ consistent opposition to Proposition 65 (a California law requiring 
additional toxicity labeling on products)); Sidney M. Wolf, Fear and Loathing About the Public 
Right to Know: The Surprising Success of the Emergency Planning and Community Right-To-
Know Act, 11 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 217, 220 (1996) (discussing strong industry opposition 
to passage of Environmental Planning and Community Right-To-Know Act (EPCRA)). Some 
of the opposition is based on trade secret concerns, although this does not explain all of  
the opposition. 
 52. See supra notes 10–24 and accompanying text. 
 53. A.H. Robins Company manufactured the Dalkon Shield, an intrauterine birth control 
device (IUD), and its own corporate scientists bemoaned the inadequate state of the company’s 
safety testing on the IUD. See MORTON MINTZ, AT ANY COST: CORPORATE GREED, WOMEN, 
AND THE DALKON SHIELD 123 (1985) (quoting a memo by Dr. Robert Murphey, the director of 
scientific development and international research for the company, stating that “we possess 
inadequate support data from animal studies as to long-term safety of the current Dalkon 
Shield”); id. at 133 (quoting a memo of Dr. Oscar Klioze, the director of pharmaceutical 
research and analytical services, warning that the string on Dalkon Shield “has not been 
subjected to any formal stability testing”); id. at 134 (quoting a memo by Kenneth Moore, 
Dalkon Shield Project Coordinator, warning that “[c]onsidering that we have been marketing 
the device for going on three years . . . it is about time that data are collected on the effect of the 
uterine environment”); see also Hilliard v. A.H. Robins Co., 196 Cal. Rptr. 117, 132 n.21 (Ct. 
App. 1983) (observing that “plaintiff presented substantial evidence of a conscious decision by 
defendant Robins not to test the IUD device prior to or during marketing”). See generally 
SHELDON ENGELMAYER & ROBERT WAGMAN, LORD’S JUSTICE 28, 36–38 (1985) (describing 
the inadequate safety testing of the Dalkon Shield); MINTZ, supra, at 131–48 (describing the 
considerable amount of information that Robins ignored when it delayed and avoided safety 
testing of the string on the Dalkon Shield). 
 54. In 1980, when the Center for Disease Control (CDC) became aware of a virtual 
epidemic of Toxic Shock Syndrome (TSS) among women, it conducted an epidemiology study 
that correlated the disease with the recent use of tampons. West v. Johnson & Johnson Prods., 
Inc., 220 Cal. Rptr. 437, 442–43 (Ct. App. 1985). The CDC then requested safety research from 
tampon manufacturers but received almost no information. Id. at 443. As a result of the 
considerable scientific uncertainty, CDC conducted a second study and within three to four 
weeks had isolated the cause of TSS as a potentially fatal bacteria present in a small percentage 
of women that thrived as a result of tampon use. Id. Evidence later adduced by the plaintiffs 
revealed that, between 1975 and 1980, one of the tampon manufacturers (Johnson & Johnson) 
had received 150 complaints “of a more serious nature” resulting from tampon use. Id. at 445. 
The court found that “[u]p to the time of trial, [Johnson & Johnson] had conducted no studies 
to ascertain whether use of a tampon was in any way related to vaginal infection.” Id. Similarly, 
see O’Gilvie v. International Playtex, Inc., 821 F.2d 1438, 1446 (10th Cir. 1987), finding that 
Playtex disregarded studies demonstrating a connection between highly absorbent tampons  
and TSS. 
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Bendectin,55 DES,56 breast implants,57 and tobacco58 all dug in their 
heels and resisted conducting safety research on their products, even 
when preliminary study indicated that the products harmed the 
public. Although these manufacturers, thanks in large part to public 
research on their products, were ultimately held at least partly 
accountable for the harms that they created, their strategy of resisting 
research enjoyed a long period of success and remains a popular 
approach.59 Remaining ignorant about the potential harms caused by 
one’s products and activities increases the likelihood that the actor 
can avoid tort suits and stay out of the range of plaintiffs’ attorneys’ 
radar. 
 
 55. Merrell Dow, the manufacturer of Bendectin, conducted only a minimal amount of 
safety studies on Bendectin, all of which were done after marketing the product. See Joseph 
Sanders, The Bendectin Litigation: A Case Study in the Life Cycle of Mass Torts, 43 HASTINGS 
L.J. 301, 321 (“[T]he compound had not undergone substantial testing when introduced.”). The 
absence of adequate safety testing led to early liability of Merrell Dow, although later evidence 
exonerated the manufacturer because it revealed a low to zero probability that Bendectin 
actually caused birth defects. See MICHAEL D. GREEN, BENDECTIN AND BIRTH DEFECTS: THE 
CHALLENGES OF MASS TOXIC SUBSTANCES LITIGATION 329 (1996) (“The best that we can say 
[with the benefit of the science available up until the mid-1990s] is that if Bendectin causes any 
birth defects, it does so extremely infrequently.”). 
 56. For example, in Bichler v. Eli Lilly & Co., 436 N.E.2d 182 (N.Y. 1982), at trial “[t]he 
jury determined that Lilly and other DES manufacturers wrongfully marketed the drug for use 
in preventing miscarriage without first performing laboratory tests upon pregnant mice” and 
that these tests would have alerted the manufacturers that “DES was capable of causing 
cancer.” Id. at 185; see also id. at 189 (discussing Lilly’s partial admissions regarding 
foreseeability of cancer resulting from DES). 
 57. Breast implants were not safety tested until the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) 
repeatedly insisted on added testing as a condition to marketing. The research finally filed with 
the FDA in 1991 was sorely inadequate. The leader of the FDA’s Breast Prosthesis PMA Task 
Force reported that Dow’s clinical studies were: 
“[S]o weak that they cannot provide a reasonable assurance of the safety and 
effectiveness of these devices” because they provide “no assurance that the full range 
of complications are included, no dependable measure of the incidence of 
complications, no reliable measure of the revision rate, and no quantitative measure 
of patient benefit.” 
STAFF OF HOUSE SUBCOMM. ON HUMAN RES. AND INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, 
COMM. ON GOV’T OPERATIONS, 102D CONG., THE FDA’S REGULATION OF SILICONE BREAST 
IMPLANTS 27 (Comm. Print 1993) (quoting the FDA report). 
 58. See HILTS, supra note 35, at 10–11, 20–22, 23–41, 129 (describing the concealment of 
adverse health studies conducted by the tobacco industry). 
 59. See James A. Henderson, Jr., Product Liability and the Passage of Time: The 
Imprisonment of Corporate Rationality, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 765, 779 (1983) (observing that in 
terms of making safety improvements in an existing product, frequently “the safest course in the 
short run . . . is to admit nothing, alter course as little as possible, and offer to settle with no 
one”). 
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2. Reasons Not to Produce Information That Becomes a Public 
Good. The tort system, which creates disincentives for actors to 
develop information on the externalities resulting from their products 
and activities, combined with the lack of any significant market 
incentives for producing such information provides sufficient 
explanation for the dearth of voluntary testing on externalities. In 
addition, whatever positive incentives may exist are mitigated 
because the information—once produced and publicized—becomes a 
public good. Thus actors producing useful information, unless it 
pertains exclusively to them, will be unable to capture its full benefit.60 
Any good news that safety testing may yield is of little value to a 
manufacturer unless it is publicized. But once publicized, competitors 
can capitalize on the information without bearing any of the costs of 
producing it.61 Although theoretically actors will produce information 
on the harm resulting from their activities if the benefits outweigh the 
costs, when the information is also useful to competitors, the resulting 
reduction in benefit will be added to the tally in determining whether 
the information is worth the investment. For example, investments in 
research on improving screening methods for detecting neurological 
harms from exposure to toxic products not only helps the investing 
actor assess the harm caused by its activities, but can be used by 
others. Thus, if private actors develop enhanced capabilities for 
 
 60. See generally JACK HIRSHLEIFER & JOHN G. RILEY, THE ANALYTICS OF 
UNCERTAINTY AND INFORMATION 259–94 (1992) (dedicating a chapter to exploring the tension 
between information as a public good and incentives that encourage actors to invest in the 
production of information). Thus, positive spillovers, an opposite sort of market failure 
problem, can also arise in understanding and characterizing externalities. In close cases, the 
extent to which the information will reveal negative and/or positive spillovers may be difficult to 
anticipate. The only thing that can be sure from the production of information is that the 
information will produce some spillover effects—positive or negative—that discourage its 
production. 
 61. The public good problem accompanying scientific and technological discoveries 
provides the economic basis for justifying patents, copyrights, and trade secret protections. In 
these cases, the researcher is developing information that must remain private, thus “allowing 
the researcher to improve his situation relative to uninformed parties.” Id. at 258. By contrast, 
disseminating privately produced information on air or water quality or even methods for 
testing harms would seem to rarely, if ever, provide advantages to competitors. In this way, the 
“public good” aspects do not necessarily detract from the actors’ original incentives for 
obtaining the information: the information is not less valuable to the original researcher once it 
has been disseminated. Rather, the public good features simply underscore the reality that 
actors have produced a good for which they are not capturing full economic benefits. The 
pesticide laws attempt to mitigate this problem by requiring competitors to share the costs of 
mandatorily produced health and safety data incurred by one company when such data are also 
relevant to the safety of the competitors’ products. See infra note 393. 
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detecting these harms, they help produce a public good for which they 
will not be compensated adequately. 
B. Actors Will Generally Resist Disseminating Information about the 
Adverse Effects of Their Activities and Products 
If actors believe that information about their activities has a 
negative value, they might not only resist producing this information, 
but also may make it more difficult for third parties to produce it. 
Indeed, the extent to which actors will actively impede the public 
production of information can be predicted using essentially the 
reverse of the economic formula for the production of information. 
Actors will invest as much in obstructing research as they expect to 
lose if the information is made publicly available.62 Moreover, to the 
extent that actors enjoy superior access to or control over information 
essential to assess externalities, they may be able to increase the costs 
of third-party research simply by preventing access to key 
information. If actors believe that they have much to lose from public 
enlightenment about externalities—particularly, for example, if there 
is a potential for mass liability—they might even take affirmative 
steps to discredit or counter the claims made by third parties. Even if 
these efforts ultimately fail, the actors benefit by postponing the 
ultimate “day of reckoning”—sometimes indefinitely. 
1. Actors Often Enjoy Superior Information about the Suspected 
Harms Caused by Their Activities, and They Sometimes Conceal This 
Information. Actors who create externalities affecting public health 
and the environment often enjoy private or superior information 
about their externalities.63 These actors, with mountains of detailed 
 
 62. Cf. Shavell, supra note 34, at 263 (“It is socially optimal to acquire information when 
[the value of the information exceeds the cost of acquiring that information].”). 
 63. Although the economics literature is incomplete, see infra notes 366–71 and 
accompanying text, economists do acknowledge firms’ informational advantages with respect to 
determining the costs of abatement and with respect to private knowledge of compliance. See, 
e.g., Claus Huber & Franz Wirl, The Polluter Pays Versus the Pollutee Pays Principle Under 
Asymmetric Information, 35 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 69, 71 (1998) (assuming that a polluter 
has asymmetric information on the benefits of the polluting activity); Tracy R. Lewis, Protecting 
the Environment When Costs and Benefits Are Privately Known, 27 RAND J. ECON. 819, 826–31 
(1996) (modeling regulation when firms have superior information about abatement costs and 
emissions levels); Daniel F. Spulber, Optimal Environmental Regulation Under Asymmetric 
Information, 35 J. PUB. ECON. 163, 163 (1988) (modeling regulatory options around the 
constraint of firms’ private information on abatement costs); infra note 245 and accompanying 
text. Importantly, however, economists also assume that the victim actually has superior 
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facts about about their polluting activities and products, amass 
specialized private expertise about the ways that these activities or 
products could cause harm.64 In their unique role as creators of a 
product or activity, these actors enjoy both superior knowledge and 
superior access to this information.65 
The extent to which an actor has superior knowledge about an 
externality is generally a function of whether the harms associated 
with the externality are readily visible, without the aid of expensive 
instruments. When the information is not readily visible to others, 
actors can enjoy different degrees of asymmetrical access to that 
information. First, actors can have direct information about the 
effects of their activities on the environment and public health as a 
result of internal research and analysis.66 Second, usually as a result of 
operating research production facilities or directing specific research, 
actors often enjoy privately-held, circumstantial information about 
the effects of their activities, as well as greater sophistication about 
how to conduct additional research on these effects.67 Finally, actors 
might be in a better position to obtain information about the effects 
of their activities relative to others because they know approximately 
where or what to sample or could sample more cheaply, even though 
they have not yet done the research. In this setting, actors have 
superior access to information because they have an “inside track” on 
where best to obtain it.68 
 
information on the damages done to public health and the environment. See infra note 367 and 
accompanying text. 
 64. The actor discharging wastes or producing products is essentially an expert for that 
activity and enjoys the types of information advantages that experts enjoy over their domain of 
expertise. Cf. Asher Wolinsky, Competition in a Market for Informed Experts’ Services, 24 
RAND J. ECON. 380 (1993) (discussing professional experts’ advantage in determining the level 
of service needed). 
 65. Although the distinction between these two types of asymmetries—asymmetric 
information and asymmetric access to information—is not clearly relevant to economic analysis, 
it is pertinent to law because once the information is in the “files,” it is potentially discoverable 
and, in some settings, reportable. Moreover, failure to disclose known information relevant to 
another party can constitute fraud. See 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (2000) (prohibiting the submission of 
false information to a government agency, and prohibiting the concealment of information). In 
such a legal setting, a manufacturer is better off remaining ignorant of all adverse effects when 
there are not specific, enforceable rules requiring information production. See Wagner, supra 
note 50, at 790–96 (arguing generally that common law tort causation requirements reward 
ignorance). 
 66. See infra notes 73–80 and accompanying text. 
 67. See infra note 69 and accompanying text. 
 68. See infra note 74 and accompanying text. 
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For externalities that are not readily apparent, actors can use 
their superior access to information to increase the costs associated 
with public efforts to understand the externality and, in some cases, 
can even impede third-party efforts to assess the resulting harms.69 
For example, the manufacturers of Agent Orange understood that the 
ingredient dioxin could adversely affect health and the environment, 
yet this harm was largely invisible and therefore unknown to veterans 
and others who were sprayed with the substance, as well as by the 
government who purchased it for wartime use.70 The same story can 
be retold for a number of other products and wastes.71 By contrast, 
other sorts of external harms—car accidents caused by drunk drivers; 
poorly designed buildings that collapse on individuals—impose 
obvious costs on society. Asymmetric, or private, information about 
the potential for harm might exist before the accident takes place, but 
after the accident, the fact that the activity caused harm is widely 
known.72 
The types of information advantages available to actors who 
create externalities can be divided into at least two general categories. 
The first category relates to the superior information that actors 
derive simply from their expertise and involvement in the production 
cycle.73 Manufacturers best know the contents, contaminants, and 
 
 69. The tobacco papers, for example, suggest that the tobacco industry learned how to 
manipulate nicotine levels to make cigarettes more addictive simply by using trace amounts of 
ammonia. Government and third-party research on cigarettes, by contrast, was unable reliably 
to characterize the addictive properties of nicotine, much less hypothesize that a manufacturer 
could manipulate a substance like ammonia to make cigarettes more addictive. See, e.g., HILTS, 
supra note 35, at 46, 171 (reporting that “[t]he studies of nicotine among the [tobacco] 
companies were extensive—far beyond anything outside their walls” and quoting from a 
deposition of Dr. Jeffrey Wigand, Brown & Williamson whistleblower, describing how ammonia 
frees up nicotine so that more of it will be activated during smoking). 
 70. PETER H. SCHUCK, AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL: MASS TOXIC DISASTERS IN THE 
COURTS 159 (1986). Judge Weinstein censured chemical companies for their failure to warn the 
government in light of earlier indications about Agent Orange’s effects. Id. 
 71. See supra notes 53–58 and infra notes 246–48 and accompanying text. 
 72. Because there is little ambiguity about the existence of these sorts of accidents or the 
existence of some resulting harm, there are simply no opportunities for actors to argue that the 
harm really did not occur or was caused by others. These are, however, familiar arguments in 
toxic cases. See, e.g., SCHUCK, supra note 70, at 3–15. 
 73. See, e.g., Peter Osmundsen, Regulation of Common Property Resources Under Private 
Information About Resource Externalities, 24 RESOURCES & ENERGY ECON. 349, 350 (2002) 
(analyzing the regulatory impediments created by various firms’ asymmetric information 
regarding common resource exploitation); see also CLIFFORD S. RUSSELL ET AL., ENFORCING 
POLLUTION CONTROL LAWS 10 (1986) (discussing the movement toward self-regulation in 
environmental laws); infra notes 245–48 and accompanying text. This “asymmetrical advantage 
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waste products associated with producing their products and often 
experience firsthand any adverse effects of the products and 
associated wastes.74 Actors also have superior information about 
when, where, and how they eject materials into the environment. 
Whether the actors dispose of materials within a plant site,75 in rural 
areas at midnight,76 or in the normal course of business,77 others will 
have a difficult time learning about it. Moreover, by actors’ sheer 
proximity to the discharge or emission point, they are bound to gain 
additional information about pollution through smells, color, and 
even worker or wildlife reactions, such as rashes or fish kills.78 Actors 
also best appreciate the probability and magnitude of a range of risks 
that could arise from their activities.79 For example, Union Carbide at 
 
enjoyed by firms is why the environmental laws have gradually moved increasingly toward” 
relying on heavily proscribed self-monitoring regimes that often require constant monitoring, 
assessing criminal penalties for fraudulent monitoring or tampering with monitoring equipment, 
and providing increasingly attractive protections for industrial whistleblowers. PERCIVAL ET 
AL., supra note 5, at 986–88. 
 74. See, e.g., Lyndon, supra note 31, at 1815 (“[T]he chemical producer knows what the 
chemical is, while the buyer often does not. Without the chemical identity of the product, the 
buyer cannot seek assistance in developing information independently.”) The existence of this 
asymmetrical access to adverse information regarding products is also the basis for the adverse 
information reporting requirements under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide 
Act (FIFRA) and the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA). See infra note 164 and 
accompanying text. 
 75. See infra note 247 and accompanying text. 
 76. The difficulty of catching parties who secretly dump hazardous wastes on the property 
of others (i.e., “midnight dumpers”) led Congress to create an exclusion for owner liability 
under CERCLA. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(3) (2000). 
 77. See, e.g., Lynn Blais et al., Enforcement Against Air Toxics Hotspots in Texas: A 
Report to the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality and the United States 
Environmental Protection Agency 45–50 (Nov. 8, 2004) (preliminary draft report, on file with 
the Duke Law Journal) (discussing residents’ reports of flaming plumes and noxious odors in 
the middle of the night, but noting that inspectors were unable to verify the problem the next 
day when the problems had disappeared and the facilities denied the existence of any problem). 
 78. Employers also appreciate the suite of toxic exposures that their employees will 
encounter in the plant far better than outsiders who can spend only an hour at the plant trying 
to assess safety from sporadic data points. See, e.g., infra note 103 (describing the asbestos 
industry’s concealment of information regarding the adverse effects of asbestos on their sick 
workers). However, manufacturers may not have superior information about the adverse effects 
of their air emissions on global warming, for example, because they have no private advantage 
in understanding these potential regional and global harms. 
 79. Overcoming some of these asymmetries is the sole objective of the Emergency 
Planning Provisions of the Environmental Planning and Community Response Act (EPCRA) 
42 U.S.C. § 11,001–11,050 (2000), which requires facilities to work with local emergency 
response officials to develop plans for responding to unexpected releases, explosions, and the 
like. Included in these detailed plans is the location and characteristics of all of the hazardous 
substances on the site. Id. §§ 11,021–11,023. 
WAGNER FINAL.DOC 2/9/2005 11:06 AM 
2004] COMMONS IGNORANCE 1645 
its Bhopal plant best understood the risks of the leak of methyl 
isocyanate arising from its manufacturing process and even had 
advance notice of the leak, but delayed notifying the surrounding 
neighborhood for more than an hour after the gas escaped the plant.80 
The second type of informational advantage is the actor’s ability 
to use several legal protections to actively exclude others from 
accessing the basic information and physical data needed to assess 
externalities. For example, intellectual property law allows actors to 
raise the costs of accessing information about externalities and, in 
some cases, to bar access to this information completely.81 Using 
broad trade secret protections, manufacturers impede public access to 
a large body of information regarding their manufacturing processes, 
testing data, and the contents of their toxic products and waste 
streams.82 Until a federal agency is forced to review the merits of a 
confidential business information claim and determines that it is 
unjustified, the information remains unavailable to health 
professionals, risk assessors, members of the public who have been 
exposed to the waste or product, and most regulators.83 Even the 
legitimacy of an underlying trade secret claim is based largely on 
asymmetrical information; firms best know whether competitors can 
readily use information regarding their products and wastes to their 
economic detriment, or whether their trade secret claim is instead 
intended simply to impede access to “troublesome” information.84 
Similarly, privacy law and real property law give actors the 
ability to exclude others from accessing information about activities 
 
 80. JOHN S. APPLEGATE ET AL., THE REGULATION OF TOXIC SUBSTANCES AND 
HAZARDOUS WASTES 1138–39 (2000). 
 81. The right to exclude others provides the purpose of these property-based legal 
protections. See, e.g., HIRSHLEIFER & RILEY, supra note 60, at 259 (observing how patents, 
copyrights, and trade secrets provide “imperfect and partially effective property rights in ideas” 
to encourage the production of new information); see also MICHAEL A. EPSTEIN, EPSTEIN ON 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 6-3 (1999) (discussing how copyright, trade secret, and patent laws 
each offer a unique contribution to the protection of “sensitive corporate information”). 
 82. See infra Part III.B.1. 
 83. See Mary L. Lyndon, Secrecy and Innovation in Tort Law and Regulation, 23 N.M. L. 
REV. 1, 34–39 (1993) (discussing the costs of broad protections for confidential business 
information); Thomas O. McGarity & Sidney A. Shapiro, The Trade Secret Status of Health and 
Safety Testing Information: Reforming Agency Disclosure Policies, 93 HARV. L. REV. 837, 840–
48 (1980) (same); infra note 280 and accompanying text. 
 84. Disparate evidence reveals that firms do exaggerate the need for broad trade secret 
protections for basic information about the externalities that the firms generate. See infra notes 
284, 290–97 and accompanying text. 
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occurring on their property that might create negative externalities.85 
For example, government inspectors are typically permitted to enter 
private property to collect health and safety information only under 
conditions acceptable to the owner; otherwise they must obtain a 
warrant.86 This privacy protection is maintained even if the actor 
engages in an activity suspected of creating external social costs. Such 
protections are relaxed only in an emergency.87 As a result, 
government inspections often provide, at best, a preliminary and 
incomplete picture of the potential hazards and pollution sources at 
large facilities.88 Government officials may be able to determine if an 
actor significantly underestimates or underreports pollution levels by 
conducting expensive ambient monitoring outside a facility, but such 
monitoring is still of little use in pinpointing particular, problematic 
sources of pollution inside the facility.89 
 
 85. See infra Part III.B.2. Although this Article focuses primarily on how the laws 
sometimes motivate actors to hide or ignore adverse effects of products and wastes on health 
and the environment, these same types of legal disincentives also occur in the laws governing 
the protection of endangered species. Most notable is the ability of private landowners to 
exclude those who wish to survey endangered species or landowners who can secretly destroy 
the species or its habitat to avoid the regulatory constraints of species protection. For an 
insightful analysis of these advantages that arise out of private property rights, see Stephen 
Polasky & Holly Doremus, When the Truth Hurts: Endangered Species Policy on Private Land 
with Imperfect Information, 35 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT 22, 26–29 (1998). 
 86. See, e.g., Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 324 (1978) (holding that warrantless 
searches under the Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651–678 (2000), are 
unconstitutional). See generally ARNOLD W. REITZE, JR., AIR POLLUTION CONTROL LAW: 
COMPLIANCE & ENFORCEMENT 496–504 (2001) (describing procedures governing consensual 
inspections conducted under environmental laws and procedures that apply to obtaining 
warrants when consent is not provided). 
 87. See, e.g., REITZE, supra note 86, at 496–503 (discussing generally when a warrant is 
required for an inspection); id. at 500 (discussing the emergency circumstances when warrants 
are not required, which include “potential imminent hazardous situations and situations where 
evidence may be destroyed or removed while a warrant is obtained”). 
 88. See generally id. at 489 (observing that inspections provide the “most important source 
of compliance information” but that they are “resource intensive” and thus need to “target 
sources to maximize the effectiveness of their inspection expenditures”). 
 89. See, e.g., Michael May, The One That Got Away: Polluting Perps Go Down, But 
Huntsman Walks, TEX. OBSERVER, Nov. 8, 2002, at 20 (observing that even if the few monitors 
in industrial neighborhoods reveal high levels of air pollutants, “it is usually impossible to prove 
which plant is responsible”); see also David Allen et al., Accelerated Science Evaluation of 
Ozone Formation in the Houston-Galveston Area, at 18 (Sept. 13, 2001) (unpublished 
manuscript, on file with the Duke Law Journal) (reporting, based on overflight monitoring of 
plumes, that plants in Texas are emitting far more hydrocarbons than would be expected based 
on their permit limits and emissions inventories), available at 
http://www.utexas.edu/research/ceer/texaqsarchive/accel_science_eval.PDF; Blais et al., supra 
note 77, at 3–16 (discussing elevated air pollutants in Texas City (in the Houston-Galveston 
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Experience bears out the prediction that actors will sometimes 
take advantage of these informational advantages and limit access to 
potentially damaging information about their products and activities.90 
For example, Johnson & Johnson,91 A.H. Robins,92 Merrell Dow,93 and 
 
corridor) based on two-day, annual mobile monitoring trips that measured elevated levels of air 
toxics). 
 90. See, e.g., ALICIA MUNDY, DISPENSING WITH THE TRUTH: THE VICTIMS, THE DRUG 
COMPANIES, AND THE DRAMATIC STORY BEHIND THE BATTLE OVER FEN-PHEN 133–34 (2001) 
(citing Fen-Phen’s attempts to conceal how many reports of pulmonary hypertension it 
received, and noting that the approved labeling was based on only four cases, though there were 
an additional thirty-seven that the company’s safety surveillance officer was aware of but did 
not reveal). For examples of more general, industry-sponsored campaigns to mislead the public, 
media, and decisionmakers about the safety of the companies’ products or the products of their 
competitors, see generally DAN FAGIN & MARIANNE LAVELLE, TOXIC DECEPTION xxi (1996). 
See also supra notes 53–58; infra notes 245–48 and accompanying text. See generally SHELDON 
RAMPTON & JOHN STAUBER, TRUST US, WE’RE EXPERTS! (2001) (using extensive case studies 
to illustrate the prolific use by corporations of third-party public relations consultants to 
distance themselves from misleading information and appear more reputable and credible). 
 91. See supra note 54. 
 92. A.H. Robins, the manufacturer of the Dalkon Shield, actively concealed the adverse 
results from the very limited safety testing it did conduct. For example, eight months after it 
started selling the Dalkon Shield, Robins initiated a two-year study on the effects of the Dalkon 
Shield on baboons that was never made available to the medical profession. “Among eight [of 
the baboons tested], one ‘perished,’ and among ten, three suffered perforation of the 
uterus . . . .” MINTZ, supra note 53, at 123 (quoting the testimony of Dr. John W. Ward, Director 
of Toxicology and Assistant Director of Scientific Development). Following an escalation of 
concern by company employees over the potential for the Dalkon Shield’s string to carry 
bacteria from the vagina to the uterus, Robins retrieved 303 used strings for examination by a 
staff scientist, Thomas C. Yu, who found defects in all but 35 of the strings. Company officials 
swore that Robins maintained “no written records of the exams or the results.” Id. at 134–35. 
There is also some suggestion that Robins destroyed sensitive Dalkon Shield documents to 
better defend against litigation. Schwadel, supra note 49; see also supra note 69 (describing a 
similar pattern with tobacco). 
 93. Merrell Dow’s culpability in the controversial breast implant litigation in large part 
derived from its stubborn refusal to research the adverse effects of silicone in the body cavity 
(even at the insistence of the FDA), when its own preliminary, secret, in-house evidence 
suggested that the implants leaked and were harmful. See, e.g., Hopkins v. Dow Corning Corp., 
33 F.3d 1116, 1127–28 (9th Cir. 1994) (affirming a punitive damage award based in part on 
evidence that Dow Corning concealed the adverse results of clinical studies and knew that long-
term studies were needed). In Hopkins, the court stated: 
Dow obtained results of a study in which four dogs received silicone gel implants that 
resembled the implants that Dow was then marketing. The results demonstrated that 
after six months, the implants appeared to be functioning properly, but that after two 
years, inflammation surrounding the implants demonstrated the existence of an 
immune reaction. Dow did not publicly release the results of this research for several 
years, and when it did ultimately release the results, Dow omitted the negative 
findings and implied that the implants were safe. 
Id. at 1119; see also Rebecca Weisman, Reforms in Medical Device Regulation: An Examination 
of the Silicone Gel Breast Implant Debacle, 23 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 973, 987 n.122 (1993) 
(quoting Dow Corning discovery documents and a summary of scientific studies). Dow Corning 
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the asbestos94 and tobacco95 industries were all caught concealing 
information about their products’ adverse health impacts. Companies 
also have concealed the existence of contaminants in products, even 
when the products are widely used or heavily regulated.96 Some 
companies have even resisted mandatory reporting requirements on 
the adverse effects of their products. For example, it was only after 
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) granted substantially 
reduced penalties for noncompliance with adverse reporting 
requirements under the Toxic Substances Control Act that companies 
volunteered 11,000 studies of their products—four times the number 
of studies submitted in the previous fifteen years.97 Actors have not 
only taken advantage of existing information asymmetries but have 
worked to secure additional or broader protections on privately held 
information regarding the adverse effects of their products and 
activities.98 This evidence, taken as a whole, indicates that many 
 
also conducted a study in 1974 that revealed that silicone could “[t]rigger strong reactions of the 
immune system,” but Dow Corning denied such a reaction at an FDA hearing in 1991. Id. at 988 
n.123. Finally, in 1987 Dow Corning was aware that some of its employees had falsified 
documents regarding silicone breast implants, but Dow Corning did not alert the FDA to these 
misstatements until 1992. Id. 
 94. See infra note 103. 
 95. See supra note 58. 
 96. See, e.g., MINTZ, supra note 53, at 123–27 (noting that A.H. Robins, the manufacturer 
of the Dalkon Shield, apparently failed to disclose that the shield contained copper and copper 
sulfate to avoid having the FDA classify and ultimately regulate the Shield as a drug); supra 
note 69 (discussing the tobacco industry’s use of ammonia to manipulate nicotine levels without 
detection by government machines). 
 97. Agency Watch, EPA’s Voluntary Data, NAT’L L.J., Nov. 4, 1996, at A10. In a related 
type of inducement to disclose violations within the companies’ superior control, the National 
Pork Producers Council agreed to an independent environmental audit of their compliance with 
the Clean Water Act, conditioned on the EPA’s agreement to significantly lower the penalties 
for the reported violations. See, e.g., Richard E. Schwartz et al., Encouraging Self-Auditing 
Within the Pork Industry: The Nationwide Clean Water Act Enforcement Agreement for 
Agriculture’s First Industry-Wide Environmental Auditing Program, 29 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. 
Inst.) 10,395, 10,395 (1999). 
 98. Actors’ primary investments along these lines are their efforts to broaden the privileges 
available to keep information secret. See infra Parts III.B.1, III.B.5. Actors also have invested in 
constitutional challenges to prevent government inspectors from obtaining information about 
the externalities that the actors generate—challenges that appear generally unsuccessful. See, 
e.g., Balelo v. Baldrige, 724 F.2d 753, 758–60 (9th Cir. 1984) (rejecting a challenge mounted by 
the commercial fishery industry against regulations under the Marine Mammal Protection Act, 
16 U.S.C. § 1371 (2000), as imposing an unconstitutional search and seizure because the 
regulations required stationing federal observers aboard large fishing fleets to ensure 
compliance); see also infra Parts III.A.2., III.B.2. Private actors have also worked affirmatively 
to destroy key information and evidence, thus precluding subsequent researchers from 
obtaining critical information. See, e.g., supra notes 90–97 and accompanying text. 
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companies do have information regarding the harms of their activities 
and products that is unavailable to the general public and, depending 
on their corporate leadership and culture, may be unwilling to share 
that information. 
In sum, actors who create externalities are best situated to access 
and produce information on the nature of the harms that their 
activities cause, but they also stand to lose from providing such 
information. As a result, these actors use their ability to control 
access to this information to create impediments for third parties who 
seek to ensure that polluting activities and hazardous products are in 
fact safe. At the very least, actors’ ability to limit access to 
information about their products and activities raises the costs to 
third parties of developing even a preliminary understanding of these 
externalities.99 Just as importantly, as the next Section discusses, this 
problem is exacerbated if and when an actor decides to actively 
discredit and obfuscate damaging third-party research. 
2. Actors Sometimes Manufacture Uncertainty about the 
Suspected Harms Caused by Their Activities. Faced with especially 
incriminating information on the adverse effects of a product or 
activity, actors may not only decline to voluntarily assist in producing 
additional research but may actively work to obfuscate especially 
damaging information produced by others.100 The same formula that 
predicts that rational actors will refrain from studying the invisible 
harms associated with their products and activities also predicts that 
rational actors will invest as much time, money, and energy in 
discrediting information on the adverse effects of their activities that 
they expect to lose if credible information is ultimately produced that 
can be used against them.101 In dramatic cases, when expensive 
 
 99. See supra note 89 and accompanying text. 
 100. Unlike most goods, complex information is vulnerable to rather dramatic depreciation 
and even obsolescence. If information, such as a research study, is relatively complicated, then 
its credibility can be reduced simply through strategic efforts to attack the methods, 
experimental design, or integrity of the researcher. Unless onlookers have the time and 
wherewithal to investigate such attacks, the value of original studies will be reduced. Investing 
in ends-oriented research that is intended to refute previous findings can diminish, however 
temporarily, the value of a research study. For the breadth and sophistication of these efforts, 
see infra notes 107–31 and accompanying text. Cf. infra note 404 and accompanying text 
(discussing the scientific community’s heavy reliance on conflict disclosures to avoid some of 
these problems). 
 101. Generally, one would expect it to be in an actor’s best interest to make this investment 
if the loss that is expected from the information is greater than the costs of conducting 
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liability or regulations could result from an objective assessment of 
the externalities, actors could invest quite a lot to discredit third-party 
research and obscure research results. In such instances, even 
delaying the general acceptance of third-party research can produce 
sufficient returns to make an aggressive and organized campaign of 
obfuscation and obstruction worthwhile.102 
Actors have developed a number of imaginative approaches to 
obscure or discredit potentially troublesome third-party research 
suggesting that their activities cause harm. The easiest approach is for 
an actor simply to publicize only the positive information about a 
product or activity, while keeping potentially damaging information 
private. Because actors control access to key information, this tactic 
allows them to present a misleadingly positive account of the 
externalities associated with their products and activities that helps to 
offset damaging research produced by outsiders. Various accounts 
exist of industry actors who selectively publish the positive studies 
within their control, while concealing or prematurely halting 
unfavorable research.103 Actors can also take advantage of their 
 
discrediting operations times the expected benefits of these discrediting projects. Actors will 
thus invest in discrediting projects if expected loss from undisturbed information > [(costs of 
discrediting x expected benefits from discrediting) – losses if discrediting strategy is revealed] x 
high discount rate. If the actor enjoys asymmetric information that is useful to the discrediting, 
then the costs of conducting the attacks are likely lower. See supra notes 90–97 and 
accompanying text. 
 102. See, e.g., Gordon C. Rausser et al., Information Asymmetries, Uncertainties, and 
Cleanup Delays at Superfund Sites, 35 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 48, 49 (1998) (arguing that 
potentially responsible parties at Superfund sites may use their asymmetric information 
regarding their contributions to a site to delay EPA investigation and cleanup because delay 
brings great cost savings); Sidney A. Shapiro & Thomas O. McGarity, Not So Paradoxical: The 
Rationale for Technology-Based Regulation, 1991 DUKE L.J. 729, 737–39 (making the case for 
how increased profits resulting from delay in regulation make it profitable in many cases for 
industry to judicially challenge regulatory requirements, regardless of the expected outcome on 
the merits). 
 103. One industry that has engaged in such conduct is the asbestos industry. The record of 
asbestos manufacturers’ attempts to conceal or downplay the hazards of asbestos is well 
documented. See generally BRODEUR, supra note 35 (chronicling litigation against the asbestos 
industry). Some of the more dramatic examples include animal studies on asbestosis in the 
1930s, the findings of which, by agreement, belonged to the investors until they agreed to 
disclose them to the public, id. at 118–19; notes detailing Johns-Manville Co.’s health review 
committee meeting during which executives “developed a corporate policy of not informing sick 
employees of the precise nature of their health problems for fear of workmen’s-compensation 
claims and lawsuits,” id. at 145; and successful company efforts to persuade the editor of a trade 
magazine that growing scientific studies on “asbestosis . . . [should] receive the minimum of 
publicity,” id. at 116–17. 
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superior expertise by exaggerating the positive attributes of their 
products or activities in ways that could be disproved only through 
significant investigative efforts.104 In some cases, actors have even 
managed to subvert third-party efforts to gather needed information 
by taking advantage of their ability to control the activity causing the 
harm. For example, in enforcement settings, actors have temporarily 
halted problematic activities during government inspections.105 In 
other cases, manufacturers have gone so far as to tamper with legally 
required pollution control monitors.106 
If the risks associated with third-party research are great enough, 
some actors may also find it necessary to undertake a more 
affirmative campaign of disinformation and obfuscation.107 
Manufacturing scientific controversy appears to be an established 
 
  Similar tactics have been used in other industries. For example, the manufacturer of the 
Dalkon Shield concealed evidence of that product’s dangerousness. See, e.g., Tetuan v. A.H. 
Robins Co., 738 P.2d 1210, 1240 (Kan. 1987) (awarding punitive damages based on corporate 
misconduct, including evidence that A.H. Robins “commissioned studies on the Dalkon Shield 
which it dropped or concealed when the results were unfavorable” and “consigned hundreds of 
documents to the furnace”); cf. MINTZ, supra note 53, at 122 (referencing a memo by Kenneth 
Moore, the project coordinator of Robins’ Dalkon Shield, reporting that Robins’ main purpose 
in funding research was “to make available for publication extremely good Dalkon Shield 
results“). The breast implant industry has engaged in similar conduct. See Hopkins v. Dow 
Corning Corp., 33 F.3d 1116, 1119, 1127–28 (9th Cir. 1994) (affirming a punitive damage award 
based in part on evidence that the defendant company concealed the adverse results of clinical 
studies and knew that long-term studies were needed). The tobacco industry vigorously 
concealed its research on the carcinogenic and addictive properties of cigarettes. See, e.g., 
STANTON GLANTZ ET AL., THE CIGARETTE PAPERS 15 (1996) (concluding that by the early 
1960s Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corporation and its parent, British American Tobacco, 
“had developed a sophisticated understanding of nicotine pharmacology” but did not disclose 
this understanding to consumers); id. at 58–107 (outlining documentary evidence of the tobacco 
industry’s knowledge of and research on the addictive properties of nicotine); HILTS, supra note 
35, at 38–40 (describing both the cover-up of rich research conducted on the carcinogenic 
properties of cigarettes and Brown & Williamson’s “document retention” policy that involved 
shipping all such research and underlying documentation out of the country). 
 104. See, e.g., Shankar Vedantam, Antidepressant Makers Withhold Data on Children, 
WASH. POST, Jan. 29, 2004, at A1 (describing the only partial publication and dissemination of 
clinical trials studying the effectiveness of specific antidepressant drugs on children and 
revealing that some studies yielding negative results had not been published). 
 105. See infra note 247 and accompanying text. 
 106. See, e.g., Keith Schneider, Coal Company Admits Safety Test Fraud, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 
19, 1991, at A14 (reporting that since 1980 six mining companies have been convicted for 
tampering with devices that monitor levels of coal dust in mines). 
 107. The tobacco industry’s broad and expensive campaign against public science provides 
the most familiar and disturbing account of this strategy. See generally HILTS, supra note 35, at 
6, 8–12 (describing how tobacco officials’ strategy in 1953 was to develop “comprehensive and 
authoritative scientific material which completely refutes the health charges”). 
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strategy. For example, even Frank Luntz, a prominent Republican 
Party consultant, openly recommends promoting scientific 
controversy as a strategy for justifying President George W. Bush’s 
position on global warming: 
Voters believe that there is no consensus about global warming 
within the scientific community. Should the public come to believe 
that the scientific issues are settled, their views about global 
warming will change accordingly. Therefore, you need to continue to 
make the lack of scientific certainty a primary issue in the 
debate, . . .108 
Discrediting damaging independent research can become a collective 
endeavor when multiple actors with a common interest agree to share 
the costs of the discrediting.109 In response to the highly influential Six 
Cities epidemiology study used by the EPA to revise its particulate 
standard, more than six hundred potentially affected industries from 
the petroleum, automobile, and other business sectors organized and 
formed the “Air Quality Standards Coalition” in order to criticize the 
Six Cities research.110 
 
 108. Frank Luntz, Straight Talk, The Environment: A Cleaner, Safer, Healthier America 
137 (n.d.) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Duke Law Journal). The quotation comes 
from a memo by consultant Frank Luntz to Republican policymakers obtained by the 
Environmental Working Group and posted on its website at 
http://www.ewg.org/briefings/luntzmemo/pdf/luntzresearch_environment.pdf (last visited July 
27, 2004). See also Paul Krugman, Editorial, Salt of the Earth, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 2003, at A21 
(quoting the Lutz memo on global warming and reiterating, based on the evidence, that much of 
the appearance of uncertainty is manufactured: “Very few independent experts now dispute 
that manmade global warming is happening, and represents a serious threat.”). 
 109. Collective efforts organized by the tobacco industry, the Center for Regulatory 
Effectiveness, and the Competitive Enterprise Institute provide particularly good examples of 
what can be accomplished when stakeholders pool their resources. See, e.g., GLANTZ ET AL., 
supra note 103, at 108–09 (recounting that, in the wake of having conducted scientific research 
illuminating the deleterious effects of tobacco use, the tobacco industry did not disclose these 
studies but engaged in two simultaneous campaigns: “an internal research campaign to develop 
a ‘safe’ cigarette and an external public relations campaign to convince the public that cigarettes 
had not been proven dangerous to health”); Center for Regulatory Effectiveness, at 
http://www.thecre.com (last visited Mar. 5, 2004) (on file with the Duke Law Journal) 
(describing the organization, which engages in collective attacks on publicly produced science 
and which sponsors legislation (thus far passed in the form of appropriations riders), providing 
more legal mechanisms for challenging public science); Competitive Enterprise Institute, at 
http://www.cei.org (last visited Mar. 5, 2004) (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (describing 
the organization, which filed a Data Quality petition against multiple agencies on global 
warming—presumably on behalf of a collective of affected industries). 
 110. See, e.g., Richard Dahl, Spheres of Influence, 105 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 1306, 1306 
(1997) (describing the industries’ Coalition and their efforts to obtain the raw data from the Six 
Cities Study); Jocelyn Kaiser, Showdown Over Clean Air Science, 277 SCIENCE 466, 466 (1997) 
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More aggressive efforts to manufacture uncertainty take on a 
variety of forms, but they generally involve either blatant, 
underhanded attacks on third-party research or investments in 
“counter-research” carefully designed to produce results more 
favorable to an actor’s interests. Although in many areas there is no 
scientific consensus about certain issues and presenting another side 
of an issue is legitimate, the manufactured critiques and studies 
discussed here involve a strategic, ends-oriented effort to undermine 
credible research and obscure scientific consensus.  Many actors have 
launched a frontal assault on academic or public research that 
documents how their products or activities harm the public health or 
the environment. In some cases, because of the inherent complexity 
of the studies, even high-quality technical research can be at least 
temporarily discredited by making groundless challenges about the 
methods used, the reliability of the data collected, the qualifications 
of the researcher conducting the study, or by suggesting that the 
review processes are flawed.111 These “hired gun” attacks on third-
party research are common in high-stakes cases when acceptance of 
 
(describing the activities of the Coalition (although stating that it has only five hundred 
industrial members) and quoting it as taking the position that the science underlying the EPA’s 
particulate rule is “totally inadequate”). The American Iron and Steel Institute, presumably one 
of the members of the Coalition, hired an epidemiologist from the University of Washington, 
Suresh Moolgavkar, specifically to critique the Six Cities Study. Hillary J. Johnson, The Next 
Battle Over Clean Air, ROLLING STONE, 48, 52 (2001). Finally, the Competitive Enterprise 
Institute (an organization that does not disclose its sources of funding on its website) published 
a report critical of the Six Cities Study in 2001. KAY JONES & BEN LIEBERMAN, THE ONGOING 
CLEAN-AIR DEBATE: THE SCIENCE BEHIND EPA’S RULE ON SOOT (2001), available at 
http://www.cei.org/PDFs/ongoing_clean_air_debate.pdf. 
 111. Credible studies, traditional research methods, and respected researchers (from the 
perspective of a “realist-constructionist”) may all be deconstructed if those judging or 
scrutinizing the science do not respect the vulnerable, socially constructed features of traditional 
research methods, especially those unique to particular disciplines. See generally STEVEN COLE, 
MAKING SCIENCE 12–13 (1992). To require the testing and validation of each assumption that 
underlies a study would result in an infinite regress—the never-ending exposure of assumptions 
that lack validation. To circumvent this logical problem, established scientific communities 
informally agree on “accepted methods,” some of which necessarily are based on consensual, 
but technically unvalidated, assumptions. Because they are consensual within the scientific 
community, once these consensual decisions gain acceptance scientists tend to take them for 
granted as necessary features of research. Unfortunately, outsiders and enemies of a particular 
research study are unlikely to give deference to accepted scientific methods based on consensual 
but technically unsupportable assumptions, leaving the research vulnerable to damaging 
deconstruction by persons seeking to discredit it. See, e.g., Sheila Jasanoff, Research Subpoenas 
and the Sociology of Knowledge, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 95, 99–100 (Summer 1996). 
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the results could lead to shattering liability and publicity.112 The 
tobacco industry is the most notorious with respect to using this tactic, 
but it is by no means alone.113 Individual companies or trade 
associations engaged in the production of oil,114 lead,115 asbestos,116 and 
beryllium117 have all actively worked to discredit research that, if 
widely understood and accepted, would likely result in substantial 
liability, regulation, and market costs.118 
 
 112. To be sure, some of this adversarial vetting improves the quality of science. See, e.g., 
Jocelyn Kaiser, Synergy Paper Questioned at Toxicology Meeting, 275 SCIENCE 1879 (1997) 
(discussing the scientific controversy surrounding potential human health effects of endocrine 
disrupters and the uproar created by a recent Tulane study on disrupters that was subsequently 
withdrawn because it misreported the research). But when the motive for vetting is an ends-
oriented attack on specific results, the vetting is not beneficial and can distract or impair the 
value of information by focusing users on trivialities and artificial or minor quibbles. See supra 
note 111. Unlike with routine scientific vetting, in these efforts to discredit research, the 
attackers (or hired attackers) will work backwards to try to find a problem or alternative result 
that is more hospitable to their own interests. This is not how scientists review each others’ 
work, and it does not produce outcomes that are randomly distributed along the result 
spectrum. In addition, because the attacker is biased with regard to the outcome, this type of 
scientific disagreement violates one of the premiere tenets of science. See, e.g., Robert K. 
Merton, The Normative Structure of Science, in THE SOCIOLOGY OF SCIENCE 267, 275–77 (J. 
Gaston ed. 1973). 
 113. See, e.g., Thomas O. McGarity, On the Prospect of “Daubertizing” Judicial Review of 
Risk Assessment, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 155, 179–99 (Fall 2003) (documenting the 
tobacco industry’s attack on a watershed environmental tobacco smoke epidemiology study and 
the researcher who conducted it). 
 114. See, e.g., Jeffrey Short, Abstract, Stifling Science: Attacks on Government Scientists 
After the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill, in Speaker Information, Center for Science in the Public 
Interest, Conference on Conflicted Science: Corporate Influence on Scientific Research and 
Science Based Policy 34 (2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Duke Law Journal) 
(asserting that “motivated by litigation” over the Exxon spill, Exxon aggressively challenged the 
documentation of harm caused by the spill, using methods that included “misrepresentation of 
government data, manipulating agendas of scientific meetings, abuse of the scientific peer-
review process, abuse of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), shadowing  
field studies, and groundless allegation of scientific misconduct”), available at 
http://www.cspinet.org/integrity/cs_conference_abstract.pdf. 
 115. The lead industry’s protracted and multifaceted attack on Dr. Herbert Needleman’s 
research published in the New England Journal of Medicine is the most familiar example of this 
type of campaign to discredit research. See infra note 119. 
 116. See supra note 103 and accompanying text. 
 117. The beryllium industry, among other tactics, identifies inevitable assumptions in 
research that cannot be rectified and maintains that, because of these gaps, more study is 
needed. See, e.g., David Michaels, A Case Study of the Beryllium Industry 2 (2003) 
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the Duke Law Journal). 
 118. This tactic also is used affirmatively in challenging regulations. For example, virtually 
every substantive challenge mounted against an EPA model involves multiple technical 
disagreements on virtually every facet of the model. In several cases, moreover, the 
disagreements appear to be manufactured challenges that enjoy little support from the record. 
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ongoing research.123 Research on R.J. Reynolds’ use of the “Joe 
Camel” logo to induce teens to smoke threatened Reynolds to such 
an extent that the company attacked the individual researchers as 
well as their research. In an effort to halt this research, which was 
ultimately successful, the company filed harassing subpoenas and 
state public records requests seeking the release of confidential 
information, such as names and addresses of the children involved in 
the study. Reynolds also instigated scientific misconduct proceedings 
against the researchers, which were ultimately dismissed as without 
basis.124 
In addition to attacking the credibility of the research and in 
some cases the researcher, affected actors have also financed counter-
research designed to refute third-party research, either by producing 
different results or by suggesting that the results of the independent 
research cannot be reproduced125—a devastating critique within the 
scientific community.126 By hiring scientists willing to “collaborate” 
closely with the sponsoring industry (under contracts that require 
 
 123. See, e.g., Steven Picou, Compelled Disclosure of Scholarly Research: Some Comments 
on “High Stakes Litigation,” 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 149, 155 (Summer 1996) (describing 
how third-party subpoenas served on his research relevant to the Exxon oil spill litigation 
“permanently disrupted” his research project “due to the constant need to respond to motions 
and affidavits,” and how Exxon worked to deconstruct his research in order to undercut the 
plaintiffs’ evidence and call into question his professional integrity); Short, supra note 114 
(documenting Exxon’s aggressive challenge to the documentation of harm caused by the spill). 
For an example of a critique of the integrity of government-paid scientists by an Exxon-paid 
scientist, see J.A. Wiens, Oil, Seabirds, and Science. The Effects of the EVOS, 46 BIOSCIENCE 
587, 594 (1996). 
 124. Fischer, supra note 121, at 159. 
 125. See, e.g., Charles H. Peterson et al., The Joint Consequences of Multiple Components of 
Statistical Sampling Designs, 231 MARINE ECOLOGY PROGRESS SERIES 309 (2002) (arguing that 
Exxon-paid scientists manipulated sampling designs to reach desirable conclusions). 
 126. See, e.g., MUNDY, supra note 90, at 115 (discussing in detail the manufacturer of Fen-
Phen’s strategy for research on its controversial drug, suggesting that the manufacturer first 
“[p]roduce[d] studies [showing] no link or only a minimal link with valve disease” and then 
“[r]aise[d] questions about the validity of the research done at the Mayo Clinic and Fargo”); 
Deborah E. Barnes & Lisa A. Bero, Industry-Funded Research and Conflict of Interest: An 
Analysis of Research Sponsored by the Tobacco Industry Through the Center for Indoor Air 
Research, 21 J. HEALTH POL. & L. 515, 518–30 (1996) (concluding that the tobacco industry’s 
sponsorship of the Center for Indoor Air Research (CIAR) compromised CIAR’s stated 
mission of high-quality, objective research because of evidence of a conflict of interest in 
CIAR’s choice of projects and its framing of research questions (i.e., attempting to show that 
poor nutrition, occupation, or genetic predisposition could cause the same diseases attributed to 
smoking) and in the discovery of likely data fabrication in CIAR studies that produced results 
more favorable to the tobacco industry). When an original database is public, actors can attack 
the public research more cheaply by commissioning consultants to statistically reanalyze (called 
“crunching”) data until they produce favorable results. 
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sponsor control of the research), sponsors historically have been able 
to exert dramatic control over the outcome of research, to the point 
of designing studies, framing research questions, and even editing and 
ghostwriting articles.127 Sponsors also routinely reserve the right to 
suppress publication of research that they fund and are not reticent to 
use this right if study results are adverse to their interests.128 Some 
sponsors do not stop at merely funding, influencing, and controlling 
research. These sponsors have successfully published the same study 
in different journals under different author names with no cross-
references, making it appear that research support favoring their 
product or activity is based on several independent studies, rather 
than simply a rereporting of the same findings.129 Because the 
scientific community generally deems commissioned studies less 
objective than independent research, scientific journals increasingly 
 
 127. See generally SHELDON KRIMSKY, SCIENCE IN THE PRIVATE INTEREST: HAS THE 
LURE OF PROFITS CORRUPTED BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH? (2003) (discussing this problem 
throughout the book with considerable support). One of the editors of the Journal of the 
American Medical Association (JAMA) has argued that ghostwriting is occurring in biomedical 
articles at an alarming rate. Companies will pay prestigious big names who have not worked on 
studies to appear on the byline in the companies’ place. Drummond Rennie et al., When 
Authorship Fails: A Proposal to Make Contributors Accountable, 278 JAMA 579, 580 (1997). As 
a result, some prominent research journals refuse to publish literature reviews or editorials by 
an author with a conflict of interest in the outcome, because the extent and effect of the author’s 
bias is difficult to catch through the usual methods of replication and validation familiar to 
science. See, e.g., Int’l Comm. of Med. Journal Editors, Uniform Requirements for Manuscripts 
Submitted to Biomedical Journals: Writing and Editing for Biomedical Publication, at 
http://www.icmje.org (Oct. 2004) (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (“Disclosure of [conflicts 
of interest] is also important in connection with editorials and review articles, because it is [sic] 
can be more difficult to detect bias in these types of publications than in reports of original 
research.”). There is also some literature finding, through statistics, that commissioned research 
is generally of lower quality than noncommissioned research, at least for the research 
commissioned by the tobacco industry. E.g., Deborah Barnes & Lisa Bero, Abstract, Scientific 
Quality of Original Research Articles on Environmental Tobacco Smoke, 6 TOBACCO CONTROL 
19 (1997). 
 128. See, e.g., Bruce M. Psaty & Drummond Rennie, Stopping Medical Research to Save 
Money: A Broken Pact with Researchers and Patients, 289 JAMA 2128, 2128–29 (2003) 
(explaining that Apotex Inc. stopped two trials that were intended to identify adverse effects 
from an iron-chelation therapy, and that shortly thereafter the company issued legal warnings, 
under the guise of “confidentiality,” to prevent the principal investigator from publishing the 
results or disclosing risks to patients); see also supra note 92 and accompanying text. 
 129. See, e.g., Drummond Rennie, Fair Conduct and Fair Reporting of Clinical Trials, 282 
JAMA 1766 (1999) (discussing the overpublishing—without cross-referencing—of clinical trials 
with specific examples from the literature); Rennie et al., supra note 127, at 580 (arguing that 
repeated publication of a single study “with or without minor additions, inflates bibliographies 
and is common,” and that “[w]hen similar parts of the same trial are published repeatedly under 
different authors’ names, without cross-referencing, the record is distorted in the name of 
promotion, and meta-analysis is confounded to the detriment of care”). 
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require disclaimers of funding and author affiliation as a condition to 
publication.130 To circumvent this disclosure requirement, some 
sponsors have developed ways to “launder” their research support 
through nonprofit “. . . shells, creating the illusion that they 
themselves play no role in research that supports their interests.”131 
Actors have also commissioned review articles and convened expert 
panels that purport to summarize existing research on a topic—such 
as the health effects of environmental tobacco smoke—even though, 
in reality, the commissioned review articles or reports are intended 
(and contractually guaranteed) to portray existing research in the 
light most favorable to the sponsor.132 
Unfortunately, the scientific community is generally not involved 
in refuting this manufactured controversy. Because much strategically 
produced research is of an applied nature, academic scientists, who 
are most interested in developments pertaining to basic research and 
scientific theory, are not likely to read, challenge, or attempt to 
 
 130. See, e.g., Joseph Sanders, The Bendectin Litigation: A Case Study in the Life Cycle of 
Mass Torts, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 301, 337 (1992) (describing the studies that Merrell conducted 
after litigation in Bendectin cases as a “lose-lose proposition” because “[i]f they showed an 
effect, the studies would be used against the company” and if they did not “[a]ny slight technical 
flaw in the design or execution of the experiment would be exploited by plaintiffs to undermine 
Merrell’s findings”). 
 131. See, e.g., Alicia Mundy, Hot Flash, Cold Cash: How a Once-Respected Women’s Group 
Went through The Change—With the Help of Drug Industry Money, WASH. MONTHLY, 
Jan./Feb. 2003, at 35 (reporting on drug companies’ influence on a nonprofit called the Society 
for Women’s Health Research, which includes substantial corporate giving, sitting on the 
“corporate” board, and is ultimately reflected in the Society’s position on various issues). 
 132. The skillful use of review articles has been identified as one strategy used by at least the 
tobacco industry. Deborah E. Barnes & Lisa A. Bero, Why Review Articles on the Health Effects 
of Passive Smoking Reach Different Conclusions, 279 JAMA 1566 (1998) (finding that the most 
strongly supported explanation for the discrepancy in reviews assessing the impact of passive 
smoking was whether or not they were written by authors affiliated with the tobacco industry). 
Some journals will not accept these commissioned review articles, although the ability of 
journals to police conflict disclosures is limited. See supra note 127. 
 The creation of handpicked or “stacked” expert panels is even more commonplace. See, 
e.g., GLANTZ ET AL., supra note 103, at 32–33 (summarizing that the Tobacco Industry Research 
Committee (TIRC, later renamed Council for Tobacco Research (CTR)) was formed jointly by 
tobacco companies with the publicly identified purpose of “fund[ing] independent scientific 
research” on hazards of cigarettes, whereas internal documents reflect that its true purpose was 
“to convince the public that the hazards of smoking had not been definitively proven”); 
RICHARD KLUGER, ASHES TO ASHES 164–67, 205–12, 227–29, 466–68 (1996) (describing the 
activities and mission of the tobacco industry’s TIRC/CTR); MUNDY, supra note 90, at 119–21 
(discussing how the manufacturer of Fen-Phen convened an expert panel to review the drug, but 
that many of the experts selected had allegiances to the company). 
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replicate the commissioned results.133 Moreover, in contrast to 
federally funded research, private research is not subject to the 
scientific-misconduct or research-objectivity regulations promulgated 
by the U.S. Office of Research Integrity.134 Thus, virtually all quality 
checks on much of this “offscreen” research depend on the rigor of 
scientific journals and their peer review processes. Yet deficiencies in 
these processes have been well documented.135 Thus, for much 
research on the harms created by externalities, actors with a sufficient 
stake in the outcome and with the financial wherewithal to exert 
influence can significantly affect the trajectory of scientific 
knowledge, at least in the short term. 
C. Exceptions to the General Rule 
It may not always be in a rational actor’s interest to perpetuate 
ignorance about the social costs of its activities.136 If an actor loses 
when the safety of its activities is not adequately assessed, the 
incentives are obviously reversed. For example, legal rules that 
presume the worst can create powerful incentives to conduct 
research.137 Under these circumstances, because research might 
produce good news that lessens liability or compliance costs, or at 
 
 133. See, e.g., James S. Coleman, Policy Research in the Social Sciences, in COMM’N ON THE 
OPERATION OF THE SENATE, 94TH CONG., 2D SESS., POLICY ANALYSIS ON MAJOR ISSUES 25, 
27–29, 40 (Comm. Print 1977) (contrasting policy research from “discipline research” and 
discussing how the incentives for conducting policy research lie predominantly outside of the 
scientific community); DANIEL SAREWITZ, FRONTIERS OF ILLUSION: SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, 
AND THE POLITICS OF PROGRESS 98 (1996) (“[T]he science community . . . ascribes the greatest 
intellectual and social prestige to basic or ‘pure’ research—the source of new knowledge—while 
viewing the role of applied research and technology development as more concrete, less 
difficult, and therefore less intrinsically worthy.”). 
 134. See Responsibility of PHS Awardee and Applicant Institutions for Dealing With and 
Reporting Possible Misconduct in Science, 42 C.F.R. §§ 50.101–50.105 (2003); HSS 
Responsibility of Applicants For Promoting Objectivity in Research for Which PHS Funding Is 
Sought, 42 C.F.R. §§ 50.601–50.607 (2003). 
 135. See, e.g., DARYL E. CHUBIN & EDWARD J. HACKETT, PEERLESS SCIENCE: PEER 
REVIEW AND THE U.S. SCIENCE POLICY 94 (1990) (identifying the limitations of scientific peer 
review, including presenting evidence of caprice and bias, such as favoring famous authors, that 
sometimes play a larger role than the quality of the authors’ work in a peer reviewer’s 
evaluation); SHEILA JASANOFF, THE FIFTH BRANCH: SCIENCE ADVISERS AS POLICYMAKERS 
69–71 (1990) (discussing studies that purport to show the influence of various forms of bias in 
the peer review process). 
 136. If there is no perceived benefit or cost-effective way to combat publicly disseminated 
research regarding an actor’s externalities, the actor will simply not invest in challenging the 
research. 
 137. See also infra Part IV.C.2. 
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least better news than existing status quo assumptions, it pays to 
invest in research. The breast implant and Bendectin companies’ 
investment in additional research in response to plaintiff verdicts 
provides a case in point.138 Similarly, an actor may worry that local 
communities will express animosity about its pollution through costly 
lawsuits and picketing, both of which are potentially damaging to the 
actor’s corporate image. In such cases, an actor may seek to stave off 
these potentially costly problems by conducting a legitimate and 
publicly accessible self-study. More subtle but perhaps much more 
powerful are the incentives created by worst-case cancer assumptions 
(i.e., precautionary policies) used by the EPA to regulate 
carcinogens.139 The EPA’s default assumption that there is a linear 
dose-response relationship for cancer, with the lowest doses still 
leading to harm, has provided a strong incentive for actors to 
collectively fund research on carcinogenesis.140 This research, set 
against the worst-case background, can only be expected to produce 
good news relative to regulatory standards set at zero. In fact, at least 
some of the advances in understanding cancer caused by 
 
 138. See Rebecca S. Dresser et al., Breast Implants Revisited: Beyond Science on Trial, 1997 
WISC. L. REV. 705, 743–44 (documenting and citing others who observed that scientific research 
on the adverse effects of breast implants and Bendectin peaked after and as a result of the 
unfavorable products liability litigation). 
 139. In extrapolating from high-dose studies on animals to possible low-dose effects, it is 
necessary to select some type of dose-response curve, but because there is generally no way to 
study low-dose effects, the appropriate curve must be based on policy considerations. As a 
working default dose-response curve, the EPA selects a linear curve for strong and intermediate 
carcinogens and other select substances, meaning that the response to a toxin increases in direct 
proportion to the dose of the toxin. See, e.g., Proposed Guidelines for Carcinogen Risk 
Assessment, 61 Fed. Reg. 17,960, 17,981 (Apr. 23, 1996) (recommending this “default” 
assumption of linearity when there is evidence of adverse effects but not evidence to support an 
assumption that the dose-response relationship is nonlinear); id. at 17,986–90 (listing seven 
examples of types of substances subject to risk assessment and recommending a linear default 
for four of the seven types of substances); see also National Primary Drinking Water 
Regulations, 66 Fed. Reg. 6976, 7004 (Jan. 22, 2001) (“The use of a linear procedure to 
extrapolate from a higher, observed data range to a lower range beyond observation is a science 
policy approach that has been in use by Federal agencies for four decades.”). Also central to this 
working assumption is the corollary assumption that animals provide a reliable surrogate for 
assessing the effects of a toxin on humans. E.g., COMM. ON RISK ASSESSMENT OF HAZARDOUS 
AIR POLLUTANTS, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, SCIENCE AND JUDGMENT IN RISK 
ASSESSMENT 86 (1994) [hereinafter NRC, SCIENCE AND JUDGMENT]. 
 140. See, e.g., Sean M. Hays et al., Potential Uses of PBPK Modeling to Improve the 
Regulation of Exposure to Toxic Compounds, RISK POL’Y REP. (Inside Wash. Publishers, 
Arlington, D.C.), Dec. 18, 1998, at 37 (industry consultant describes and advocates greater use 
of intricate and assumption-laden modeling for estimating cancer risks, a technique that is still 
limited by the unavailability of data for most chemicals and pollutants). 
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environmental contaminants is undoubtedly due in part to private 
sector investments in research encouraged by the EPA’s protective 
regulations.141 
Although certain markets might also reward as heroes those 
companies that take proactive steps to ensure that their products and 
activities do not create harmful externalities,142 in the environmental 
law context such protective actions often follow, rather than precede, 
laws that require actors to avoid these harmful activities.143 For 
example, regulations passed under the Marine Mammal Protection 
Act (MMPA) prohibit U.S. tuna companies from catching tuna with 
nets that injure dolphins.144 When there was a public outcry because 
tuna was still being caught by fleets that were not complying with 
these requirements, Congress passed a second law providing for the 
use of “dolphin safe” labels to allow consumers to identify tuna 
caught with dolphin safe nets.145 Faced with a public boycott if they 
continued to purchase from tuna suppliers who harmed dolphin, 
companies like StarKist supported and even encouraged such a 
federal labeling law. Federal labeling requirements could help them 
regain disenfranchised consumers, while at the same time portraying 
the tuna companies as corporate philanthropists who voluntarily 
relinquished profits to save dolphins.146 Thus, despite preexisting laws 
 
 141. The American Chemistry Council’s Long Range Initiative Program (LRI) exemplifies 
industry’s research investments in understanding the mechanisms of carcinogenesis. See, e.g., 
American Chemistry Council, Long Range Initiative (LRI) program, available at 
http://www.uslri.org; LRI, The Chloroform Story: How Science Can Improve Regulatory 
Decision-making, LRI PERSPECTIVES, Sept. 2003 (describing industry-funded research on 
chloroform that revealed that higher concentrations of chlorine were safe for public health in 
contrast to the EPA’s assumption that there was no safe dose of chlorine), available at 
http://www.uslri.org/documents/cat_25/doc_362.pdf. 
 142. For an elaboration on when there might be competition to be heroic, see Richard H. 
McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH. L. REV. 338, 369–72 
(1997). 
 143. Cf. supra note 39 and infra Part II.A. 
  144. See, e.g., Taking and Related Acts Incidental to Commercial Fishing Operations by 
Tuna Purse Seine Vessels in the Eastern Tropical Pacific Ocean, 50 C.F.R. § 216.24 (restricting 
the use of purse-seine nets in the eastern, tropical Pacific Ocean); see also Marine Mammal 
Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1371 and 1374 (2000). 
 145. See Dolphin Protection Consumer Information Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1385 (2000); see also 
Susan C. Alker, Comment, The Marine Mammal Protection Act: Refocusing the Approach to 
Conservation, 44 UCLA L. REV. 527, 557 (1996) (describing the public outcry that led to 
legislation for “labeling tuna cans as dolphin safe”). 
 146. See, e.g., Alker, supra note 145, at 557–58 (discussing StarKist and several other tuna 
companies’ reaction to the public boycott and observing that these tuna companies came away 
“looking like ‘good guys’ who cared more about dolphins than profits”). Shortly after adopting 
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that had already attempted to require dolphin-safe tuna in the U.S., 
StarKist and other tuna producers were viewed as corporate heroes. 
Additionally, of course, a firm might simply not act rationally 
and might voluntarily produce information on externalities, even if 
such information would potentially reduce profits and increase 
liability.147 Indeed, a growing body of literature suggests that 
corporate managers respond to a variety of stimuli when making 
decisions.148 To the extent that a corporation does not consider its 
immediate financial interests in deciding whether to voluntarily 
produce information regarding its potential externalities, then, it 
might not follow the rational paths of action previously discussed. 
 
this dolphin safe policy, StarKist used it to its advantage in promotional materials, prompting 
one competitor to note, “They took a half-page ad in the New York Times and they only 
stopped murdering the dolphins the week before.” Michael J. McDermott, Charlie and the 
Mermaid Sing a Different Tuna; Tuna Marketing and Environmental Policy, FOOD & BEV. 
MKTG., Sept. 1990, at 24. 
 147. This possibility is lessened somewhat by the limited legal requirements that encourage 
this production, see infra Part II, and the growing number of legal incentives that discourage 
information production, see supra Parts I.A, I.B; infra Part III. The possibility that firms might 
voluntarily produce information about how their products, wastes, or activities harm health and 
the environment also seems diminished by the reality that firms might not realize the large 
deficits in information. See infra Part IV.A. In fact, it appears that the necessary conditions for 
enforcing norms and rewarding compliance are largely absent. For one, it is not clear at what 
point the norm to produce information is triggered, or how much information is enough. Also, 
as detailed throughout Part I, there is little chance of third parties evaluating whether the norm 
has been violated. Thus, at least two of the three conditions for norm-based enforcement are 
missing. See McAdams, supra note 142, at 358 (identifying three conditions under which “the 
desire for esteem produces a [behavioral] norm” in a given population of individuals: (1) there is 
“consensus about the positive or negative esteem worthiness of engaging in [that behavior],” (2) 
there is “risk that others will detect whether one engages in [the behavior],” and (3) both the 
“consensus and risk of detection [are] well-known within the . . . population”); cf. Clifford 
Rechtschaffen, Deterrence vs. Cooperation and the Evolving Theory of Environmental 
Enforcement, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 1181, 1193–94 (1998) (discussing skepticism that corporations 
will comply with environmental laws out of a sense of social responsibility, rather than because 
of the threat of sanctions or other deterrents). 
 148. See, e.g., IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: 
TRANSCENDING THE DEREGULATION DEBATE 22 (1992) (“[Business informants] claimed that 
they and their colleagues took seriously business responsibility, ethics, and obligations . . . to be 
responsive to nonshareholding stakeholders in the corporation.”). But see JAMES V. DELONG, 
OUT OF BOUNDS, OUT OF CONTROL: REGULATORY ENFORCEMENT AT THE EPA 24 (arguing 
that the EPA’s “arbitrary enforcement tends to encourage lawbreaking because business 
acceptance of the modern environmental ethic depends in part upon reasonableness”). 
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II.  THE LAWS DO NOT REQUIRE THE  
PRODUCTION OF NEEDED INFORMATION 
Laws that require the production and disclosure of financial 
information are considered vital to ensuring a thriving securities 
market and strong corporate governance.149 Information on the 
potential health and environmental harms caused by dangerous 
products and polluting activities seems at least as important for 
informed consumer and regulatory decisions. Indeed, the case for 
legal intervention is especially compelling for the production of 
environmental and health information given the lack of incentives for 
private actors to produce this information, and, in some cases, their 
parallel inclination to actually discredit the information that is 
available.150 Nonetheless, current laws implemented by the EPA 
generally do not require information on a given product’s or activity’s 
risks or harms.151 
Most environmental laws do aspire to ensure that needed 
information on environmental harms is developed and, in some cases, 
the laws even demand that actors bear full responsibility for 
producing this information. Every major environmental statute 
includes among its opening goals a declaration that externalities be 
identified and regulated so that the public and the environment will 
 
 149. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Market Failure and the Economic Case for a Mandatory 
Disclosure System, 70 VA. L. REV. 717, 734–37 (1984) (discussing, with empirical evidence 
(decreased price dispersion), the social benefits of the federal securities laws, in addition to their 
benefit to investors); Louis Lowenstein, Financial Transparency and Corporate Governance: 
You Manage What You Measure, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1335, 1335 (1996) (discussing why 
corporate financial reporting in the United States “is so much better than that elsewhere, why it 
contributes so much to the fairness and efficiency of our financial markets, and most particularly 
why it has contributed so much to effective corporate governance and oversight”); Joseph E. 
Stiglitz, The Contributions of the Economics of Information to Twentieth Century Economics, 
115 Q. J. ECON., 1441, 1467–68 (2000) (concluding that “[l]egal institutions—from reporting 
requirements to strong fraud laws to laws to protect minority shareholders from the majority—
are all essential parts of a broad system of corporate governance” needed to counteract 
problems arising out of asymmetric information and incentives for strategic behavior). 
 150. See infra Part III.C. 
 151. This Article considers only the laws administered by the EPA, even though similar 
problems may arise in public health programs administered by the Occupational Safety and 
Health Administration and the Food and Drug Administration and in natural resource 
programs administered by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, the Forest 
Service, and various agencies in the Department of the Interior. See also BREYER, supra note 
28, at 23–26 (discussing the classic justification for regulation based on preventing negative 
spillovers, but neglecting to consider as an added justification for social regulation the goal of 
requiring actors who engage in the negative spillovers to produce preliminary information about 
their activities, particularly when they enjoy superior information about the activities). 
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be fully protected, or at least protected to the extent reasonable or 
feasible. These statutes also require actors to actively assist in 
ensuring that public health and the environment are adequately 
protected.152 In several statutes, in fact, the laws specifically direct the 
manufacturers or polluters to produce all needed information on the 
safety of their products or activities so that regulators can determine 
an appropriate regulatory response.153 In the Toxic Substances 
Control Act (TSCA),154 for example, Congress declared as one of the 
statutory goals that “adequate [safety] data . . . be developed . . . and 
that the development of such data should be the responsibility of 
those who manufacture and those who process such chemical 
substances and mixtures.”155 
Despite these noble statutory intentions, however, the 
regulation- and litigation-driven implementation of these laws 
nevertheless allows actors to escape much of the responsibility for 
producing vital information on the externalities that they create.156 
 
 152. Virtually all of the environmental laws require at least some actors to identify 
themselves as creating an externality, and to explicate the general nature of that externality. See, 
e.g., Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), 7 U.S.C. § 136a (2000) 
(requiring manufacturers of new pesticides to conduct specific tests on the pesticide and obtain 
registration from the EPA before marketing the pesticide); TSCA, 15 U.S.C. § 2604 (requiring 
manufacturers of new chemicals to submit a premanufacture notification); Clean Water Act 
(CWA), 33 U.S.C. § 1321(a)(2) (2000) (prohibiting the point source discharge of pollution 
without a permit); RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6922 (2000) (requiring generators to test their wastes to 
determine whether they are hazardous); id. §§ 6923–25 (2000) (requiring transporters and 
treatment, storage, and disposal units handling hazardous wastes to self-identify and follow 
regulatory requirements); Clean Air Act (CAA), 42 U.S.C. § 7412(i) (2000) (prohibiting the 
emissions of air toxins in major amounts without a permit that specifies emissions limits for the 
source); Comprehensive Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C.  
§ 9603 (2000) (requiring persons in charge to report releases of reportable quantities of 
hazardous substances); Environmental Planning and Community Right-To-Know Act 
(EPCRA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 11,002–11,003, 11,022–11,023 (2000) (requiring covered facilities to self-
identify; report their storage, use, and disposal of hazardous substances; and prepare an 
emergency response plan). Failure to self-identify can lead to both criminal and civil sanctions. 
E.g., CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1319 (2000). 
 153. See infra Part II.A. 
 154. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2692 (2000). 
 155. Id. § 2601(b)(1). 
 156. The statutes that are most emphatic in requiring actors to produce information have 
not always been written or implemented in ways that ensure production of the needed research. 
As discussed at infra Part III.A.1, by requiring only the submission of “available” information 
on the safety of new and existing chemicals, TSCA generally provides disincentives for 
conducting new, voluntary research on chemical safety. EPCRA is written and implemented in 
a similar, perverse fashion. The statute requires some information of the harmful properties of a 
substance for the EPA to designate it as one of the chemicals in need of disclosure. See 42 
U.S.C. § 11,002(a)(4) (empowering the EPA administrator to designate a substance as 
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This Part discusses the shortcomings of the existing environmental 
laws in ensuring the production of needed information. The first half 
of the Part surveys the limited, affirmative requirements that the laws 
do impose on actors for producing information about adverse effects. 
The second half then explores the various types of information that 
actors are not required to produce, even though much of this 
information is privately held and is vital to assessing the harm that 
results from private activities. 
A. Information That Actors Are Required to Produce 
Environmental laws, as currently implemented, limit the 
demands placed on actors to account for the harms that their 
products and activities create. There are only three circumstances 
under which actors are routinely required to produce information 
about their externalities, and they are discussed below. 
1. Manufacturers of Certain New, Hazardous Products (E.g., 
Pesticides and “Suspect” Toxic Substances) and a Smaller Set of 
Existing Hazardous Products Are Required to Conduct Prescribed 
Toxicity Tests to Get or Keep Their Products on the Market. EPA 
regulations require manufacturers to conduct a series of mandated 
toxicological tests and obtain agency approval before marketing a 
new pesticide.157 The EPA can also require toxicity testing for existing 
 
hazardous based on its toxicity). Predictably, regulated parties vigorously challenge the listings 
as insufficiently supported. The D.C. Circuit agreed for at least one chemical, not appearing to 
notice the irony of a disclosure statute that allows polluters to avoid disclosure requirements if 
they skillfully avoid researching the safety (or harmfulness) of a toxic pollutant. See Troy v. 
Browner, 120 F.3d 277, 293 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (rejecting as arbitrary the EPA’s decision to 
designate the chemical DMP as hazardous under EPCRA because both of the studies on which 
the EPA relied—the only two available studies on DMP—were performed in the Soviet Union 
during the 1960s and were insufficiently documented). 
 157. With only a few exceptions, all new pesticides are required to undergo a relatively 
thorough battery of safety tests pursuant to the registration requirements of FIFRA. 7 U.S.C.  
§ 136a. Because existing pesticides are grandfathered into the regulatory program and must be 
tested after the fact, there is considerably less data available on them. Id. § 136a-1; see also 
Neurotoxic Pesticides; Availability of Data Call-In Notice, 64 Fed. Reg. 42,945 (Aug. 6, 1999) 
(requiring manufacturers of existing pesticides, for the first time, “to conduct acute, sub-chronic, 
and developmental neurotoxicity studies” on pesticide products). However, the need to set 
pesticide tolerances under the Food Quality Protection Act, 21 U.S.C. § 346a(b)(2) (2000), is 
causing the EPA to place some additional testing demands on manufacturers of existing 
pesticides. See, e.g., Envtl. Prot. Agency, Endocrine Disrupter Screening Program, at 
http://www.epa.gov/scipoly/oscpendo/ (last visited Sept. 27, 2004) (on file with the Duke Law 
Journal) (providing information on the EPA’s “approach and progress for screening and testing 
chemicals for potential endocrine disruption”). 
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pesticides,158 although this testing is not automatic and must be 
instigated by the agency.159 
Testing can also be mandated for toxic substances, although this 
rarely occurs.160 If the EPA determines that a new toxic substance 
 
Under FIFRA, the EPA has developed a chart setting out the series of tests that a 
manufacturer must conduct before a pesticide is permitted to enter the market. EPA Data 
Requirements for Registration, 40 C.F.R. pt. 158 (2003) (setting forth a basic core set of over 
one hundred studies that would assist in determining the effects of pesticides); EPA Toxicology 
Data Requirements, 40 C.F.R. § 158.340 (providing a table for all testing requirements and 
guidelines under FIFRA). 
Vigorous testing of new products is justified because, as noted previously, manufacturers 
have superior knowledge about product contents and therefore are in the best position to 
conduct these tests. In addition, manufacturers can test early in the course of product 
development, thereby avoiding the costs associated with marketing a product unlikely to pass 
muster with the agency. In some cases, a manufacturer can also use test results to modify a 
product’s composition and, in so doing, to reduce its negative environmental impact. Research 
on industrial innovation reveals that for chemical products, more than 70 percent of the total 
development time (averaging from seventeen months to four or five years) is dedicated to the 
final stages of product design—after the product is designed, but before the product is 
marketed. See EDWIN MANSFIELD ET AL., RESEARCH AND INNOVATION IN THE MODERN 
CORPORATION 113–15, 118 (1971) (identifying five stages of the design of a product, beginning 
with applied research and ending with manufacturing start-up, and reporting that the final four 
stages consume most of the time of product design but can begin only after the product itself has 
been determined), quoted in GEORGE EADS & PETER REUTER, DESIGNING SAFER PRODUCTS: 
CORPORATE RESPONSES TO PRODUCT LIABILITY LAW AND REGULATION 53–54 (1983). The 
complementary asymmetries in information discussed in Part I.B.1, supra, make placing the 
responsibility on manufacturers for safety testing only that much more cost-effective. 
 158. This split between testing for old and new products, although problematic from an 
informational perspective, is partly justified by the economic gains in testing earlier in the life 
cycle and the legal and economic impediments to requiring manufacturers to test products 
already on the market. Cf. James A. Henderson, Jr., Product Liability and the Passage of Time: 
The Imprisonment of Corporate Rationality, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 765, 774 (1983) (“[T]o the extent 
that increases in exposure to liability are likely to flow from reasonable efforts by manufacturers 
to make their products safer, they discourage manufacturers from engaging at the margin in 
precisely the sorts of activities that tort law purports to encourage.”). 
 159. See supra note 158; infra note 198 and accompanying text. 
 160. Except for chemicals produced in high volumes and posing a substantial risk of 
exposure, as set forth in 15 U.S.C. § 2603(a)(1)(A) (2000), TSCA provides the EPA with 
authority to impose testing requirements on new chemicals only if the EPA can demonstrate 
that the existing data are “insufficient” to assess the chemical and the EPA has reason to 
suspect that the new chemical “may present” a risk or hazard. Id. § 2604(e). To get around the 
vicious circle of ignorance built into these regulatory requirements, the EPA has devised a 
“suspect” category of chemicals based on their structural activity, which provides some 
indication, albeit imperfect, of whether they might be hazardous. If the structure of a chemical 
falls into one of these forty-five suspect chemical families, the EPA requires manufacturers to 
run what are often rather extensive tests to ensure that the chemical does not pose a risk. 
Wendy E. Wagner, The Precautionary Principle and Chemical Regulation in the U.S., 6 HUM. 
ECOLOGY RISK ASSESS. 459, 465 (2000). There is even less testing required for existing toxic 
substances. See infra notes 162–63 and accompanying text. 
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poses a potential risk—a determination that is sometimes based solely 
on the substance’s chemical structure—the EPA can require the 
manufacturer to conduct specific toxicity tests before allowing the 
chemical to be marketed.161 The EPA also has the authority to require 
additional testing for existing toxic substances, but the agency must 
first present evidence that the chemical presents a potential risk to 
health or the environment.162 In both cases, the testing is by no means 
automatic and, particularly for existing toxic substances, is generally 
the exception rather than the rule.163 Manufacturers are also required 
to report the “adverse effects” of both pesticides and toxic substances 
already on the market, although these reporting requirements are not 
easily enforced.164 
2. Polluters Who Discharge through a Pipe into Surface Waters 
or Emit or Discard into the Outside Air or onto Land More Than a 
Threshold Amount of Pollution Must Get a Permit and Report Their 
Waste Disposal Activities.165 Current law requires actors to obtain a 
 
 161. See, e.g., U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFFICE, TOXIC SUBSTANCES CONTROL ACT: LEGISLATIVE 
CHANGES COULD MAKE THE ACT MORE EFFECTIVE, at 46 (1994) (discussing the lack of 
testing required of existing chemicals and reporting that “[a]ccording to EPA officials, the 
agency has not used its authority to require more testing, largely because it must undergo a 
lengthy and costly rule-making process”). 
 162. See supra note 152. To avoid challenges under this section, most of the testing 
requirements are negotiated by the EPA with manufacturers through voluntary testing 
agreements. See, e.g., Holly E. Petitt, Comment, Shifting the Experiment to the Lab: Does EPA 
Have a Mandatory Duty To Require Chemical Testing for Endocrine Disruption Effects Under 
the Toxic Substances Control Act?, 30 ENVTL. L. 413, 426–27 (2000) (describing the EPA’s 
expansive use of these testing agreements). 
 163. See, e.g., U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFFICE, supra note 161, at 46 (observing, based on a study of 
TSCA test rules required of existing substances, that “little is known about the effects of many 
chemicals used in commerce”). The inadequate state of testing was the major impetus for the 
High Productive Volume (HPV) Challenge Program, which involves voluntary agreements 
between the EPA and manufacturers to test chemicals produced in high volumes. Information 
about the program is available at the EPA website on the HPV Challenge Program, at 
http://www.epa.gov/opptintr/chemrtk/volchall.htm (last visited Oct. 30, 2004) (on file with the 
Duke Law Journal). This voluntary agreement was accomplished in part because the EPA has 
greater authority under TSCA, 15 U.S.C. § 2603(a)(1)(B), to require testing for this set of 
chemicals because they are produced in higher volumes and hence the exposure risks are 
presumptively greater. 
 164. FIFRA, 7 U.S.C. § 136d(a)(2) (2000) (“If at any time after the reregistration of a 
pesticide the registrant has additional factual information regarding unreasonable adverse 
effects on the environment of the pesticide, the registrant shall submit such information to the 
[EPA] Administrator.”); TSCA, 15 U.S.C. § 2607(c), (e) (reiterating the recordkeeping and 
reporting requirements); see also infra notes 215–17 and accompanying text. 
 165. See, e.g., CWA, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311, 1362(12), 1362(14) (2000) (clarifying that the 
prohibition on “discharging” pollutants into navigable waters without a permit applies only for 
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permit for major pollutant discharges and provide regular self-
monitoring reports that, to the extent possible, account for the 
contaminants in their waste streams.166 In addition, the largest 
dischargers of contaminants often must install monitoring equipment 
on large stacks and pipes within their facilities and are required to 
conduct periodic self-inspections on smaller sources within the facility 
to ensure that the requisite pollution control equipment is in place.167 
(No monitoring of actual emissions is ordinarily required for small 
sources of pollution at these facilities.) Some testing and associated 
recordkeeping are also required of industrial facilities before they 
send wastes off-site.168 The receiving facilities, which ultimately 
dispose, store, or treat these hazardous wastes, are also required to 
keep records of their activities and to monitor the environment into 
which the treated wastes are discharged.169 
To ensure a macroview of the overall magnitude of contaminants 
being released into the environment, the Emergency Planning and 
Community Right to Know Act (EPCRA)170 requires facilities with 
especially large pollution loads to estimate and report the total 
amount of pollution that they generate, release, and ship off-site, on a 
chemical-by-chemical basis.171 However, these estimates need not be 
documented, validated, or peer reviewed; instead, they can be based 
on rough estimates.172 As a result, there are problems of 
 
pollutants discharged through a “discrete conveyance” or point source); RCRA, 42 U.S.C.  
§§ 6922, 6924 (2000) (requiring generators and owners and operators of treatment, storage, and 
disposal facilities of hazardous wastes to meet federal standards for operating the respective 
facilities, which includes periodically testing the wastes); CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7661a(a) (2000) 
(requiring Federal Clean Air Act permits only for “major” sources of emissions, including more 
dispersed “area” sources or other identified large facilities.) 
 166. CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1318(a) (requiring permit holders discharging pollutants to keep 
records and monitor discharges); RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6922(a)(1), (6) (requiring recordkeeping 
and regular reporting of hazardous wastes generated); CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7414(a)(3) (requiring 
enhanced self-monitoring for major stationary sources). The most thorough discussion of the 
self-monitoring requirements in environmental law is Arnold W. Reitze, Jr. & Lee D. Hoffman, 
Self-Reporting and Self-Monitoring Requirements Under Environmental Laws, 1 ENVTL. LAW. 
681 (1995). 
 167. See infra note 250 and accompanying text. 
 168. 42 U.S.C. § 6922(a). Small quantity generators are effectively exempted unless they 
produce extremely hazardous wastes. Id. § 6921(d). 
 169. See 42 U.S.C. § 6924(p), (r), (s), (v). 
 170. EPCRA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 11,001–11,050 (2000). 
 171. EPCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 11,023. 
 172. The regulated party is only required to make “reasonable estimates” using available 
data. If monitoring is not otherwise required by law, the regulated party need not do more than 
make a reasonable estimate. Id. § 11,023(g)(2). An EPA study on the quality of data reported to 
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underreporting by certain facilities, both with regard to whether they 
meet reporting requirements, and with regard to the data that they 
submit about their polluting activities.173 
3. When the Accidental Release of a Hazardous Substance 
Occurs, Actors Must Report This Release If They Believe It to Exceed 
a Specified, Daily “Reportable Quantity.” Actors are required to 
report sudden releases of large amounts of hazardous substances 
from their facilities under threat of civil and criminal penalties.174 If 
responsible for the sudden release, the actor may also be required to 
finance a more extensive risk assessment and, ultimately, to pay for 
resulting cleanup costs and damages to natural resources.175 Under 
these reporting requirements, however, the actor is generally not 
required to measure the release directly and is excused from the 
obligation to report if the release is less than a threshold amount 
(ranging between one pound and five thousand pounds in a day).176 
Due to their superior informational advantages, some actors may 
 
the Toxic Release Inventory (TRI) reveals that manufacturers use monitoring data as one of the 
bases for estimating annual use, release, and disposal of hazardous substances less than 20 
percent of the time, whereas purchase or inventory records are used in making roughly 80 
percent of the estimates. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 1996 TOXIC RELEASE INVENTORY: DATA 
QUALITY REPORT 4-6, tbl.4-1 (1998) [hereinafter EPA TOXIC RELEASE REPORT], available at 
http://www.epa.gov/tri/tridata/data_quality_reports/ index.htm. 
 173. The EPA concludes in its 1996 study of the data quality of the TRI reports that: 
Overall, facilities correctly calculated thresholds for 95% of the EPCRA Section 313 
chemicals used at the selected industries. However, the frequency of incorrect 
threshold determinations suggests that the TRI database might not account for a 
significant quantity of chemicals used at reportable levels. More specifically, the site 
survey results suggest that for RY 1996, facilities correctly reported for 88% of the 
chemicals that actually exceeded thresholds. 
EPA TOXIC RELEASE REPORT, supra note 172, at 4-17. There was also systematic 
underreporting of air releases and off-site transfers (by as much as half the true amount). Id. at 
5-14 tbl.5-2; 6-9 fig.6.2a. 
 174. See CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9603(a) (requiring the “person in charge” of a facility to 
report releases of “reportable quantities” of “a hazardous substance”). Under the Clean Water 
Act, the actor must report the release of any pollution, including oil and nonhazardous 
substances, into navigable waters. See CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(5) (requiring the “person in 
charge” of a vessel or facility to report “any discharge of oil or a hazardous substance” that 
exceeds quantities promulgated by the EPA). Notification requirements governing releases 
from, and even the physical existence of, underground storage tanks are more expansive under 
RCRA, however. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 6991a and 6991b. 
 175. The damages for which responsible parties may be liable are set forth in the following 
provisions: CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(9), (10); Oil Pollution Act (OPA), 33 U.S.C. § 2702(b) 
(2000); RCRA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6924(u)–(w) and 6991d; CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(A)–(D). 
 176. Designation of Hazardous Substances, 40 C.F.R. § 302.4 tbl.302.4 (2003). 
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succeed in underestimating release levels and forgo reporting with 
little chance of being caught.177 
B. Information That Actors Are Not Required to Produce 
Except for the circumscribed sets of products and circumstances 
described above, actors are generally off the hook when it comes to 
identifying and analyzing the harms created by their products and 
activities. Even when actors are required to collect such information, 
these self-assessments are limited in scope, except for cleanups.178 
Typically actors are only required to provide information about the 
nature of the activity and not information about its possible adverse 
effects.179 Indeed, as discussed in this Section, existing laws allow most 
private actors to avoid responsibility for providing any information 
about the harms created by their products and activities. It is instead 
left to the public, particularly government agencies, to collect and 
assess this information.180 
1. As Long As Their Activities Do Not Fall into the Discrete Sets 
of “Covered” Acts Identified Above, Polluters and Manufacturers of 
Hazardous Products Bear No Legal Responsibility for Producing Any 
 
 177. See, e.g., Blais et al., supra note 19, at 22–23 (discussing the ways that facilities can 
avoid reporting unexpected, large releases of air toxins under the current regulatory system). 
 178. See supra note 172 and accompanying text. 
 179. All of the pollutant monitoring requirements discussed in notes 165–73 and 
accompanying text, supra, require monitoring only of the characteristics of the waste stream, not 
of the probable or actual impacts on the environment. At best, responsibility for information 
production stops at the discharge point. For a discussion of the limited ecological tests required 
of the manufacturers of pesticides and toxic substances, see infra notes 198–99 and 
accompanying text. 
 180. In all cases, it is the regulator, rather than the actor, who identifies the substances that 
need monitoring. See CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(2)(C)–(D) (referencing a House Committee 
Report list of 126 toxic substances for which technology-based standards must be promulgated 
under the Clean Water Act); Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA), 42 U.S.C. § 300g-1 (2000) 
(instructing the EPA to identify and set standards for drinking water contaminants); RCRA, 42 
U.S.C. § 6921(a)–(b) (directing the EPA to list hazardous wastes and to develop other 
hazardous waste listing criteria); CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7412(b) (2000) (listing 189 air toxins for 
which technology-based standards must be promulgated); EPCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 11,023 (2000) 
(establishing various reporting requirements for facilities that handle or dispose of more than a 
threshold amount of a list of hazardous substances specified by Congress in the authorizing 
statute); see also Atl. States Legal Found., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak, 12 F.3d 353, 358 (2d Cir. 
1993) (recounting the EPA’s CWA enforcement position, which allows the release (even in 
large quantities) of toxics not listed in a Clean Water Act permit); EPA, Addition of Certain 
Chemicals; Toxic Chemical Release Reporting; Community Right-To-Know, 59 Fed. Reg. 1788 
(Jan. 12, 1994). 
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Information about Their Activities and Remain Essentially Invisible to 
Regulators and the Public. Although new and some old pesticides 
must undergo mandatory safety testing at the EPA’s command,181 no 
toxic substance needs to be tested unless there is some evidence that 
the chemical presents a potential risk.182 This creates a “Catch 22” 
situation, because manufacturers can (and have) challenged the 
EPA’s test requirements by arguing that the agency has insufficient 
evidence to show a risk of harm sufficient to justify testing.183 This 
loophole may help to explain the absence of any toxicity information 
on 80 percent of the forty-five thousand products already in 
commerce before 1984: under the prevailing interpretation of its 
testing authority, the EPA faces significant obstacles in justifying 
additional testing requirements for these untested chemicals.184 
Industrial actors similarly avoid a variety of disclosure and 
regulatory requirements about the disposal of hazardous wastes if 
they determine that the wastes do not qualify (in toxicity and volume) 
as hazardous. In some cases, they are permitted to use their own 
knowledge about the substance as the sole basis for the estimation, 
with no requirement for having this knowledge validated by an 
objective third party.185 Moreover, as previously noted, actors need 
not even monitor or report spills of toxins unless they appear—to the 
actor—to exceed a threshold amount.186 
2. Even When There Is Information Indicating That a Particular 
Activity or Product Is Likely Causing Harm, There Are a Number of 
Circumstances for Which Actors Are Legally Excused from Reporting 
 
 181. See supra note 157 and accompanying text. 
 182. Although TSCA does not demand that the EPA produce definitive proof of chemical 
hazards, it generally does require that the agency have some scientific evidence that a chemical 
presents a risk before imposing testing requirements, warnings, or use restrictions on a 
manufacturer. See TSCA, 15 U.S.C. § 2604(e) (2000) (permitting the EPA to require additional 
safety testing if it has reason to suspect that the new or existing chemical “may present” a risk or 
hazard); see also 15 U.S.C. § 2603(a)(1)(B)(i) (placing a lighter burden on the EPA to require 
testing on high production volume chemicals, and requiring only that the agency show a 
substantial risk of exposure). 
 183. The EPA must establish a “more-than-theoretical” probability of a hazard or 
significant risk of exposure to require additional testing. See, e.g., Chem. Mfrs. Ass’n v. EPA, 
859 F.2d 977, 984 (D.C. Cir. 1988). 
 184. NRC, TOXICITY TESTING, supra note 10; see also supra notes 23–24 and accompanying 
text. 
 185.  Criteria For Listing Hazardous Waste, 40 C.F.R. § 262.11 (2003); see also infra notes 
252–55 and accompanying text. 
 186. See supra Part II.A.3. 
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or Monitoring Their Harmful Activities. In virtually every state, actors 
who use pesticides and fertilizers that wash off into rivers and lakes as 
runoff escape accountability for producing information about their 
activities, even though these actors appear responsible for more than 
half of the water pollution in the United States.187 Likewise, no 
monitoring of emissions or ambient air is required for the smaller 
sources of toxic air pollution under the Clean Air Act (although some 
standard pollution control technologies are usually required), even if 
cumulatively these sources account for a significant amount of the 
toxic air pollution emitted by large industrial facilities.188 Even actors 
who unexpectedly release toxic air pollutants as a result of a 
malfunction or change in operations, or who discover that controls 
designed to reduce the pollutant load have failed, may not be 
required to measure, repair, or even report the problem.189 
 
 187. See, e.g., U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFFICE, GREATER EPA LEADERSHIP NEEDED TO REDUCE 
NONPOINT SOURCE POLLUTION 8 (1990) (reporting that nonpoint source pollution is a 
predominant problem for 76 percent of the lakes, 65 percent of the streams, and 45 percent of 
the estuaries that fail to meet water quality standards). 
 188. See National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants for Source Categories, 
40 C.F.R. pt. 63 (2003) (providing no requirements for monitoring emissions). But these sources 
cumulatively do contribute a significant source of toxic air pollution in some urban areas. For 
example, in 1999, roughly one-third of the total emissions of hazardous air pollutants (HAPs) 
reported under EPCRA in Texas were from fugitive sources. (The search was done by 
requesting details on air emissions through the EPA’s TRI Explorer Database which can be 
accessed at http://www.epa.gov/tri/). Indeed, beyond excusing facilities from ambient 
monitoring, the regulations provide facilities with fugitive sources wide latitude in self-
monitoring their compliance with required pollution control equipment. Under the regulations, 
a facility is required to self-inspect to ensure compliance with technology-based requirements 
for fugitive emissions sources only at specified intervals, sometimes as infrequently as once per 
year. See Storage Vessel Provisions—Procedures to Determine Compliance, 40 C.F.R.  
§ 63.120(a) (requiring visual inspections only once annually for storage vessels). When a facility 
catches its own violation, there is a period of time during which the facility can repair the 
problem without penalty. Under some fugitive pollution rules, this excused repair time can be as 
long as forty-five days. Id. § 63.120(a)(4). Theoretically, then, a facility may be able to emit 
HAPs from some fugitive sources in violation of an emissions requirement for as long as one 
year and forty-three days without violating air quality regulations. At the same time, these 
emissions would probably not be reportable emissions events because they would likely not 
exceed the reportable quantity over a twenty-four-hour period. 
 189. Malfunctions and unexcused releases must be reported only when the operator knows 
that the release exceeds the daily reportable quantity set for one or more hazardous substances 
under CERCLA. 42 U.S.C. § 9603(a) (2000). As a result, most releases need not be reported at 
all. Even when they are reported and the state agency or the EPA determines that they are 
preventable, corrective action could be required only if the emissions event produced a risk to 
health and safety (a data intensive inquiry). See, e.g., Texas Emissions Event Law, TEX. 
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 382.0216(b) (Vernon 2001). 
WAGNER FINAL.DOC 2/9/2005 11:06 AM 
2004] COMMONS IGNORANCE 1673 
Actors owning land that leaches toxic substances onto 
neighboring land, into public recreational resources, or into other 
water supplies (including drinking water supplies), are effectively 
immunized from accounting for their pollution if the amount 
“appears” smaller than the reportable quantities defined by 
regulations.190 The contamination may only be discovered if a 
governmental entity or other third party identifies the problem.191 
Under existing regulatory requirements, for example, Beatrice Foods, 
a defendant-polluter in the Civil Action drama, was legally able to 
ignore the fact that its wastes were dissipating into the groundwater 
until someone else discovered them (for example, local families trying 
to find a cause for the high rate of childhood cancer in their 
community).192 Actors who formerly conducted hazardous disposal 
operations on land that they no longer own, or who sent wastes to 
dangerous dump sites, also appear to bear no responsibility for 
volunteering information about their prior activities, and, given their 
liability risks, are undoubtedly disinclined to do so.193 
 
 190. See CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(5) (requiring reports of spills of oil and hazardous 
substances only above a threshold amount and, even then, only from vessels or facilities, thus 
excluding runoff); CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9603(a) (requiring reports of releases of hazardous 
substances only if they exceed a “reportable quantity”). 
 191. Ultimately, owners can be held liable if their contributions are discovered and lead to 
response costs or cleanup activities. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9604(a), 9606(a), 9607(a). But until then, 
owners are free from responsibility. Recall some of the surprises this limited accountability 
brings. See supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
 192. This is the scenario that unfolded in the Beatrice Foods scandal, chronicled in A Civil 
Action. See HARR, supra note 21. Companies such as Beatrice Foods can take such a position 
provided that they do not have “knowledge” of the release of a reportable quantity of a 
hazardous substance, which is based on a daily rate of leaking that seems incapable of measure 
because of the passive nature of the release and that in any event is likely below reportable 
quantities because of the gradual leaching. See 42 U.S.C. § 9603(a) (“Any person . . . shall, as 
soon as he has knowledge of any release . . . of a hazardous substance from such vessel or facility 
in quantities equal to or greater than those determined pursuant to section 102 of this title, 
immediately notify the National Response Center . . . of such release.”); Designation of 
Hazardous Substances, 40 C.F.R. § 302.4 (2003) (listing reportable quantities of various 
hazardous substances); see also HARR, supra note 21, at 491 (reporting that the EPA later “filed 
suit against both W.R. Grace and Beatrice Foods to recover the costs of the cleanup project,” 
but that the EPA appears not to have filed a claim for failure to report). 
 193. Reporting is only required for the “person in charge,” which appears not to include 
past activities or peripheral actors (although the EPA could in theory define the term more 
broadly). CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9603(a). By contrast, past owners, generators, and transporters 
can all be strictly and jointly and severally liable for any resulting cleanup required at a site 
contaminated with hazardous substances. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a). Under such a scenario, it seems 
unlikely that these potentially responsible parties (who appear not to be the “person in charge”) 
will be very helpful in identifying the past history of dangerous hazardous sites, much less 
volunteering that these sites exist. 
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3. In Addition to Being Excused from Monitoring or Reporting 
Potentially Harmful Activities, Manufacturing and Polluting Firms Are 
Also Excused from Researching the Adverse Effects of Most of Their 
Activities on Health and the Environment, Leaving the Public and 
Victims to do the Scientific Research. With the single exception of 
requiring responsible parties to assess contamination at hazardous 
waste or similar sites,194 actors are rarely required to support, much 
less conduct, ambient monitoring on the environment, even if their 
pollution or products cumulatively cause residents to become 
physically ill195 or are suspected of contributing to fish kills in 
recreational rivers.196 In fact, only rarely are actors required to 
account for the effects of their pollution or products on public health 
and the environment. For example, developers of wetlands are not 
required to conduct research on the wetlands they hope to fill to show 
that they are not environmentally valuable. On the contrary, 
opponents to the development must bear the burden of conducting 
this research, even though the land is often privately held and its 
 
 194. See supra notes 174–75 and accompanying text. 
 195. Sprayers of pesticide products, for example, might be required by state law to post signs 
alerting neighbors to the spraying. See N. Y. State Pesticide Coalition, Inc. v. Jorling, 874 F.2d 
115 (2d Cir. 1989) (discussing such requirements in New York and determining they were not 
preempted by FIFRA). However, sprayers are neither required by federal law, nor generally by 
state law, to conduct monitoring of neighboring populations to ensure that they are adequately 
protected. Monitoring for the effects of pesticides, if done at all, is conducted and funded by 
state and federal governments. See, e.g., Laws to Protect Public from Pesticides Not Being 
Followed, at http://www.mncenter.org/p.asp?WebPage_ID=24&Profile_ID=112 (Oct. 1, 2001) 
(arguing that the “Minnesota Department of Agriculture . . . has violated Minnesota law by 
failing to adequately monitor pesticide use and contamination” in Minnesota); California 
Department of Pesticide Regulation pesticide monitoring website, http://www.cdpr.ca.gov/ 
docs/empm/pubs/tribal/tribproj.htm (last visited Mar. 3, 2004) (discussing an herbicide 
monitoring project on tribal lands in California conducted by both the State and U.S. EPA at 
tribes’ request). 
 196. There are, for the most part, only three circumstances in which a party suspected of 
contributing to health or environmental problems may be required to reimburse the 
government for the expense of assessment: (1) the liability provisions of CERCLA are met (i.e., 
the hazard is a CERCLA “hazardous substance,” the party falls into one of the four categories 
of liable parties, and the government incurred response costs or injunctive relief is justified), 42 
U.S.C. §§ 9604(a), 9606(a), 9607(a); (2) there is a sudden discharge of oil or hazardous 
substances into navigable waters punishable under CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1321(f) or OPA, 33 U.S.C. 
§ 2702; or (3) the release presents an imminent and substantial endangerment to public health 
and welfare under the CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1364(a), RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6973(a), or CAA, 42 
U.S.C. § 7603. If one of these narrow conditions is met, the EPA or other parties (under more 
limited circumstances) may bring a suit against the party to recover the assessment damages or 
force them to study the harm. Id. 
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owners can deny the access needed for research.197 Even 
manufacturers of new pesticides are not required to do field testing 
except when the EPA determines that this added research is needed 
as a result of the high potential for ecological harm.198 Likewise, 
manufacturers of toxic substances—who are, in any case, generally 
excused from testing their products—are rarely, if ever, required to 
conduct anything more than laboratory toxicity tests once the EPA 
mandates testing.199 
 
 197. Developers and other wetland-fillers identify themselves as falling under the regulatory 
crosshairs of section 404 of the Clean Water Act, the “wetland provision,” 33 U.S.C. § 1344, a 
self-determination that includes a number of exemptions. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(e)–(f). Once parties 
determine that the regulatory requirements apply to them, they must fill out an application and, 
if their development is not water dependent, must typically prove that there are no practicable 
alternative sites. (If their development is water dependent, they do not need to make this 
showing). After they provide this information, their homework is done. A permit application is 
available at http://www.spk.usace.army.mil/organizations//cespk-co/regulatory/pdf/ENG4345.pdf 
(last visited Oct. 30, 2004) (on file with the Duke Law Journal). No inventory of the wetlands, 
plant life, ecological functions, or wildlife is required unless the Army Corps of Engineers or the 
EPA ultimately decide that added assessments are required (usually pursuant to the National 
Environmental Policy Act) and also decide that the developer should conduct or finance that 
assessment. Otherwise, those opposing a wetlands development or the EPA, Corps, or affected 
state must prove that the wetlands have “significant” ecological value and that its destruction 
will significantly impact water quality or other ecological goods. See generally Permits for 
Discharges of Dredged or Fill Material into Waters of the United States, 33 C.F.R. pt. 323 
(2003) (codifying practices that the Army Corps of Engineers must follow in issuing permits 
under the CWA); 404 Regulations, 40 C.F.R. pt. 232 (2003) (defining activities exempt from 
EPA regulation). 
 198. There are some ecological tests that pesticide manufacturers may be required to 
conduct when the expected harm is expected to be high, but even then manufacturers are 
generally required to test the product on only one or a few nontarget species, such as birds. See, 
e.g., Environmental Fate Data Requirements, 40 C.F.R. § 158.290 (2003) (specifying additional 
tests that the EPA can require to assess environmental fate); Wildlife and Aquatic Organisms 
Data Requirements, 40 C.F.R. § 158.490 (2003) (specifying additional tests that the EPA can 
require to assess impacts on wildlife); Nontarget Insect Data Requirements, 40 C.F.R. § 158.590 
(2003) (specifying additional tests that the EPA can require to evaluate effects on nontarget 
insects); see also Envtl. Prot. Agency, Data Requirements for Pesticide Registration, at 
http://www.epa.gov/pesticides/regulating/data.htm#longterm (last visited Mar. 3, 2004) (on file 
with the Duke Law Journal) (summarizing data requirements, including the fact that long-term 
or field studies are only required “when predictions as to possible adverse effects in less 
extensive studies cannot be made, or when the potential for harmful effects is high”); infra note 
202 (explaining that the EPA is attempting to conduct an ecological risk assessment on several 
rodenticides). 
 199. Environment-related testing is not among the test guidelines for safety testing under 
TSCA. See Identification of Specific Chemical Substance and Mixture Testing Requirements, 40 
C.F.R. pt. 799 (2003) (listing test guidelines for toxic substances). In fact, tests for 
developmental neurotoxicity and for reproductive/developmental toxicity were only added to 
the TSCA test guidelines (which list the types of tests that the EPA can require under a test 
rule) in 2000. See EPA, Toxic Substances Control Act Test Guidelines: Final Rule, 65 Fed. Reg. 
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4. Actors Are Excused from Contributing to the Development of 
Methods for Assessing the Harms Caused by Their Activities, Leaving 
Regulators to Struggle with Developing the Tests. The development of 
the methods to assess the impact of pollution and products (like 
pesticides) on public health is financed, published, and corroborated 
largely with public dollars.200 The only role that private actors play in 
the development of assessment tools is to pick apart agency protocols 
and the necessarily limited scientific information upon which they are 
based.201 The pesticide and chemical industries in particular are 
vigorous critics of the EPA’s protocols and test guidelines, filing 
lengthy critiques of each tentative advance made by the EPA in 
assessing noncancer risks, while bearing none of the costs of these 
innovative research efforts.202 The EPA’s more than thirteen-year 
effort to promulgate a rudimentary rule requiring additional testing 
of certain chemical substances for neurological effects provides a case 
 
No. 78,746, 78,748, tbl.1 (Dec. 15, 2000) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 799) (listing seventeen 
new test guidelines added to the TSCA list of testing requirements). Even the high production 
volume (HPV) testing challenge, discussed supra note 163, requires only a few animal tests for 
these widely used chemicals. The six tests are acute toxicity, genetic toxicity, repeat dose 
toxicity, reproductive and developmental toxicity, and acute toxicity to fish. Physicians 
Committee for Responsible Medicine, Appendix A: The HPV Animal Test Battery, at 
http://www.pcrm.org/issues/PDFs/hpvappa.pdf (last visited Mar. 3, 2004) (on file with the Duke 
Law Journal). 
 200. See, e.g., NRC, BUILDING A FOUNDATION, supra note 10, at 10, 49, 61 (pointing out 
that the EPA shoulders much of the burden of producing the information needed to support its 
regulatory programs, and highlighting the EPA’s stark limitations given its $500 million research 
budget). But see supra Part I.C. (arguing that there are sometimes incentives for parties to 
develop this information, but usually only in the shadow of onerous legal liabilities  
or requirements). 
 201. See, e.g., McGarity & Wagner, supra note 118, at 10 (detailing how the “EPA’s models 
are frequently subject to tedious, technical nitpicking” by opponents and how “[v]irtually every 
substantive challenge [in court] mounted against an EPA model involves multiple technical 
disagreements on virtually every facet of the model”). 
 202. For example, the EPA is currently attempting to conduct an ecological risk assessment 
on several rodenticides after becoming aware of potential adverse effects on birds and wildlife. 
Rodenticides; Availability of Preliminary Comparative Ecological Assessment, 68 Fed. Reg. 
4468 (Jan. 29, 2003); see also EPA EDocket, at http://www.epa.gov/pesticides/rodenticidecluster/ 
(last visited Mar. 3, 2004). The effort was met with vigorous resistance by manufacturers who 
appeared to challenge virtually every facet of the assessment, without identifying ways in which 
the assessment could be improved. See, e.g., Letter from John L. Hott, Syngenta Crop 
Protection, Inc. to the EPA, Comments on Rodenticide Ecological Assessment (Mar. 31, 2003), 
available at http://www.epa.gov/pesticides/rodenticidecluster; see also infra notes 231–35 and 
accompanying text (discussing a similar campaign against the testing of the herbicide atrazine). 
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in point.203 The chemical industry provided the bulk of the critical 
input on the proposed guidelines,204 and ultimately the EPA managed 
to require tests for only a portion of the neurological effects of 
concern with respect to ten chemicals in commerce.205 The 
manufacturers’ constant vigilance helps explain why the EPA has 
made little progress in promulgating even rudimentary testing 
methods to measure neurological, reproductive, ecological, and 
hormonal effects.206 
III.  THE LAWS ENCOURAGE ACTORS TO PERPETUATE IGNORANCE 
It is bad enough that environmental laws—contrary to their 
promise—fail to require actors to produce information needed to 
assess their externalities. But some environmental laws lead to a still 
worse state of affairs: the laws sometimes reward actors for their 
ignorance, penalize them for producing useful knowledge, and 
 
 203. See Multi-Substance Rule for the Testing of Neurotoxicity, 58 Fed. Reg. 40,262, 40,262–
63 (July 27, 1993) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 799): 
EPA’s efforts to obtain data to address its concern for the neurotoxicity of specific 
solvents dates back over 10 years to a proposed test rule, Chloromethane and 
Chlorinated Benzenes Proposed Test Rule, 45 Fed. Reg. 48,524 (July 18, 1980), which 
discussed EPA’s concerns for the neurotoxic effects of chloromethane in adults after 
chronic exposure and on offspring exposed in utero, and concerns related to abuse 
liability. 
 204. The EPA reports that public comments were received on its 1991 proposal from 
Chemical Manufacturers Association (CMA) (Ref. 3), CMA’s Acetone Panel (Refs. 
4, 5 and 68), CMA’s Glycol Ethers Panel (Ref. 6), CMA’s Ketones Panel (Refs. 7 and 
8), CMA’s Oxo Process Panel (Refs. 9 through 12), the American Industrial Health 
Council (AIHC) (Ref. 1), the Diethyl Ether Manufacturers Task Group (DEMTG) 
(Ref. 13), BASF Corporation (BASF) (Ref. 2), The Dow Chemical Company (Dow) 
(Ref. 14), DuPont (Ref. 15), Kodak (Ref. 16), Monsanto (Ref. 17), Rohm and Haas 
(Ref. 18), Union Carbide (Ref. 19), the Interagency Testing Committee (ITC) (Ref. 
21), Dr. J. Glowa of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (Ref. 20), 
Dr. D. McMillan of the University of Arkansas (Ref. 22), Dr. R. Neal of Vanderbilt 
University (Ref. 25), and Drs. D. Cory-Slechta (Ref. 23) and B. Weiss (Ref. 24) of the 
University of Rochester. These submissions contained both comments regarding the 
proposed rule and additional studies for EPA to consider before promulgating the 
final rule. 
Multi-Substance Rule for the Testing of Neurotoxicity, 58 Fed. Reg. at 40,263. 
 205. Id. (conceding that the tests only assess neurotoxic effects after chronic exposure, 
without measuring changes on offspring exposed in utero or assessing concerns related to abuse 
liability, and concluding that the “EPA is requiring a very modest testing program in this area in 
comparison to the scientifically acknowledged diversity of the potential neurotoxic effects of 
concern”). 
 206. See generally Guidelines for Reproductive Toxicity Risk Assessment, 61 Fed. Reg. 
56,274 (Oct. 31, 1996); EPA, Guidelines for Ecological Risk Assessment, 63 Fed. Reg. 26,846 
(May 14, 1998); EPA, Neurotoxicity Guidelines, 63 Fed. Reg. 26,926 (May 14, 1998). The EPA 
has not completed its development of preliminary methods for assessing hormonal effects. See 
ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 13, at 1. 
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provide mechanisms for them to attack damaging public science that 
suggests they are causing harm. 
This Part discusses three ways that existing laws, rather than 
promoting the production and dissemination of information about 
potential harms to the environment and public health, actually 
perpetuate ignorance. The first Section discusses how existing laws 
not only fail to create positive incentives for the production of needed 
information but actually create disincentives to information 
production. The second Section discusses how existing laws increase 
the asymmetric advantages that private actors have over the 
production of this information, particularly through the use of 
overbroad confidentiality privileges. The final Section then discusses 
how recent legal developments have increased the avenues available 
for regulated parties to manufacture controversy about regulatory 
science and, in so doing, to delay regulation and obfuscate the 
established scientific consensus. 
A. Ignorance Is Bliss in Regulation and Enforcement 
Under the current regulatory system, volunteering adverse 
information on the effects or even the existence of harms associated 
with one’s product or activity is equivalent to shooting oneself in the 
foot. Regulation and enforcement increase in lockstep with the 
availability of public information on adverse effects.207 Whereas no 
information means no regulation, a solid body of uncontested, 
adverse information will almost certainly lead to intrusive regulation, 
enforcement activity, and sometimes even a ban on the activity or 
product.208 This Section argues that as long as information is neither 
 
 207. See generally Priority List of Substances Which May Require Regulation Under the 
Safe Drinking Water Act, 56 Fed. Reg. 1470, 1471 (Jan. 14, 1991) (explaining that the EPA 
selects contaminants for regulation under the Safe Drinking Water Act based in large part on 
“[a]vailability of sufficient information on the substance”); NRC, SCIENCE AND JUDGMENT, 
supra note 139, at 253 (“In the past, EPA has often appeared to base its priorities on the ease of 
obtaining data on a particular chemical.”); Howard Latin, Good Science, Bad Regulation, and 
Toxic Risk Assessment, 5 YALE J. ON REG. 89, 141 (1988) (“In practice, agencies seldom 
commence regulatory proceedings until considerable evidence has accumulated that a substance 
may be hazardous.”); Richard Wilson et al., Uncertainty in Risk Assessment, in RISK 
QUANTIFICATION AND REGULATORY POLICY 133, 136 (David G. Hoel et al. eds., 1985) 
(describing how the EPA’s Carcinogen Assessment Group calculates risks for chemicals that 
have been tested on animals, but often entirely neglects other chemicals that have not been 
similarly tested, “even when other information suggests that risks from [such chemicals] may be 
large enough to be important”). 
 208. See infra Part III.A.1. 
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required nor rewarded but instead is used punitively by the regulatory 
system, the decision about whether to voluntarily conduct and report 
research on one’s product’s or activity’s externalities is an easy one. 
Ignorance is bliss. 
1. Information Burdens on the EPA as a Precondition to 
Regulation. Despite actors’ superior knowledge about the potential 
harms created by their products or activities, environmental laws 
assign the burden for justifying regulatory action to the EPA.209 
Although this burden does not technically require the agency to 
 
 209. The burden differs from statute to statute in terms of how much or what kinds of 
evidence the EPA must produce to satisfy it. The burden is substantially lighter than parallel 
common law requirements requiring plaintiffs to produce a “preponderance of the evidence” on 
causation, yet the EPA must still provide some information and justification for its regulatory 
decisions. See generally SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO & ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN, RISK REGULATION AT 
RISK: RESTORING A PRAGMATIC APPROACH 35 (2003) (“Most of the [environmental and 
public health] laws [surveyed] . . . use triggers that create less than the maximum evidentiary 
burden and, in particular, most fall in the middle categories—risk threshold or significant risk 
threshold.”). For most standards promulgated to regulate pollutant discharges under the Clean 
Water and Clean Air Acts, Congress specified the particular substances of concern for the EPA 
in advance. The EPA’s primary burden under these statutes is to ensure that its resulting 
technology-based standards are not arbitrary and capricious (with the challenger bearing the 
burden of showing that they are). See CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(2)(C)–(D) (2000) (referencing 
a House Committee Report list of 126 toxic substances for which technology-based standards 
must be promulgated under the Clean Water Act); 42 U.S.C. § 7412(b) (2000) (listing 189 
hazardous air pollutants for which technology-based standards must be promulgated). Other 
science-based regulatory decisions made under CERCLA, EPCRA, RCRA, SDWA, FIFRA, 
and for ambient standards for criteria pollutants under the CAA, have required the EPA to 
provide some scientific research justifiying regulation, without requiring definitive proof. See, 
e.g., SDWA, 42 U.S.C. § 300g-1(b)(1)(A) (2000) (providing that to promulgate a Maximum 
Contaminant Level Goal, the EPA must show (1) that a contaminant “may have an adverse 
effect on the health of persons” (emphasis added), (2) that the contaminant “is known to occur 
or [that] there is a substantial likelihood that the contaminant will occur in public water 
systems,” and (3) that “regulation of [the] . . . contaminant presents a meaningful opportunity 
for health risk reduction”); RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6903(5) (2000) (defining “hazardous waste” for 
purposes of the statute as that which because of “quantity, concentration, or physical, chemical, 
or infectious characteristics may—(A) cause, or significantly contribute to an increase in 
mortality or an increase in serious irreversible, or incapacitating reversible, illness; or (B) pose a 
substantial present or potential hazard to human health or the environment” (emphasis 
added)). Only the regulation of existing chemicals under TSCA has been read to place a heavy 
evidentiary burden for justifying protective regulations on EPA, a burden EPA can meet only 
with “substantial evidence,” primarily from science and economics. See, e.g., Corrosion Proof 
Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201, 1215 (5th Cir. 1991) (holding that the EPA failed to present 
sufficient evidence to justify a complete ban on asbestos in light of statutory language requiring 
it to “promulgate the least burdensome, reasonable regulation” to achieve adequate protection 
of the environment). 
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engage in active information production and research,210 in reality the 
lack of available information on the harms created by suspect 
products and activities makes producing this information essential.211 
Even mandates directing agencies to issue protective standards have 
been interpreted to require some information to justify regulatory 
intervention.212 When this information is sorely incomplete, 
controverted, or effectively unobtainable, agencies have a difficult 
time supporting regulatory action.213 Under such a regulatory system, 
 
 210. For all regulatory requirements, the EPA generally bears some burden of proof, 
although the evidentiary demands can be quite light. See, e.g., Delaney Clause, Food, Drug, and 
Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 379e(b)(5)(B) (requiring only a test on animals showing that a food 
additive is carcinogenic to justify a regulatory ban of that additive). Through time, however, the 
courts and others have raised the EPA’s burden higher, particularly under some statutes. See 
SHAPIRO & GLICKSMAN, supra note 209, at 70–71 (discussing the raised evidentiary burden 
imposed on the EPA by some courts and the resulting paralysis of agency decisionmaking); 
infra note 213. 
 211. The EPA has dedicated considerable resources to collecting information and 
developing new tests. See supra note 200 and accompanying text. Yet the EPA’s role as 
gatekeeper on existing and future information on health and the environment also suggests 
room for capture. This may or may not explain the consistent despair that prominent bipartisan 
committees express with respect to the EPA’s research priorities and the coherence of its 
research programs. See, e.g., COMM. ON RESEARCH AND PEER REVIEW IN EPA, NAT’L 
RESEARCH COUNCIL, STRENGTHENING SCIENCE AT THE U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 
AGENCY: RESEARCH MANAGEMENT AND PEER REVIEW PRACTICES (2000) (recommending, 
based on an assessment of science at the EPA, that the EPA’s areas for improvement are 
strengthening its scientific leadership, enhancing the production of information, and anticipating 
future environmental needs with scientific research), available at 
http://www.nap.edu/catalog/9882.html. 
 212. See Chlorine Chemistry Council v. EPA, 206 F.3d 1286, 1291 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (vacating 
the EPA’s zero tolerance standard for chlorine in drinking water because it is “arbitrary and 
capricious” and exceeds statutory authority because it does not account for the “best available 
evidence” suggesting that there is a nonzero safe level); Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. EPA, 
824 F.2d 1146, 1152 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (en banc) (holding that a zero standard for vinyl chloride 
under the Clean Air Act is not appropriate and suggesting that, under the Act, the EPA may 
account for remaining uncertainties in setting a nonzero standard). 
 213. There is a substantial body of scholarship discussing the tendency of reviewing courts to 
require the EPA to produce considerable evidence to support its regulatory standards. See, e.g., 
R. SHEP MELNICK, REGULATION AND THE COURTS: THE CASE OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT 241 
(1983) (discussing the implications of the reviewing courts’ insistence on complete scientific 
evidence for each stage of the standard-setting process); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Two Problems in 
Administrative Law: Political Polarity on the District of Columbia Circuit and Judicial 
Deterrence of Agency Rulemaking, 1988 DUKE L.J. 300, 311 (“Courts also have . . . require[d] 
that agencies ‘find’ unfindable facts and support those findings with unattainable evidence.”). 
As a result, the most studied risks tend to be regulated first. See Wendy E. Wagner, The Science 
Charade in Toxic Regulation, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1613, 1681–82 (1995) (“[A]gencies tend to be 
‘science-biased’ in selecting the toxic substances to regulate: instead of . . . prioritiz[ing] 
substances based on the risks they present to health and the environment, the agencies appear 
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actors who want to minimize regulatory intervention have little 
incentive to produce information showing that their products or 
activities are safe. Instead, they are best advised to maintain a status 
quo of ignorance.214 
Laws that require actors who discover bad news to report it 
further exacerbate incentives for ignorance.215 Under existing laws, 
manufacturers of pesticides and toxic substances who discover 
adverse information about their products are required to report this 
information to the EPA.216 From the manufacturer’s perspective, 
 
to . . . [select] substances with more scientifically established health effects . . . over less-studied 
substances, many of which . . . [may] present greater risks at lower concentrations.”). 
 214. The safest course for manufacturers in the short term is to avoid safety testing 
altogether, particularly for existing chemicals or new chemicals that fall through the regulatory 
cracks. Most manufacturers appear in fact to follow this safer course. The OTA and the GAO 
both found that the majority of premanufacture notices (PMNs) filed under TSCA contained 
little to any toxicity data on the new chemicals. U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFFICE, supra note 161, at 45–
46; OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, THE INFORMATION CONTENT OF PREMANUFACTURE 
NOTICES 6 (1983), available at http://www.wws.princeton.edu/cgi-
bin/byteserv.prl/~ota/disk3/1983/8313/8313.PDF. A 1994 article also quotes EPA officials as 
observing that the agency, in reviewing PMNs, “often may not have a sample of the new 
chemical” and also “often does not get basic physical state information” on the new chemical. 
Premanufacture Notification: Data, Funding Gaps for New Chemicals Program Prompt Concern, 
Criticism from SAB Committee, 18 Chem. Reg. Rpt. (BNA) 997, 997 (1994). 
Beyond the perverse incentive for ignorance, such a data bias in regulation leads to 
imbalances in the regulatory terrain, much like those lamented by Peter Huber in criticizing the 
old-new distinction in regulation. See Peter Huber, The Old-New Division in Risk Regulation, 69 
VA. L. REV. 1025, 1073–75 (1983) (“Every regulation of one source of risk will cause some 
secondary ‘risk displacement,’ encouraging producers or consumers to favor alternative, less 
stringently regulated processes or products that will themselves be risky in some degree.”). If 
some substances are regulated because there is a lot of information, and others are ignored 
because there is little information, activities will shift toward the unregulated and unstudied 
wastes, products, and general externalities. This problem is not new to environmental law. For 
example, although Congress busily closed off opportunities to dispose of wastes into the water 
and air, it left others open and thus essentially encouraged more damaging types of pollution, 
like disposal of hazardous wastes on land. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1491, pt. 1, at 4 (1976) 
(recognizing that, during the passage of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, 
Pub. L. No. 94-580, 90 Stat. 2795 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.), the 
“federal government . . . [spent] billions of dollars to remove pollutants from the air and water, 
only to dispose of such pollutants on the land in an environmentally unsound manner”); Frances 
H. Irwin, An Integrated Framework for Preventing Pollution and Protecting the Environment, 22 
ENVTL. L. 1, 12–14 (1992) (discussing how fragmentation of statutes leads to the transfer of 
pollutants to other environmental media). 
 215. See, e.g., CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9603(a) (2000) (requiring the person in charge to 
immediately report a release of a reportable quantity of a hazardous substance). See generally 
supra Part II.A.3. 
 216. See FIFRA, 7 U.S.C. § 136d(a)(2) (2000) (“If at any time after the registration of a 
pesticide the registrant has additional factual information regarding unreasonable adverse 
effects on the environment of the pesticide, the registrant shall submit such information to the 
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engaging in exploratory research under such a legal regime is 
decidedly hazardous.217 The EPA, in turn, may use any adverse 
information to promulgate stricter standards. The manufacturer, of 
course, can avoid this entire scenario simply by not assessing the 
safety of its products and activities. In such a legal environment, 
ignorance will always be the best recourse. 
The direct correlation between the availability of information 
and the likelihood of regulatory intervention not only encourages 
manufacturers to pursue a policy of strategic ignorance, but also 
makes it beneficial for them to campaign to raise the EPA’s burden of 
proof still higher for initiating regulatory action. A higher burden of 
proof in an information-starved area such as health and safety 
regulation could significantly reduce the number of regulations that 
the agency can support.218 Requiring more research as a prerequisite 
to promulgating protective regulation also places greater demands on 
agency resources and ignores the fact that actors enjoy superior 
information about the risks posed by their activities. 
Regulated parties’ campaign to further raise the burden of proof 
for the EPA is most evident in their general advocacy of information-
intensive checks on regulation, like cost-benefit analysis219 and 
 
Administrator.”); TSCA, 15 U.S.C. § 2607(c), (e) (2000) (requiring manufacturers and 
processors to maintain records of “significant adverse reactions to health or the environment . . . 
alleged to have been caused by the substance or mixture” and to immediately report 
“information which reasonably supports the conclusion that such substance or mixture presents 
a substantial risk of injury to health or the environment”). 
 217. See generally Reitze & Hoffman, supra note 166, at 739–41 (discussing civil and 
criminal penalties for violating reporting requirements, including criminal enforcement of false 
reporting and fraud). 
 218. TSCA, for example, has been interpreted by the Fifth Circuit to place the burden on 
the EPA not only to establish the scientifically established risks of an existing chemical before 
taking regulatory action, but also to establish that the chemical’s public health risks outweigh 
the social benefits of the substance and that the EPA has selected a regulatory approach to 
preventing health harms that is the “least burdensome” in comparison with alternative 
approaches. Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201, 1215, 1223 (5th Cir. 1991). This 
heavy evidentiary burden has effectively discouraged the EPA from taking regulatory action 
against dangerous chemicals. See Thomas O. McGarity, The Courts and the Ossification of 
Rulemaking: A Response to Professor Seidenfeld, 75 TEX. L. REV. 525, 548 (1997) (“In the six 
years that have passed since the Corrosion Proof Fittings opinion, the EPA has not initiated a 
single action under section 6 of TSCA . . . .”). 
 219. The use of cost-benefit analysis to rebut protective standards is mandatory under a few 
statutes. See generally Applegate, supra note 33, at 269 (recounting that FIFRA and TSCA both 
target “unreasonable” adverse risks, and that the legislative history suggests that this requires 
balancing costs and benefits). The most prevalent use of cost-benefit analysis occurs informally, 
under an executive order that requires cost-benefit analyses for economically significant 
rulemakings. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1982), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 
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regulatory “good-science” reforms, which demand that the EPA 
accumulate a definitive body of hard evidence on harm before 
implementing a proposed regulation.220 Cost-benefit requirements 
surreptitiously increase the evidentiary demands on regulators by 
 
(1988) (specifying cost-benefit requirements issued by President Reagan); Exec. Order No. 
12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1994), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (2000) (specifying cost-benefit 
requirements issued by President Clinton and retained by President George W. Bush with only 
minor changes in Exec. Order No. 13,258, 3 C.F.R. 204 (2002)). In this administrative setting, 
cost-benefit analyses are not only used as an aid in conducting regulatory analysis, but are being 
used more affirmatively to reorder agency priorities or even stall or abandon some protective 
rulemakings altogether. Under President George W. Bush, for example, the Office of 
Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA), within the Office of Management and Budget 
(OMB), has developed several initiatives that endeavor to reorder EPA priorities and 
rulemakings based in large part on the results of cost-benefit accountings. See generally Draft 
Report to Congress on the Costs and Benefits of Federal Regulations, 67 Fed. Reg. 15,014, 
15,020 (Mar. 28, 2002) [hereinafter OMB Cost-Benefit Report] (describing OIRA’s effort to 
shift from being a “reactive” to a “proactive” force “in suggesting regulatory priorities for 
agency consideration”). These initiatives include targeting existing rules that “should be 
rescinded or changed to increase net benefits by either reducing costs or increasing benefits,” id. 
at 15,022, engaging in the same sort of activity with respect to “problematic” agency guidelines 
that have not complied with process requirements like cost-benefit accountings, id. at 15,035, 
and sending prompt letters to agencies when OIRA believes that they are not prioritizing a 
particular, “beneficial” regulatory activity as highly as they should, id. at 15,020. 
 220. Good-science reforms that have been passed and implemented include the Data 
Quality Act, Treasury and General Government Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2001, Pub. 
L. No. 106-554, § 515, 114 Stat. 2763 (2000), and the Data Access Act, Omnibus Appropriations 
Act for Fiscal Year 1999, Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681-495 (1998), discussed infra Part 
III.C. Other good-science reforms are still in the proposal stages. See, e.g., Alan Raul & Julie 
Zampa Dwyer, Regulatory Daubert, 66 Law & CONTEMP. PROBS. 7, 7 (Fall 2003) (proposing 
that the Daubert test “provides a suitable framework for reviewing the quality of agency science 
and the soundness of agency decisions”). The earliest versions of good-science regulatory 
proposals were blatant efforts to use good science as a Trojan horse for regulatory delay by 
insisting on impossible burdens of evidence as a prerequisite to regulation. President Reagan 
was the originator of the idea that health and environmental regulation should not proceed 
unless it is based on good science, which in turn necessitates hard proof of damage to health. 
JONATHAN LASH ET AL., A SEASON OF SPOILS: THE STORY OF THE REAGAN 
ADMINISTRATION’S ATTACK ON THE ENVIRONMENT 131 (1984); Howard Latin, Regulatory 
Failure, Administrative Incentives, and the New Clean Air Act, 21 ENVTL. L. 1647, 1662 n.40 
(1990) (“[T]here is abundant evidence that administrators [of the EPA under President Reagan] 
frequently chose to ‘study’ uncertain issues as a way to avoid resolving them.”). More recent 
efforts are more sophisticated and varied, but they all tend to work toward narrowing the range 
of evidence that regulators can consider, as well as raising the EPA’s burden of proof to justify 
regulation. See infra notes 228–35 and accompanying text. As a result, because the EPA bears 
the burden of proof, and because that burden is relatively onerous, regulated entities will 
volunteer information or engage in information production only when it is likely to make the 
resulting regulation less stringent. Further, to the extent that the information is asymmetrical, 
industry will attempt to use its superior control to its advantage by disclosing only information 
that benefits it and concealing information that is damaging. Finally, the burden will encourage 
obstructionist behavior from regulated parties: they will attack studies that might lead to 
stronger standards. See infra Part III.C. 
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requiring them to demonstrate quantitatively that the benefits of 
regulation exceed its costs.221 As cost-benefit is currently practiced, 
nonquantified and poorly understood harms are generally excluded 
from the quantitative calculations.222 For example, a familiar poison 
such as arsenic—which appears to cause neurological harms, 
endocrine effects, at least seven different types of cancer, 
reproductive and development effects, and other life-threatening 
harms—is evaluated in a cost-benefit analysis only on the basis of its 
risks of causing bladder and lung cancers, because these two cancers 
are the only risks that have been studied sufficiently to be 
quantified.223 
Information problems of a different nature affect the cost side of 
the equation. Quantifying the costs of regulation currently depends, 
in large part, on the regulated parties’ estimates of compliance costs. 
Because the bulk of the essential data needed to prepare these 
estimates is privately held and therefore not subject to critical review, 
 
 221. Meeting this requirement, in itself, is quite resource intensive. To estimate the benefits 
associated with the product or activity being considered for regulation, each potential harm 
associated with the product or activity must be identified, the impact of the harm must be 
quantified, and this quantification must be translated into monetary terms. The costs to industry 
of complying with the proposed regulation must also be quantified. Ironically, though, for all of 
the cost-benefit reports that are produced annually, none appear to account for the costs 
incurred in conducting the analysis, either in terms of staff resources or delay. 
 222. See David M. Driesen, The Societal Cost of Environmental Regulation: Beyond 
Administrative Cost-Benefit Analysis, 24 ECOLOGY L. Q. 545, 604 (1997) (“[Cost-benefit 
analysis] will tend to produce lower benefit valuations than those of consumers, overestimate 
costs, and cause agencies to make very few decisions in a world of serious environmental 
problems from a variety of sources.”); Thomas O. McGarity, A Cost-Benefit State, 50 ADMIN. L. 
REV. 7, 58 (1998) (“When information or values that arise cannot easily be factored into the 
benefit models, the modelers often simply ignore them. . . . [N]eglecting ‘soft’ considerations . . . 
does bias the analysis against regulatory intervention, because the cost side of the equation 
implicates fewer ‘soft’ considerations than the benefits side.” (emphasis omitted)). 
 223. See ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA 815-R-00-026, ARSENIC IN DRINKING WATER RULE: 
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 1-4 (2000) (listing nonquantifiable, potential adverse effects of arsenic 
including skin cancer, kidney cancer, cancer of the nasal passages, liver cancer, prostate cancer, 
cardiovascular effects, pulmonary effects, immunological effects, neurological effects, endocrine 
effects, and reproductive and developmental effects), available at 
http://www.epa.gov/safewater/ars/econ_analysis.pdf. None of these nonquantified harms are 
factored into either the low- or the high-bound estimates of the benefits of regulation. Id. The 
benefits of preventing the two quantifiable cancers are the only benefits that are compared 
against the costs of compliance to identify a final cost-benefit-justified standard. Id. at 1-6. The 
standard ultimately chosen by the EPA (after some waffling within the new administration)—10 
micrograms—appears on this cost-benefit table as the point at which the cost estimate and the 
upper-bound benefits estimate balance at a seven percent discount rate. Id. 
WAGNER FINAL.DOC 2/9/2005 11:06 AM 
2004] COMMONS IGNORANCE 1685 
the costs are often inflated.224 In fact, retrospective studies of the 
veracity of industry cost estimates show that such estimates are 
generally double the actual cost to the regulated party.225 
These limitations on the accuracy of cost-benefit requirements—
underestimating benefits and overestimating costs—are nevertheless 
ignored by many analysts.226 The Office of Management and Budget’s 
(OMB’s) Annual Cost-Benefit Reports to Congress, which compile 
all of the cost-benefit reports prepared governmentwide, have, on 
occasion, not only failed to acknowledge both sources of error but 
have presented the final estimates as if they magically identify the 
precise point at which regulation is appropriate.227 
 
 224. This behavior is not necessarily duplicitous; it likely constitutes a rational reaction 
aimed at preventing overregulation. Regardless of motive, economists recognize the tendency of 
regulated parties to overestimate the costs of regulation. See Spulber, supra note 63, at 178–79 
(concluding that asymmetric information about abatement costs to firms subject to 
environmental regulations can be very entrenched); see also Jason S. Johnston, A Game 
Theoretic Analysis of Alternative Institutions for Regulatory Cost-Benefit Analysis, 150 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1343, 1350 (2002) (modeling regulatory impediments that arise from cost-benefit regimes 
when the regulatory targets possess private information on the cost of compliance and enjoy 
opportunities to block regulation). 
 225. See Thomas O. McGarity & Ruth Ruttenberg, Counting the Cost of Health, Safety, and 
Environmental Regulation, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1997, 2042 (citing a study conducted by Goodstein 
and Hodge, which found that in eleven of twelve regulatory initiatives that they examined, “the 
initial estimates were at least double the actual costs”). Professors McGarity and Ruttenberg 
report that another study conducted in 1995 by the Congressional Office of Technology 
Assessment found that the ex ante cost estimates for the Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration’s (OSHA’s) 1974 vinyl chloride standard exceeded $1 billion; however, a survey 
released subsequently found that compliance costs were in the $228–278 million range. Id. at 
2031. One of the major struggles in ensuring that industry estimates are accurate is the lack of 
empirical knowledge concerning the costs of regulations for businesses or even how many 
regulations apply to businesses. Id. at 2032–33. To address this information gap, the General 
Accounting Office undertook a study in 1996 to understand the impact of federal regulation on 
regulated businesses. Initially, most of the companies contacted were obstinate about supplying 
material that would advance this study; of the fifteen that consented, little information was 
provided in the way of compliance costs, and “none of the companies provided cost data that 
were both comprehensive and incremental.” Id. at 2035 (quoting U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFFICE, 
REGULATORY BURDEN: MEASUREMENT CHALLENGES AND CONCERNS RAISED BY SELECTED 
COMPANIES 49 (1996), available at http://www.gao.gov/archive/1997/gg97002.pdf). 
 226. See infra notes 364–67 and accompanying text. 
 227. In a recent draft Cost-Benefit Report, for example, the OMB omitted the qualitative 
costs and benefits from most of the cost-benefit tables. See, e.g., OMB Cost-Benefit Report, 67 
Fed. Reg. 15,014, 15,024 tbls.5–6, 15,042 tbl.14 (Mar. 28, 2002) (assigning total dollar figures to 
the benefits and costs of rules when in some rulemakings the EPA explicitly indicated that it 
was only able to quantify some of the benefits and costs); id. at 15,038 tbl.13 (listing the benefits 
of paperwork requirements as zero even though the OIRA concedes in the text that “[a]t 
present, it is not feasible to estimate the value of annual societal benefits of the information the 
government collects from the public”). In the only table in which OIRA provided an indication 
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Good-science reforms appear even more obviously crafted to 
exploit the limits in scientific information as an excuse to postpone 
regulation.228 Under this approach, the agency, by default, must 
produce definitive scientific research on harms caused by an activity 
before rushing to regulate.229 Good-science advocates, however, never 
urge that the regulated actors be charged with producing this good-
science research as a condition to operating, even though such a 
burden would be in keeping with the precautionary objectives of the 
relevant statutory mandates.230 
“Good science” reforms are not only used by regulated parties to 
attempt to raise the bar on the amount of evidence needed to justify 
protective regulation, but are also used to limit the type of 
information available to the agency to support its burden. For 
example, concerned about potential regulatory restrictions on the 
herbicide atrazine, its manufacturer and agricultural users argue not 
only that the EPA must scientifically justify regulatory restrictions on 
the product, but that the science acceptable for regulation must be 
 
that not all costs and benefits had been quantified—Table 7—OIRA did not list qualitative costs 
and benefits under the columns headed “costs” or “benefits,” but under the “other information” 
column. Id. at 15,025 tbl.7. OMB concluded its report by totaling only the monetized costs and 
benefits of all regulations in final, cumulative tables to provide an even more error-laden basis 
for evaluating the appropriateness of regulation. Id. at 15,042 tbl.14. 
 228. See supra note 220. See generally Donald T. Hornstein, Accounting for Science: The 
Independence of Public Research in the New, Subterranean Administrative Law, 66 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 227 (Fall 2003). As discussed later, in their most recent incarnation, these 
good-science reforms also provide regulated parties with more powerful tools for challenging 
individual studies produced with public monies that incriminate their activity or product. See 
infra Part III.C. 
 229. See DEMOCRATIC CAUCUS OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON SCIENCE, 104TH CONG., 
ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCE UNDER SIEGE: FRINGE SCIENCE AND THE 104TH CONGRESS (1996) 
(report by Rep. George E. Brown, Jr., ranking Democratic member) (identifying the sinister use 
of “sound science” in Congress to paralyze environmental regulation), available at 
http://www.house.gov/science_democrats/archive/envrpt96.htm. 
 230. See supra notes 220–28 and accompanying text; see also D. Hiep Truong, Daubert and 
Judicial Review: How Does an Administrative Agency Distinguish Valid Science from Junk 
Science?, 33 AKRON L. REV. 365, 370 (2000) (examining “the possibility of using the Daubert 
standard to effectuate a more meaningful judicial review of an agency’s determination of risk” 
and arguing that “[b]y using the Daubert standards, a reviewing court is simply treating an 
agency like a testifying expert”); Charles D. Weller & David B. Graham, New Approaches to 
Environmental Law and Agency Regulation: The Daubert Litigation Approach, 30 Envtl. L. 
Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,557, 10,566–72 (2000) (providing detailed recommendations for how the 
courts can incorporate Daubert into their review of agency science, including using Daubert 
hearings for the review of certain agency actions). 
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conducted under a limited number of EPA-approved protocols.231 
This means, according to industry representatives, that cutting-edge 
research discovering significant adverse effects on frogs exposed to 
low levels of the herbicide (the male frogs develop female 
reproductive organs)232 must be excluded from the agency’s 
assessment of the herbicide’s safety.233 For this research to be 
acceptable, the manufacturer argues, the EPA must first promulgate 
a testing protocol for these endocrine effects—a process that might 
take decades, given industry opposition234—and then must compel or 
fund applied research using those protocols.235 Such restrictions on 
regulatory decisionmaking make it impossible for regulations to be 
based on the best available science, however. To the extent that 
actors succeed in convincing the EPA to exclude credible research 
from its decisions because the research fails to meet their narrow 
conceptions of good science, regulatory decisions become still more 
information-deprived. 
2. Information Burdens on the EPA as a Precondition to 
Enforcement. Just as actors are likely to appreciate that producing 
information about their products and activities can lead to increased 
regulatory requirements, they are also likely to understand that 
volunteering information about violations of existing laws will be 
rewarded with enforcement actions and sanctions.236 Although some 
 
 231. See Center for Regulatory Effectiveness, Request for Correction, supra note 43, at 7 
(arguing that “[u]ntil and unless there are properly validated tests, there can be no reliable 
information regarding atrazine’s purported endocrine effects”). 
 232. See Hayes et al, supra note 43 (reporting the effects of atrazine on frogs). 
 233. Specifically, this group of industrial actors argues: 
As soon as possible, EPA should correct its Environmental Risk Assessment at pages 
11, 90–94, to state that there is no reliable evidence that atrazine causes “endocrine 
effects” in the environment [and thus exclude the Hayes study from regulatory 
consideration]. EPA’s corrected Environmental Risk Assessment should state that 
there can be no reliable, accurate or useful information regarding atrazine’s 
endocrine effects until and unless there are test methods for those effects that have 
been properly validated. 
Center for Regulatory Effectiveness, Request for Correction, supra note 43, at 9. 
 234. See supra Part II.B.4. 
 235. This latter burden is also problematic. The EPA’s lack of funds makes it unlikely that it 
can finance much of the research itself, and this type of applied research is not a candidate for 
general science funding from the National Science Foundation. On the other hand, if forced, 
industry could conduct the research using its own scientists, labs, reporting methods, and 
contractual agreements, thus exerting at least some control over the outcome. Cf. infra notes 
400–04 and accompanying text (discussing problems with biased research).  
 236. This resulting deliberate ignorance is one of the principal justifications for the audit 
laws that provide decreased penalties and, in some cases, even the promise of confidentiality 
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states do attempt to reward firms with good compliance records,237 
most environmental enforcement regimes provide only sticks, not 
carrots.238 Coors Brewing Corporation learned this lesson the hard 
way when it voluntarily discovered and reported to state regulators 
189 violations of Clean Air Act requirements.239 Rather than 
rewarding Coors’s candor, state regulators greeted the voluntary 
disclosure with a $1.05 million fine and more stringent emissions 
reduction requirements.240 
Coors’s experience only serves to remind the regulated 
community that when compliance costs are high and the likelihood of 
being caught is low, ignorance—or at least silence—is bliss. Moral and 
ethical imperatives notwithstanding, enforcement theory instructs 
that rational actors will not comply with a law or regulation if the 
economic benefits that they derive from their violation exceed the 
cost of the sanction times the probability of being caught.241 In the 
case of environmental violations, the probability of being caught 
depends both on the extent to which the violation is evident and on 
the resources of the enforcers: in many regulatory settings, both can 
 
privileges for incriminating information if actors conduct self-assessments in compliance with 
environmental requirements. See infra notes 263–69 and accompanying text. 
 237. The state of Texas does attempt to reward companies who are regularly in compliance: 
the greater the number of inspections that reveal a plant is in compliance, the higher the 
performance rating and the lighter the penalties for violations that are ultimately discovered or 
self-reported. See 30 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 60.2 (West 2003). This increases the financial 
incentives for firms to discover and correct violations in advance of an inspection (conditioned 
on the likelihood that the inspector is also likely to discover the violations). 
 238. There are rarely rewards for documenting overcompliance with regulatory 
requirements. Economists, however, have suggested that rewards may be in order under some 
circumstances, especially when a firm enjoys private information about its compliance. See 
Lewis, supra note 63, at 826–37 (discussing this literature). 
 239. See Coors Says Fine Could Deter Corporate Environmental Audit, Daily Env’t. Rep. 
(BNA) A3 (July 28, 1993) (stating that the Colorado health department “cited Coors for 100 air 
pollution emission notification violations, 56 permit violations and 33 volatile organic compound 
violations”). 
 240. See id. The state later backed down, perhaps as a result of adverse publicity, and settled 
the enforcement case by requiring Coors to pay $237,000 and reduce emissions. Coors Settles 
with State over Violations Discovered During Company’s Self Audit, Daily Env’t. Rep. (BNA) 
A3 (Feb. 22, 1994). The state’s initial ingratitude motivated the Colorado legislature to pass a 
relatively broad audit law. Id; see also infra notes 263–69 and accompanying text (discussing self-
audit laws). 
 241. See, e.g., STEVEN SHAVELL, The Optimal Structure of Law Enforcement, in A READER 
ON REGULATION 307, 308–10 (R. Baldwin ed., 1998) (observing that firms will find it financially 
imprudent to comply with legal requirements when benefits of noncompliance > (probability of 
being caught in violation) x (sanctions/penalty)). The penalty should also include the costs of 
defending oneself in an enforcement case. 
WAGNER FINAL.DOC 2/9/2005 11:06 AM 
2004] COMMONS IGNORANCE 1689 
be quite low.242 Indeed, it is the regulators’ lack of resources for 
discovering most environmental violations243 that makes 
environmental enforcement so heavily dependent on self-reporting by 
 
 242. This simple calculation has been lost on at least a few judges, however. In Sierra Club v. 
Cedar Point Oil Co., 73 F.3d 546 (5th Cir. 1996), the district court held that the appropriate 
amount of civil penalties that should be charged to a company that illegally disposed of produce 
water into Galveston Bay for 797 days without a permit should be determined solely by 
reference to the economic benefits that accrued to the company as a result of its noncompliance. 
Under the court’s assessment methods, as long as the probability of being caught is somewhat 
less than 100 percent (an inevitability) and as long as attorneys’ fees are not too high, it is in 
actors’ interest to remain ignorant of their environmental obligations and any resulting 
violations. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the penalty assessment, holding that it was not clearly 
erroneous. Id. at 575–76. As a predictor and, of course, as precedent for how the courts will 
assess civil penalties, the opinion clearly makes noncompliance the economically preferable 
option. See also infra notes 270–72 and accompanying text. 
 243. The literature is replete with discussions of underfunded and understaffed enforcement 
offices at the EPA and state environmental protection departments. See, e.g., JOEL A. MINTZ, 
ENFORCEMENT AT THE EPA: HIGH STAKES AND HARD CHOICES 113–18 (1995); U.S. GEN. 
ACCT. OFFICE, GAO-RCED-95-65, EPA AND THE STATES: ENVIRONMENTAL CHALLENGES 
REQUIRE A BETTER WORKING RELATIONSHIP 3 (1995); Rena I. Steinzor, EPA and Its Sisters at 
30: Devolution, Revolution, or Reform?, 31 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 11,086, 11,086–89 
(2001). As of 2000, the EPA employed roughly four hundred full-time inspectors to monitor 
compliance nationally. See REITZE, supra note 86, at 491 n.20. Enforcement resources at the 
state level provide the bulk of the enforcement artillery; yet states vary considerably in the 
resources and manpower that they dedicate to environmental enforcement. See OFFICE OF 
INSPECTOR GEN., ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, NO. 7100246, AUDIT OF REGION 9’S 
ADMINISTRATION OF THE CALIFORNIA AIR COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT PROGRAM 
(1997) (discussing serious weaknesses in California’s enforcement programs), available at 
http://www.epa.gov/oigearch/reports/1997/air9tabl.htm; Victor B. Flatt, A Dirty River Runs 
Through It (The Failure of the Enforcement in the Clean Water Act), 25 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. 
REV. 1, 34 (1997) (concluding, based on an empirical study comparing enforcement of Clean 
Water Act requirements in Washington and Georgia, that substantial differences exist between 
the states in their commitment to enforcing the Act). The EPA’s oversight of state programs 
also provides only partial assurance that enforcement will be rigorous. See, e.g., OFFICE OF 
INSPECTOR GEN., ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, NO. E1AE7-63-0045-100244, CONSOLIDATED 
REPORT ON OCEA’S OVERSIGHT OF REGIONAL AND STATE AIR ENFORCEMENT PROGRAMS 
(1998) (discussing the shortcomings of the EPA’s ability to oversee the states’ implementation 
of the Clean Air Act), available at http://www.epa.gov/oigearth/reports/1998/8100244.pdf. 
TSCA and FIFRA programs are not delegated to the states, and thus the EPA remains 
the sole agency overseeing enforcement of these programs. Information on the EPA’s 
enforcement resources under FIFRA was not readily available, although in terms of the number 
of inspections conducted by EPA regional offices, this statute fared the worst, accounting for 
only 1 percent of all inspections conducted in 1998 (a decline from roughly 4 percent in 1995). 
REITZE, supra note 86, at 491. Some dated information on the staffing and resources of the 
EPA’s TSCA program, which primarily involves the review of premanufacture notifications 
under TSCA, suggests that the program is badly understaffed. An OTA project found that in 
the nineteen-year history of TSCA implementation, the EPA had reviewed only “about 2 
percent of the 70,000 chemicals in commerce.” OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, 
PUB NO. OTA-BP-ENV-166, SCREENING AND TESTING OF CHEMICALS IN COMMERCE  
11 (1995). 
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regulated parties.244 Consequently, regulated actors, who know 
whether they are in compliance with regulations and can limit access 
to their facilities, are able to lower the probability that their violations 
will be discovered.245 When industries strategically avoid leveling with 
regulators about the extent of modifications to their facility in order 
to sidestep onerous Clean Air Act requirements,246 or when an oil 
refinery flushes an open tank filled with volatile hazardous wastes 
 
 244. See Rechtschaffen, supra note 147, at 1253 (arguing that “self-audits uncover and 
correct many violations that the government would never discover on its own”); see also infra 
notes 258–59 and accompanying text. 
 245. This problem is appreciated by some environmental economists, who have written 
articles devising regulatory approaches that no longer allow private parties to benefit from 
private information regarding compliance. See Frank Jensen & Niels Vestergaard, Moral 
Hazard Problems in Fisheries Regulation: The Case of Illegal Landings and Discard, 24 
RESOURCES & ENERGY ECON. 281, 281–82 (2002) (proposing a “tax/subsidy” mechanism to 
regulate fisheries); Lewis, supra note 63, at 826–37 (suggesting ways to decrease information 
rents through incentive regulation); Kathleen Segerson, Uncertainty and Incentives for Nonpoint 
Pollution Control, 15 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 87, 88 (1988) (describing “an economic 
incentive scheme that could be used to control [pollution] even in the presence of uncertainty 
and monitoring difficulties”). The problem also has been explored by Drs. Polasky and 
Doremus in their analysis of endangered species protection. See Polasky & Doremus, supra note 
85, at 41 (concluding from their analysis that the current Endangered Species Act (ESA), “in 
which the burden of proof is on the regulator and compensation is provided only in extreme 
cases, gives landowners little incentive to cooperate with information collection activity”). 
Congress has been attentive to these problems, and has provided incremental adjustments to 
individual environmental laws that endeavor to increase the probability of catching violations by 
increasing protections to whistleblowers, see generally TSCA, 15 U.S.C. § 2622 (2000); OSHA, 
29 U.S.C. § 660 (2000); SDWA, 42 U.S.C. § 300j–9(i) (2000); CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1367 (2000); 
CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7622 (2000); RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6971 (2000); CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9610 
(2000), and providing bounties to third parties who report violations, see generally CAA, 33 
U.S.C. § 7413(f) (2000); CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9609(d). The use of citizen suits also serves to 
increase the probability that violations will be caught and sanctioned. See generally Barton H. 
Thompson, Jr., The Continuing Innovation of Citizen Enforcement, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 185 
(2000) (describing the important role that citizen enforcement plays in detecting and enforcing 
violations). 
 246. See, e.g., James Lofton, Environmental Enforcement: The Impact of Cultural Values and 
Attitudes on Social Regulation, 31 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,906, 10,913 (2001) 
(discussing how, in one case: 
[M]anagers [of large utility plants] were aware that if the scale and magnitude of the 
massive construction projects needed to keep the plants running came to EPA’s 
attention, it was unlikely that EPA would agree that these projects were routine 
maintenance, repair, or replacement. Rather than seeking agency guidance to 
determine if their practices were legal, [these] managers took careful notes at power 
industry conferences where they were counseled to use the term “‘routine 
maintenance’” rather than ‘“modifications’” when talking to EPA officials about 
component replacements at coal-fired plants. 
(footnotes omitted)). 
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while front-office staff keep the state inspector waiting,247 they 
demonstrate how much latitude they have in safeguarding potentially 
damaging private information and, in so doing, limiting the 
probability of an enforcement action.248 
To counteract this problem and raise the probability of catching 
violations, some environmental laws employ rigid self-monitoring 
requirements that mandate actors to self-monitor and self-report their 
polluting activities under guidelines that leave little room for 
discretion.249 The Clean Water Act requirements for discharge permits 
and the Clean Air Act requirements governing large electric utilities 
provide the best examples of these inflexible, self-monitoring 
requirements: they require actors to install monitors on large 
pollution stacks and outflow pipes that automatically sample the 
pollutant stream at regular intervals.250 
Self-monitoring requirements established under other 
environmental regulatory programs are considerably more 
permissive, however. In fact, many other regulatory self-monitoring 
requirements provide actors great discretion regarding when and how 
 
 247. See RUTH CLEVELAND, TEXAS NATURAL RESOURCE CONSERVATION COMMISSION 
UPSET/MAINTENANCE INVESTIGATION REPORT, BP AMOCO, TEXAS CITY BUSINESS UNIT 2 
(2000) (on file with the Duke Law Journal). 
 248. See also infra note 257. 
 249. See, e.g., EPA Technical Standards and Corrective Action Requirements for Owners 
and Operators of Underground Storage Tanks, 40 C.F.R. § 280.40 (2003) (prescribing release 
detection methods for all underground storage tanks to detect leaks “from any portion of the 
tank and the connected underground piping that routinely contains product”). 
 250. See CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1318(a)(A) (requiring dischargers to install monitoring 
equipment and maintain records on discharges); CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7414 (same); id. § 7651k(a) 
(requiring utilities engaged in a sulfur dioxide trading program to install continuous emissions 
monitoring equipment). But see Flatt, supra note 243, at 18–19 (observing that smaller point 
sources often are not required to obtain National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System 
(NPDES) permits, making it difficult to track their individual or cumulative contributions to 
water quality problems). In promulgating regulations for continuous emissions monitors for 
large utilities, the EPA has even established penalties for monitors that fail, producing even 
stronger incentives for accurate compliance information. See, e.g., Acid Rain Program: General 
Provisions and Permits, Allowance System, Continuous Emissions Monitoring, Excess 
Emissions and Administrative Appeals, 58 Fed. Reg. 3590, 3635 (Jan. 11, 1993) (promulgating a 
rule assuming that emissions are at the maximum level whenever there are not continuous 
emissions monitoring data). 
However, even these programs have been criticized by the GAO for leaving substantial 
gaps in both the accuracy and representativeness of self-reporting information. See U.S. GEN. 
ACCT. OFFICE, GAO/RCED-90-155, AIR POLLUTION: IMPROVEMENTS NEEDED IN 
DETECTING AND PREVENTING VIOLATIONS (1990); U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFFICE, GAO/RCED-
93-21, ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT: EPA CANNOT ENSURE THE ACCURACY OF SELF-
REPORTED COMPLIANCE MONITORING (1993). 
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they self-monitor and report pollution, including allowing them to 
determine whether they even fall under an environmental regulatory 
program at all.251 Actors, for example, can determine based on their 
own knowledge when or whether to test wastes to determine if they 
are hazardous and subject to expensive disposal restrictions.252 As 
previously discussed,253 actors are also given considerable discretion in 
determining whether sudden releases of a hazardous substance 
exceed threshold amounts and require reporting.254 Because the 
regulated entities themselves make many of the key decisions about 
how and when to comply,255 enforcement officials lack reliable and 
consistent information about the nature of these activities.256 Thus, the 
 
 251. See, e.g., Reitze & Hoffman, supra note 166, at 743–45 (deeming it problematic that the 
major environmental statutes rely heavily on facilities “to identify themselves as subject to 
regulation, monitor their own compliance and report to the EPA or the authorized state 
agency”). 
 252. See, e.g., Standards Applicable to Generators of Hazardous Waste, 40 C.F.R. § 262.11 
(2003) (instructing generators of potentially hazardous wastes under RCRA to “[a]pply[ ] 
knowledge of the hazard characteristic of the waste” or “[t]est[ ] the waste” according to federal 
regulations but not specifying what constitutes adequate “knowledge,” how often wastes should 
be tested, how to ensure that wastes being tested are representative, or how generator 
compliance with the regulation should be documented); see also EPCRA, 42 U.S.C.  
§ 11,023(g)(2) (2000) (requiring facilities to make only “reasonable estimates” of their use, 
manufacture, and processing of listed hazardous substances to determine whether they are 
covered under the TRI requirements); supra notes 173–74. Other “knowledge-based” self-
monitoring requirements include (1) whether to report the release of a reportable quantity of 
hazardous substances under CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9603(a), and associated regulations, 40 
C.F.R. § 302.6 (requiring notification once a “person in charge” “has knowledge,” but only 
when “the total amount of the mixture or solution equals or exceeds the RQ [reportable 
quantity]”); and (2) whether a facility is “major” and thus subject to various, more stringent 
emission requirements under the Clean Air Act, see CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7511e (2000) (detailing 
when a source is major for purposes of heightened regulatory restrictions under nonattainment 
rules, determinations that are left to the facilities’ discretion to validate). 
 253. See supra Parts II.B.1–2. 
 254. See CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(5) (relying on “person in charge” to accurately assess 
whether there has been a release of more than a reportable quantity of hazardous substance); 
CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9603(a) (same). 
 255. See, e.g., Caroline B. Buenger, Reliance on Generator Knowledge to Characterize Waste 
Under RCRA: Gambling on the Use of ‘Unacceptable’ Knowledge, 27 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. 
Inst.) 10,439, 10,441–42, 10,447–48 (1997) (outlining the uncertainty of the EPA’s generator 
testing requirements and its scant enforcement of the requirements (three administrative 
enforcement cases in seventeen years, all of which the EPA lost), and explaining how this 
uncertainty might allow a source of waste to defend itself successfully in future enforcement 
actions using the “fair notice” defense). 
 256. In discussing an enforcement suit for violations of the Clean Air Act against a large 
chemical plant in Texas, Mr. May details the regulators’ difficulties in learning about the high 
concentrations of air toxins in the air, tracing them to a particular facility, and then ultimately 
linking them to a particular problem inside that facility. After quoting the EPA as testifying in 
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probability of identifying violations under such circumstances is 
extremely low when the compliance requirements are vague and the 
regulated party controls the information needed to prove 
noncompliance.257 
Not surprisingly, then, a substantial shortfall exists between the 
number of enforcement actions and an industry’s own admissions of 
noncompliance.258 In one survey, two-thirds of corporate counsel 
 
the trial that it “relied 100 percent on the accuracy of information reported by regulated 
facilities,” the author (May) observes that “if the neighbors hadn’t complained, Huntsman’s [the 
polluting facility’s] crimes would have gone entirely unnoticed.” See, e.g., May, supra note 89. 
 257. Actors in some settings have gone to great lengths to keep the information to 
themselves. See supra notes 90–96. In the partly analogous context of Endangered Species Act 
enforcement, several authors have noted the resistance of some private landowners to providing 
any information on the species or providing access to their land for government regulators to 
conduct an inventory. In one report, regulators resorted to using volunteers from the Girl 
Scouts to survey private, open lands for endangered species because landowners were less likely 
to use guns against these girls. Polasky & Doremus, supra note 85, at 23. Others have 
documented landowners destroying the species’ habitat before regulators discover the animals’ 
existence on the private land. See David A. Dana, Natural Preservation and the Race to Develop, 
143 U. PA. L. REV. 655, 695 n.107 (1995) (discussing “substantial evidence of [landowner] races 
to destroy natural habitats in anticipation of the adoption of habitat preservation restrictions”). 
 258. Corporate surveys suggest that firms might be more willing to conduct self-audits if 
penalties for the detected violations were waived or reduced. A 1995 Price Waterhouse survey 
reported that half of the corporate respondents would expand their environmental auditing if 
penalties were reduced for violations voluntarily discovered and corrected, revealing a potential 
shortfall between the violations caught by regulators and the violations existing within 
corporations. See Incentives for Self-Policing: Discovery, Disclosure, Correction and Prevention 
of Violations, 65 Fed. Reg. 19,617, 19,619 (Apr. 11, 2000). Disparate empirical evidence of 
substantial noncompliance with environmental requirements reinforces the possibility that at 
least some firms are not engaged in self-audits, or at least not self-audits that lead to 
compliance. See, e.g., Jensen & Vestergaard, supra note 245, at 281–82 (observing that illegal 
landings (fishing that exceeds fishing quotas) of cod in the North Sea account for 22 percent of 
the catch weight and 51 percent of the number of caught fish, a finding that they attribute to the 
private information of fishermen regarding compliance); Blais et al., supra note 19 (describing 
the difficulties of detecting violations of air toxics requirements); see also May, supra note 89 
(describing very high, unexplained levels of air toxics at the border of a large chemical plant in 
Port Neches, Texas, which ultimately were traced to broken equipment that the company 
declined to fix and did not report); id. (reporting on a different study in Houston in 2002 
“show[ing] that amounts of ethylene and propylene measured in the atmosphere seem to be at 
least three times higher than the emissions inventories reported by industry”). 
In a harsh critique of the EPA’s enforcement policies, James Delong, a senior research 
associate at the Competitive Enterprise Institute, argues that most violations of environmental 
laws are trivial and do not harm the environment, a conclusion that he supports with surveys of 
firms regarding their prosecuted “noncompliance events” and the EPA’s statistics on civil 
enforcement cases. DELONG, supra note 148, at 12–17. What Delong neglects to account for in 
reaching his conclusion, however, are the substantial gaps in the EPA’s enforcement 
information. The EPA’s civil cases involve only identified violations that support a calculation of 
noncompliance: they say nothing about violations that the EPA has not discovered. Indeed, the 
number of enforcement suits would seem to rise with the availability of evidence on the types of 
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believed that their client corporations had, in the prior year, violated 
at least one environmental law, yet the vast majority of these 
violations appear not to have been either reported or caught.259 
Empirical statistics and enforcement reports also provide support for 
the intuitive prediction that the more rigorous the enforceable 
requirements, the higher the rate of compliance.260 When 
environmental regulatory programs leave little discretion for actors 
with regard to self-reporting, enforcement actions are more abundant; 
conversely, when regulated parties are afforded discretion with 
regard to self-monitoring, the number of enforcement actions drop.261 
 
violation. See note 207 and accompanying text. For violations about which firms are able to 
guard information on compliance, one would expect a relational decline in the enforcement 
suits filed. Yet, this pivotal role of private information in understanding compliance rates is 
completely omitted from Delong’s critique of the EPA’s enforcement effort. See DELONG, 
supra note 148, at 17 (concluding from the EPA’s enforcement record that the “number of 
major violations . . . is quite small, unless EPA’s investigators are amazingly inept”); cf. 
ENVIRONMENTAL WORKING GROUP, ABOVE THE LAW: HOW THE GOVERNMENT LETS 
MAJOR AIR POLLUTERS OFF THE HOOK 15 (1999) (arguing that “paperwork violations” are 
not necessarily insignificant but can conceal substantial underlying violations of emissions 
requirements), available at http://www.ewg.org/reports_content/abovethelaw/washington.pdf. 
Economists writing in the area of environmental enforcement would consider Delong’s failure 
to account for the role of private information in evaluating compliance rates to be a fatal error. 
See supra note 63 (discussing the effect of asymmetrical information). 
 259. See Marian Lavelle, Environmental Vise: Law, Compliance, NAT’L L.J., Aug. 30, 1993, 
at S1 (discussing a survey of corporate counsel in which two-thirds admitted that their client 
companies recently had violated environmental laws, although most lawyers surveyed asserted 
that it was not possible to achieve full compliance with the environmental laws because of their 
cost, complexity, and uncertainty). This survey seems to finesse related arguments that the 
regulatory requirements are too complex to understand, see, e.g., DELONG, supra note 148, at 
35–55, given that at least some of the applicable laws were apparently clear enough for 
“corporate counsel” to conclude that their companies were violating them. 
 260. See Flatt, supra note 243, at 27 (empirically relating noncompliance problems for 
NPDES permits under the Clean Water Act with the strength of enforcement resources); 
Rechtschaffen, supra note 147, at 1206–08 (describing a number of GAO and academic reports 
finding that increased enforcement of Clean Water Act requirements (in which self-monitoring 
expectations are unambiguous) leads to increased compliance rates); cf. id. at 1227–30 
(describing a broader range of studies that show a direct correlation between the intensity of 
enforcement and compliance rates). 
 261. See, e.g., Maria E. Chang, Citizen Suits: Toward a Workable Solution to Help Created 
Wetlands Succeed, 6 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 77, 98 (1993) (“Most citizen suits have 
concentrated on the [Clean Water Act] because that statute requires monitoring and self-
reporting, making it relatively easy to identify violations.”); LeRoy C. Paddock, Environmental 
Enforcement at the Turn of the Century, 21 ENVTL. LAW. 1509, 1523–24 (1991) (observing that 
the greatest number of citizen suits have occurred under the Clean Water Act “in part, because 
violations cannot be as easily identified using reports submitted under those [other] programs”); 
Susan D. Carle, Note, A Hazardous Mix: Discretion to Disclose and Incentives to Suppress 
Under OSHA’s Hazard Communication Standard, 97 YALE L.J. 581, 581–84 (1988) (discussing 
evidence of manufacturers’ extensive noncompliance with OSHA’s Hazardous Communication 
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Empirical support for a similar correlation between enforcement 
levels and compliance rates is also found in the tax literature.262 
Ten years of experience with self-audit laws also provide 
surprising evidence of how actors may be able to escape enforcement 
by controlling the release of internal information.263 These self-audit 
laws, passed by at least twenty-three states and the federal 
government,264 are based on the fundamental premise that regulators 
 
Standard (HCS), which is linked to the failure of the standard to require manufacturers to 
disclose product ingredients, making it nearly impossible for workers and others to enforce); see 
also Polasky & Doremus, supra note 85, at 27 (discussing similar information burdens in the 
enforcement of the Endangered Species Act on private land and noticing, after listing the 
evidentiary obstacles for government enforcers, the dearth of enforcement cases). 
 262. See, e.g., Leandra Lederman, The Interplay Between Norms and Enforcement in Tax 
Compliance, 64 OH. ST. L.J. 1453, 1503–05 (2003) (explaining that cash businesses—which 
generally lack documentation about transactions and thus have many informational 
advantages—have higher than normal tax noncompliance rates). 
 263. See, e.g., PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 5, at 989 (describing laws that protect 
environmental audits from disclosure in some circumstances); John H. Cushman, Many States 
Give Polluting Firms New Protections, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 1996, at A1 (reporting that “one 
state after another is adopting legislation to protect companies from disclosure or punishment 
when they discover environmental offenses at their own plants”). The EPA has also used self-
disclosure incentive programs for more specific reporting requirements under TSCA and testing 
and reporting requirements under the Clean Air Act. See EPA AUDIT POLICY UPDATES 2002, 
at 1177 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice Course, Handbook Series, No. B0-00L2, 830 (May/June 
2002)). 
 264. Rechtschaffen, supra note 147, at 1244–48 (listing and discussing twenty-three state 
audit laws and the EPA’s counterproposal for an audit law). A state’s enthusiasm for providing 
these rewards varies tremendously, ranging from protecting the firm from any enforcement 
action while keeping the violations confidential to simply lowering penalties to a more 
predictable amount if a firm voluntarily discloses the violations. See e.g., id. at 1246 (discussing 
state laws that protect firms conducting self-audits from enforcement action); Leroy Paddock, 
Environmental Accountability and Public Involvment, 21 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 243, 247 
(discussing the state of Minnesota’s use of penalty waivers for self-dislosed environmental 
violations). EPA’s self-audit guidelines are by far the least generous, providing only reduced 
sanctions for voluntarily disclosed violations. Incentives for Self-Policing; Discovery, Disclosure, 
Correction and Prevention of Violations, 60 Fed. Reg. 66,706, 66,711–12 (Dec. 22, 1995). 
Revisions in 2000 provided more generous timelines and helpful clarifications, but still retained 
the limited immunities for penalties. Final Policy Statement on Incentives for Self-Policing: 
Discovery, Disclosure, Correction and Prevention of Violations, 65 Fed. Reg. 19,618, 19,618 
(Apr. 11, 2000). 
At the other end of the spectrum are self-audit laws, like those passed in Colorado, that 
create a presumption of immunity from all penalties for self-discovered violations provided that 
they are disclosed and corrected within a reasonable time. George Van Cleve & Keith W. 
Holman, Promise and Reality in the Enforcement of the Amended Clean Air Act Part II: Federal 
Enforceability and Environmental Auditing, 27 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,151, 10,161 
(1997). The protections offered by these more generous state laws, however, may be undercut 
by the EPA’s opposition to the laws and its threat to overfile on state cases, which effectively 
removes any protections that these state laws offer. Channing J. Martin, Voluntary Disclosure of 
Environmental Violations: Is Mea Culpa a Good Idea or a Bad Move?, 32 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. 
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will be unable to catch most violations. The laws thus attempt to 
enlist the cooperation of the regulated parties by rewarding those 
who volunteer violations.265 Although the merits of these audit laws 
have been contested,266 their impact on the regulated community 
clearly underscores the extent of these actors’ superior knowledge of 
noncompliance. By January 2002, for example, 1,500 entities 
nationwide volunteered environmental violations at 6,065 facilities in 
order to obtain reduced penalties under the EPA’s audit policy.267 
Presumably, these violations would have escaped discovery without 
the incentives policy. An even more insidious lesson from the self-
audit laws arises from the nature of the violations that are being 
reported. The violations that are being self-reported under the EPA’s 
policy are primarily those violations that would be most easily 
detected by regulators if regulators invested the resources to 
investigate them. At the same time, these self-reported violations are 
generally inexpensive to rectify, for example, violations of 
recordkeeping requirements.268 This could mean that regulated 
 
L. Inst.) 10,692, 10,694–96 (2002); see also Thomas J. Kelly, Jr. & Gregory S. Braker, Navigating 
the Bermuda Triangle of Environmental Criminal Enforcement, 2001 A.B.A. SEC. ENV’T, 
ENERGY & RESOURCES 17 (discussing adverse ramifications for criminal liability). 
 265. See David A. Dana, The Perverse Incentives of Environmental Audit Immunity, 81 
IOWA L. REV. 969, 969–73 (2002). As defense lawyers have observed, however, the incentives in 
audit laws are probably not sufficient for violations that invite other liabilities or charges. See 
also Kelly & Braker, supra note 264, at 5–7 (detailing the multiple litigation risks that could flow 
from voluntarily disclosing environmental violations to the EPA, including toxic tort litigation; 
state enforcement; criminal charges, particularly against employees; government contracting 
problems; and shareholder suits). 
 266. See, e.g., Dana, supra note 265, at 982–93 (arguing, with public choice models, that 
audit immunities could lead to less preventative management); Rechtschaffen, supra note 147, 
at 1255–57 (detailing the arguments against audit laws). 
 267. Martin, supra note 264, at 10,695. 
 268. See EPA AUDIT POLICY UPDATES 2002, supra note 263, at 822 (showing that more 
than 83 percent of the audit settlements resolve violations of EPCRA and the CWA, which both 
have clear reporting obligations that are easy for regulators to enforce and for regulated entities 
to correct); see also Martin, supra note 264, at 10,696 (noting that the main use of the EPA’s 
audit immunities is for “recordkeeping obligations” and hypothesizing that the laws might be 
used more frequently when “[i]t is quick and easy to come into compliance” and “[t]here has 
been no harm to the environment”). Despite the low costs of compliance, EPCRA and CWA 
reporting violations can result in high penalty amounts if caught by regulators. See, e.g., 
EPCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 11045(a) (2000) (specifying maximum civil penalties of $25,000 per day for 
violations of emergency planning requirements). For example, the EPA settled with ten 
telecommunications companies for six hundred violations of EPCRA and the CWA, which 
required “properly notifying local emergency planning committees of the presence of hazardous 
chemicals and preparing spill prevention plans to reduce the risk of environmental accidents, 
and protect the safety of those who respond if an accident occurs.” EPA AUDIT POLICY 
UPDATES 2002, supra note 263, at 803. Under the audit settlement, the companies corrected 
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parties’ control over internal information enables them to volunteer 
incriminating information only when the economics support such a 
disclosure. Regulated parties’ self-reporting behavior also suggests 
that they may avoid disclosing more serious violations when they 
perceive that the probability of being caught by a regulator will be 
low, especially as compared against the economic benefits they gain 
by not installing the requisite pollution controls or satisfying other 
regulatory requirements in a timely fashion.269 
 
these recordkeeping violations (presumably at low cost) and paid a total of $128,772 in 
penalties, which was based on the amount the EPA calculated that the companies saved in 
delaying their compliance. “Pursuant to the Audit Policy, the Agency has waived or proposed to 
waive more than $4.2 million in potential gravity-based penalties that otherwise could have been 
assessed.” Id. Putting the math together, one can assume that the companies ultimately paid 
over $250,000 in penalties and compliance costs to avoid an enforcement action (and its 
accompanying litigation expenses) that could have resulted in a $4.2 million penalty. See supra 
note 241 (presenting the formula). Settling with the agency under the audit policy would thus be 
irrational only if the probability of being caught was less than 6 percent—unlikely for such 
obvious recordkeeping omissions. Even if the company expected much lower penalties (e.g., 10 
percent of the maximum $4.2 million fine), it would be in its interest to engage in an audit 
settlement if it thought the probability that it would be caught was 60 percent or higher. In fact, 
enforcement for more obvious and even flagrant reporting violations may cause enforcement 
officials to look for other violations at a plant, making volunteer settlements of these “red flags” 
even more rational. This back-of-the-envelope calculation also reveals why it is not in a firm’s 
interest to disclose violations that will be costly to correct (e.g., requiring new equipment valued 
at $500,000) or when the probability of detection of the violation by a regulator is likely to fall in 
the single digits. Assuming that the economic benefits of noncompliance are equal to the costs 
of compliance ($1 million total in this example), and assuming roughly the same penalties ($4.2 
million), firms would not be inclined to report violations so long as the probability that an 
enforcement official would discover the violation is less than about 23 percent. 
 269. See, e.g., Steven A. Herman, NCSL Study Finds That State Environmental Audit Laws 
Have No Impact on Company Self Auditing and Disclosure of Violations, 13 NAT’L ENVTL. 
ENFORCEMENT J. 18, 19 (Dec. 1998/Jan. 1999) (finding that more than three-fourths of 
corporations report performing compliance audits irrespective of the existence of audit laws, but 
that they also report that they did not disclose violations, even in states with privileges). One 
counterexample could be the willingness of some firms to enter into agreements with the EPA 
to undertake complete facility audits. See, e.g., Martin, supra note 264, at 10,696. The nature of 
these agreements might give insight into whether companies believe that the audits are in their 
financial best interest because corrections are low cost or because the prospect of civil penalties 
is so high that EPA assistance is needed. 
To the extent that penalties under an audit policy are equivalent to the economic benefits 
of noncompliance, reported violations again would seem to include only the most minor, 
economically trivial violations. Economic benefit calculations, which appear to form the basis 
for calculating penalties in most cases, are also likely to be attractive to regulated parties 
because these parties again enjoy private information about what the economic benefits might 
be. In contrast to estimating the costs of regulation for a cost-benefit analysis, however, in these 
economic benefit calculations, the regulated party/violator has strong incentives to deflate 
estimates. Empiricists could have some fun determining whether this underestimation occurs in 
fact. See supra note 63 and accompanying text. 
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Certain regulatory programs not only allow actors to reduce the 
likelihood that they will be caught committing a violation, but also 
encourage them to remain ignorant about these violations so that, in 
the event of an enforcement action, they will face lesser sanctions. 
Under current law, the more actors understand about the adverse 
effects of their activities, the higher the penalty when they are 
caught.270 Indeed, knowledgeable violators face not only high civil 
fines but criminal penalties.271 If actors smell a pungent odor in their 
air emissions but do not investigate, their penalties will likely be 
limited to civil sanctions—punishment less severe than if they sample 
the air with a device, discover an excessive level of pollutants, then do 
nothing or discard or ignore the monitoring data.272 Knowingly 
 
 270. See, e.g., CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)(3) (2000) (providing that culpability is one factor to 
consider in assessing the proper amount of administrative penalties); OFFICE OF ENFORCEMENT 
AND COMPLIANCE ASSURANCE, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, CIVIL PENALTY POLICY FOR 
SECTION 311(B)(3) AND SECTION 311(J) OF THE CLEAN WATER ACT 10 (1998) (stating that 
penalties should be based in part on “the sophistication of the respondent and the resources and 
information available to it, and any history of regulatory staff explaining to the respondent its 
legal obligations or notifying the respondent of violations”), available at 
http://www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/policies/civil/cwa/311pen.pdf. 
 271. Statutes providing criminal sanctions include the following: FIFRA, 7 U.S.C. § 136l(b) 
(2000); TSCA, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2614, 2615(b) (2000); CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c) (2000); CWA, 42 
U.S.C. § 1319(c); CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9603(b)–(d) (2000); RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)–(e) 
(2000). Cf. Richard J. Lazarus, Meeting the Demands of Integration in the Evolution of 
Environmental Law: Reforming Environmental Criminal Law, 83 GEO. L. J. 2407, 2407–13 
(1995) (arguing that the moral culpability features of criminal law are not appropriately 
integrated into the decentralized environment of environmental criminal law and that reform is 
needed). 
 272. See, e.g., United States v. Hopkins, 53 F.3d 533 (2d Cir. 1995) (explaining a case in 
which the defendant-vice president of a manufacturing plant was convicted of falsifying, 
tampering with, or rendering inaccurate a monitoring device or method because, contrary to the 
regulatory requirements, he held back self-monitored samples that exceeded regulatory 
standards and, when this did not work, he instructed employees to dilute samples with tap water 
or reduce zinc concentration using a coffee filter); see also Kelly & Braker, supra note 264, at 3 
(warning attorneys of the risks of criminal prosecution following the voluntary disclosure of civil 
violations under the EPA’s audit policies and advising that “it may be more expedient to 
disclose potential criminal violations directly to the appropriate U.S. Attorney’s Office [of 
criminal investigations]”). Similar perverse incentives could also result from criminal 
enforcement of the Endangered Species Act, in which private landowners are best advised not 
to look for endangered species before developing land. Because criminal sanctions for 
“harming” an endangered species only apply to “knowingly” harming the species, such 
sanctions seem capable of being avoided by willful ignorance. See ESA, 16 U.S.C.  
§§ 1538(a)(2)(B), 1540(b) (2000) (providing criminal sanctions for “knowing” violations only); 
cf. Michael J. Bean, The Endangered Species Act and Private Land: Four Lessons Learned from 
the Past Quarter Century, 28 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,701, 10,706–07 (1998) (discussing 
the perverse incentives for owners to destroy or develop land to avoid federal regulation under 
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violating the environmental laws is a crime and is sanctioned more 
severely than reckless or civil violations.273 
B. Increasing Protections for Concealing Information 
With such strong reasons to resist producing information, it is no 
surprise that actors not only avoid learning about the adverse harms 
created by their products or activities but, once such news is 
discovered, actively seek legal protections to limit the disclosure of 
the incriminating information.274 By claiming broad protections, actors 
can raise the costs to others of accessing this information or, in some 
cases, can even bar access completely. This Section details several 
discrete legal protections. Each allows actors to claim confidentiality 
privileges for privately held, damaging information. The protections 
bar most public access to the information. Indeed, in many instances 
even the EPA’s access is restricted. 
1. Trade Secret or Confidential Business Information 
Protections. Trade secret or confidential business information 
protections,275 which provide firms with a vehicle for erecting 
 
the ESA, and the resulting efforts of the Department of the Interior to reverse these incentives 
by rewarding collaborative land management). 
 273. Compare, e.g., CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(1) (providing criminal penalties for 
“negligent violations”), with id. § 1319(c)(2)–(3) (providing criminal penalties for “knowing 
violations” and “knowing endangerment”). See also RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)–(f) (levying 
criminal penalties only for knowing violations and defining “knowingly” in a way that excludes 
recklessness). Although there have been concerns about the knowledge standards for criminal 
environmental law, they have not taken issue with the perverse incentives for ignorance. Still, 
many of the proposals for reform that have emerged from this debate implicitly circumvent 
these perverse incentives by recommending that criminal law be used only for repeat, sinister 
types of violations. See, e.g., Lazarus, supra note 271, at 2514–17 (discussing the difficult 
legislative choices regarding what facts a criminal defendant should know to warrant criminal 
prosecution and suggesting alternatives, some of which only require a defendant to be aware 
that he is doing something reckless rather than requiring proof of the “defendant’s knowledge 
of all of the technical details”); Memorandum from Earl E. Devaney, Director, Office of 
Criminal Enforcement, to the Environmental Protection Agency, The Exercise of Investigative 
Discretion 2, at http://www.epa.gov/enforcement/resources/policies/criminal/exercise.pdf (Jan. 
12, 1994) (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (recommending that criminal environmental 
enforcement focus on the most significant and egregious violators, such as repeat or deliberator 
violators and those who tamper with data and monitors). 
 274. See Lyndon, supra note 83, at 20 (“In the absence of a well-developed information 
context, the market not only discourages firms from producing data about side effects, but 
encourages ignorance and deception.”). 
 275. For a thoughtful discussion of the tensions between trade secret law and health and 
safety protection, see id. at 4–50. 
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immediate and costly barriers to accessing information about the 
harms created by their products or activities, constitute the broadest 
form of information protection. Confidential business information 
(CBI) claims are regularly used to limit access to health information 
on toxic substances and pesticides, including information on exposure 
risks, and on chemical identity and ingredients.276 Such claims can 
even be used to protect information collected by inspectors in the 
course of environmental compliance inspections.277 Even though most 
health and safety data are legislatively excluded from trade secret 
protections,278 once a trade secret claim is asserted, the EPA generally 
considers it valid279 until a party requests the information under the 
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).280 Under existing regulations, 
 
 276. See Envtl. Prot. Agency, Confidential Business Information (CBI) Review, at 
http://www.epa.gov/pesticides/foia/cbi.htm (last visited Oct. 30, 2004) (on file with the Duke 
Law Journal) (listing environment-related information that is commonly claimed as 
confidential); infra note 290 and accompanying text. OSHA also allows employers to withhold 
information on chemical identities from employees by claiming they are protected as trade 
secrets, as long as they indicate that they have done so on the label. EPA Hazard 
Communication, 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200(i) (2003). 
 277. See EPA Definitions, 40 C.F.R. § 2.201 (2003) (defining a business confidentiality 
claim). 
 278. Because trade secret protections are a general common law construct and not 
constitutionally protected forms of property, Congress has authority to balance them against 
other goals, including health and environmental protection. Although Congress strikes the 
balance differently in the various environmental statutes, it has indicated that the balance 
should favor the general disclosure of information needed to determine potential adverse public 
health and environmental effects. See, e.g., TSCA, 15 U.S.C. § 2613(b) (2000) (stating types of 
data of which disclosure is not prohibited); CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1318(b) (exempting all 
information on “effluent data,” standards, or limitations from protection as trade secrets); 
CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7414(c) (2000) (same for “emission data”); CERCLA, 42 U.S.C.  
§ 9604(e)(7)(F) (2000) (identifying “information with respect to any hazardous substance” not 
entitled to protection). 
 279. See EPA Confidentiality of Business Information, 40 C.F.R. § 2.204(c)–(d) (2003) 
(placing the burden for investigating and determining the validity of a CBI claim on the EPA, 
with no reference to substantiation of the claim by the claimant). The EPA has promulgated 
categorical denials of CBIs for certain types of information (e.g, permit applications for NPDES 
permits under the Clean Water Act), which presumably take effect immediately and reject such 
claims. See, e.g., EPA Confidentiality of Information, 40 C.F.R. § 122.7(b) (2003) (identifying 
narrow categories for which “claims of confidentiality . . . will be denied”). 
 280. See 40 C.F.R. § 2.204(a) (describing the procedures that the EPA must follow “in 
making initial determinations of whether business information is entitled to confidential 
treatment for reasons of business confidentiality”); Public Information and Confidentiality, 65 
Fed. Reg. 80,394, 80,395 (Dec. 21, 2000) (observing that “CBI regulations generally do not 
require a business to submit a substantiation until disclosure becomes an issue”). Generally, it 
appears that a FOIA request serves as the impetus for the EPA to review a CBI claim. See id. 
(“EPA often finds it necessary to make final confidentiality determinations as a result of FOIA 
requests or rulemaking.”). In 1994, the EPA reported that it received more than forty thousand 
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there are no sanctions for asserting overbroad CBI claims.281 
Moreover, with the exception of EPCRA,282 such claims require no 
substantiation—for the privilege to apply, the firm has only to stamp 
the documents “confidential.”283 
Firms that are unenthusiastic about granting public access to 
information on the harms created by their products and activities face 
few restraints in abusing these generous trade secret protections.284 
 
FOIA requests a year, many of which seek confidential business information. Public 
Information and Confidentiality Regulations, 59 Fed. Reg. 60,446, 60,447 (Nov. 23, 1994). 
Nonetheless, in 1990, the EPA aggressively challenged over seven hundred CBI claims under 
TSCA on its own (without a FOIA trigger) and appeared to make substantial headway in 
reducing the number of overinclusive claims. See Julie Yang, Note, Confidential Business 
Information Reform Under the Toxic Substances Control Act, 2 ENVTL. LAW. 219, 235 (1995) 
(reporting and documenting this development). The literature does not reveal whether the EPA 
has been able to keep up with this internal review effort since 1990. 
 281. Empirical evidence discussed in notes 290–97 and accompanying text, infra, in fact 
suggests that industry tends to err heavily on the side of overclaiming CBI for health and safety 
information. 
 282. EPCRA allows firms to keep chemical identities confidential but explicitly requires 
companies to justify claims in their initial CBI requests. 42 U.S.C. § 11042(a)(2)(A)(ii) (2000). 
Accordingly, the EPA has developed a second set of regulations governing claims for trade 
secret protection for chemical identifiers covered under EPCRA; these regulations, in contrast 
to the EPA’s regulations for other statutes, are specifically intended to “eliminate[] legally 
invalid and frivolous [CBI] claims.” Trade Secrets Claims for Emergency Planning and 
Community Right-To-Know Information, 61 Fed. Reg. 67,016, 67,017 (Dec. 19, 1996). 
Nonetheless, if the company provides the requisite supporting documentation, the EPA appears 
to grant the claim without reviewing the merits. The claim is only reviewed once a party files a 
FOIA request or in the unlikely event that the EPA decides to invest resources in the review of 
classified information on its own initiative. EPA Trade Secrecy Claims, 40 C.F.R. § 350.9(b) 
(2003). 
 283. See 40 C.F.R. § 2.203. No official from the company need take responsibility for 
asserting the claim, and there are no penalties for asserting the claim when it is facially frivolous. 
See id. §§ 2.201–2.310; see also Christopher J. Lewis, Comment, When is a Trade Secret Not So 
Secret? The Deficiencies of 40 C.F.R. Part 2, Subpart B, 30 ENVTL. L. 143, 171–72 (2000) 
(making this same observation regarding the lack of disincentives for overbroad CBI claims). 
The firm is presumed to waive the privilege, or at least must justify it later if it does not stamp 
information as confidential when first submitting it to the EPA. 40 C.F.R. § 2.203(c). See also 
Yang, supra note 280, at 223 (discussing how “easy” it is for companies to file CBI claims under 
TSCA). For a contrasting approach to CBI taken under EPCRA, see EPA Trade Secrecy 
Claims, 40 C.F.R. §§ 350.5, 350.7, 350.13, 350.27 (2003). 
Once the information is publicly disseminated, the company loses its right to claim the
misappropriation of a trade secret. See, e.g., James T. O’Reilly, Seeking a Truce in the 
Environmental Information Wars: Replacing Obsolete Secrecy Conflicts with New Forms of 
Sharing, 30 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,203, 10,204 (2000) (discussing this point and 
concluding that “[t]his threat of income loss provides the economic incentive that motivates 
industry to oppose agencies’ broader dissemination of industry-submitted technological and 
process data.”). 
 284. The EPA openly concedes that the problem of overbroad CBI claims is serious: 
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Routinely stamping all information as “confidential business 
information” is expeditious and immediately protects such 
information from public scrutiny. At the same time, making a CBI 
claim increases search costs for others.285 Indeed, to obtain 
information that has been improperly claimed as CBI, an interested 
party must submit a FOIA request, submit a follow-up FOIA request 
if pieces of information appear left out or unaccounted for, and be 
prepared to litigate if the information is not produced.286 Because the 
public typically is denied access not only to the nondisclosed 
information, but also to the firm’s justification for asserting the CBI 
claim,287 the public is handicapped in its ability to challenge an EPA 
decision that information is appropriately classified as a protected 
 
EPA receives a large number of submissions of various types of information claimed 
as CBI. Many of the claims received are very broad, and the Agency has limited 
resources to deal with this stream of information. As a result, large amounts of 
information claimed as CBI are retained by the Agency longer than necessary, and 
broad or non-specific CBI claims may limit public access to information that is not 
actually CBI. 
Public Information and Confidentiality: Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking; Withdrawal 
of 1994 Proposed Rule, 65 Fed. Reg. 80,394, 80,395 (Dec. 21, 2000). 
 285. See, e.g., U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFFICE, supra note 161, at 54–55 (1994) (discussing how the 
scientific community and others would benefit from lower cost access to TSCA data that is 
claimed CBI); Carle, supra note 261, at 596–600 (discussing manufacturers’ tendency to claim 
product ingredients as trade secret protected under OSHA, making OSHA’s hazard 
communication standard, which provides warnings to workers, effectively unenforceable). As a 
result, a CBI claim raises the search costs for others to access the information, in some cases so 
substantially that interested parties will not invest the money or time to obtain the information 
or even learn how they might obtain it. 
Perhaps still more likely to discourage disclosure are the onerous consequences for the 
poor federal bureaucrat who makes a decision to disclose information stamped as CBI when 
that official’s decision later turns out to be wrong. Agency officials who wrongfully divulge trade 
secret information can be charged criminally and imprisoned for up to one year, and they must 
be terminated from their position. Trade Secret Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (2000). RCRA and 
EPCRA also provide sanctions for persons who disclose trade secret information who are not 
employees of the government. TSCA, 15 U.S.C. § 2613 (2000); RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6927(b)(2) 
(2000); EPCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 11045(d)(2) (2000); see CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7414(c) (2000) (stating 
that an administrator cannot divulge information entitled to protection as a trade secret). 
 286. For these and other scientific costs that flow from CBI claims, see Lyndon, supra note 
83, at 36–37. Search costs are also high because the FOIA response, at its best, is a data dump. 
There are few electronic search techniques to sort through the information, and it is rarely 
organized. Thus, even once documents are obtained, they are costly to organize and assess. 
 287. See 40 C.F.R. § 2.205(c) (providing that, in most cases, a company’s substantiation for a 
CBI claim should receive automatic classification as CBI); see also Public Information and 
Confidentiality, 65 Fed. Reg. at 80,396 (conceding potential problems with the EPA’s policy of 
automatically classifying substantiations as CBI if the firm requests them, which in turn deprives 
FOIA requestors of not only the information, but the basis for the CBI claim used to prevent its 
disclosure). 
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trade secret.288 Although less dramatic, even agency officials can be 
impeded in accessing and using information stamped CBI, regardless 
of whether the claim is meritorious: 
Staff discussions on [CBI chemicals] must be held in secure areas, 
documents can be reviewed only in secure environments, meeting 
notes themselves become confidential documents and must be 
logged and guarded under lock and key, and computers must have 
their memories and permanent storage media erased after 
processing confidential data.289 
Available evidence confirms what one might expect from these 
overgenerous trade secret protections: firms routinely use CBI claims 
without basis.290 One organization even went so far as to claim a firm 
address as protected trade secret information.291 In 1990, for example, 
the EPA reviewed CBI claims under the Toxic Substances Control 
Act (TSCA) and challenged some nonmeritorious claims. By 1992, 
“industry had voluntarily amended and withdrawn over 600 claims 
after EPA’s inquiries.”292 A 1992 study found that confidential 
 
 288. See Lyndon, supra note 83, at 35 (making this same argument). 
 289. U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFFICE, supra note 161, at 55; see also O’Reilly, supra note 283, at 
10,204–06. Moreover, only “cleared” regulators are allowed access to information claimed as 
CBI. Until recently, the statute was read to foreclose allowing state officials to access 
information claimed as CBI. Yang, supra note 280, at 231. The EPA has worked to provide 
states access to CBI information through the “contractors” provision of TSCA, 15 U.S.C.  
§ 2613(a)(2). Yang, supra note 280, at 232. Nevertheless, given these barriers to access, some of 
this information is likely missed or proves practicably unobtainable to agency regulators or their 
citizen-oriented watchdogs. 
 290. See, e.g., OFFICE OF POLLUTION PREVENTION & TOXICS, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 
FINAL ACTION PLAN: TSCA CONFIDENTIAL BUSINESS INFORMATION REFORM 1-5 (1994) 
(observing that some and possibly many CBI claims under TSCA lack merit); Sheila A. 
Ferguson et al., Influence of CBI Requirements on TSCA Implementation, Hampshire 
Research Associates 41 (Mar. 1992) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Duke Law 
Journal) (concluding, by reviewing CBI claims from 1977 through 1990, that “all available 
evidence supports the proposition that much of the information covered by CBI claims is not 
legitimately entitled to protection as TSCA CBI”). 
The GAO reports that the Hampshire Study also found that firms claimed as CBI under 
TSCA information that had already been disseminated publicly. “For example, information 
contained elsewhere in newspaper articles and corporate annual reports was submitted as was 
publicly available information from EPA’s Toxics Release Inventory, a system that contains 
nationwide information on toxic chemicals emitted into the air, ground, and water by 
manufacturing facilities.” U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFFICE, supra note 161, at 56–57. 
 291. See Industry Moves to Exempt Sensitive Information from TSCA Reporting, CHEMICAL 
ENG’G, Aug. 1994, 45–46. 
 292. U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFFICE, supra note 161, at 56. The EPA’s limited resources make this 
approach available only in the short term, however. Id. The EPA also reviewed CBI claims on 
health and safety studies and found that over one-fifth of the claims had no merit. Id. 
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information was identified in more than 90 percent of the 
premanufacture notices required for new toxic substances under 
TSCA,293 a statute in which Congress explicitly stated that “health and 
safety stud[ies]” are not ordinarily protected from disclosure by trade 
secret claims.294 
Industry representatives admit that they claim CBI protection 
when the claim is inappropriate.295 In fact, the pervasiveness of CBI 
claims is one of industry’s primary arguments against reforming the 
system. Firms argue that such practices are so prevalent that justifying 
the vast array of information that they routinely claim as confidential 
business information would be unduly burdensome. They have even 
argued that requiring this substantiation might violate the Regulatory 
Flexibility Act296 given the added burden that the requirement would 
impose on small manufacturers.297 
From the standpoint of environmental and public health 
protection, the EPA’s CBI program is a disaster. Allowing firms to 
classify much of the information that they are legally required to 
submit minimizes even the modest benefits achieved by requiring 
actors to produce at least some information on the harms caused by 
their products and activities. Moreover, actors taking this approach 
run only slight risks. CBI claims are made discreetly, so there is little 
public awareness that firms are taking advantage of this loophole. In 
 
 293. Id. at 5. 
 294. TSCA, 15 U.S.C. § 2613(b). See generally McGarity & Shapiro, supra note 83, at 874–75 
(arguing that TSCA “specifically exempt[s] health and safety studies from the protections 
otherwise afforded to proprietary information”). 
 295. In the GAO’s 1994 study, industry commentators who were interviewed “accepted the 
[GAO’s] basic finding that the chemical industry does make improper confidentiality claims and 
needs to address such claims.” U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFFICE, supra note 161, at 58. They defended 
their practice of overclaiming under TSCA, however, by arguing that “the purpose of TSCA 
information is to provide EPA with a factual basis for chemical regulation, not to provide a 
basis for disseminating data on the chemicals to other interested organizations.” Id. 
 296. 5 U.S.C. §§ 601–612 (2000). 
 297. See, e.g., Letter from Warren E. Stickle, President, Chemical Producers and 
Distributors Association & Bill Balek, President, International Sanitary Supply Association, to 
the EPA Docket 2–3 (June 13, 2001) [hereinafter Stickle & Balek Letter] (responding to 
probosed changes in the CBI rules, see Public Information and Confidentiality, Advance Notice 
of Proposed Rulemaking, 65 Fed. Reg. 80,394 (Dec. 21, 2000)), available at 
http://www.cpda.com/Content/regulatory_affairs/archived/CPDAISSAComments.pdf. At the 
same time, the agency’s administrative costs appear quite substantial. See, e.g., Lyndon, supra 
note 83, at 35 (“The agency whose mandate is to foster health protection ends up in the 
anomalous position of ‘sanitizing’ and protecting industry documents . . . .”). 
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addition, firms face few, if any, sanctions for making overbroad CBI 
claims. 
Given the multifaceted advantages that accrue to firms from 
classifying information on the externalities created by their products 
and activities, it comes as no surprise that the EPA’s concerted efforts 
to reform the CBI program have consistently failed.298 Indeed, 
industry representatives not only vigorously oppose regulatory 
reform, but they argue that existing protections are inadequate to 
ensure that competitive secrets are safe from disclosure when public 
health and safety data are disseminated. One trade association has 
even insisted that still broader protections are needed and has 
proposed legislation to that end.299 
2. Privacy Protections. Firms also take advantage of limited 
privacy protections that make it more difficult and costly for the 
 
 298. Over the past decade, the EPA has twice attempted to reform the problem of 
overbroad CBI protections—without success. See Public Information and Confidentiality 
Regulations, 59 Fed. Reg. 60,445 (Nov. 23, 1994); Public Information and Confidentiality, 
Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 65 Fed. Reg. 80,394 (Dec. 21, 2000); U.S. GEN. 
ACCT. OFFICE, ENVIRONMENTAL INFORMATION: EPA COULD BETTER ADDRESS CONCERNS 
ABOUT DISSEMINATING SENSITIVE BUSINESS INFORMATION (June 1999) [hereinafter U.S. 
GEN. ACCT. OFFICE, ENVIRONMENTAL INFORMATION] (commenting on the usefulness of such 
information), available at http://www.loyola.edu/dept/politics/intel/rced99-156.pdf; U.S. GEN. 
ACCT. OFFICE, supra note 161 (discussing the EPA’s assessment of the risks of chemicals); 
Ferguson et al, supra note 290 (noting that CBI claims severely limit access to TSCA data); 
Stickle & Balek Letter, supra note 297 (responding to the proposed reforms); see also Yang, 
supra note 280, at 229–37 (discussing the EPA’s failed effort to reform CBI under TSCA in 
1994); CBI Rule on Hold as Regulatory Negotiation Eyed, 26 Env’t Rep. (BNA) 17 (1995). 
The EPA has also suggested that firms provide materials accounting to strengthen 
EPCRA reporting, which would include information on toxic chemicals that enter, are used, and 
leave the facility. This proposal was also opposed and ultimately terminated by industry. See, 
e.g., U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFFICE, ENVIRONMENTAL INFORMATION, supra, at 11, 12 (discussing 
how industry opposition on CBI grounds led to the abandonment of this proposal). 
 299. Industry argues that even more trade secret protections are needed given the “mosaic” 
effect—the ability of competitors to piece together information about their operations from bits 
of publicly available data. See, e.g., Public Information and Confidentiality, 59 Fed. Reg. at 
80,396 (discussing how the regulated community “has made the argument that multiple pieces of 
data which may not qualify individually to be treated as CBI and are made publicly available 
can be pieced together to reveal a trade secret”); Stickle & Balek Letter, supra note 297, at 5 
(discussing the threats that the mosaic effect presents to trade secret information). In 1998, the 
law firm of Ropes & Gray prepared a report for the Chemical Manufacturers Association that 
advocated adoption of a “uniform statute that would make it easier for its members to assert 
confidentiality claims based on the ‘mosaic’ argument.” U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFFICE, 
ENVIRONMENTAL INFORMATION, supra note 298, at 22. 
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government to access information about their externalities.300 
Although the Supreme Court has upheld the aerial surveillance of a 
large industrial facility without consent of the owner as consistent 
with the Fourth Amendment,301 in-person inspections require 
inspectors to obtain either prior permission from the owner or an ex 
parte warrant from a court.302 Some courts, moreover, insist that such 
warrants provide only limited access for inspectors. For example, if an 
inspector enters a site for a routine inspection and discovers that 
invasive sampling is needed—a need not anticipated when the initial 
warrant was obtained—the inspector may be required to return to 
court to obtain a second ex parte warrant before conducting the 
sampling.303 Moreover, only government inspectors have access to 
private industrial premises. Even when there are discharges from a 
property onto adjacent land, neighboring residents have no way to 
obtain access unless the owner invites them on the site.304 
3. Litigation Settlement. Litigation settlements also provide a 
vehicle for preventing public access to incriminating information on 
the harms caused by one’s activities or products. Even though private 
litigation has uncovered some of the most important information on 
the adverse effects of products such as asbestos, lead, and tobacco,305 
 
 300. Fourth Amendment protections from unreasonable searches and seizures generally 
require government inspectors to obtain a warrant before entering a facility without consent. 
There are several exceptions that weaken these protections for industrial establishments. See 
REITZE, supra note 86, at 497–98, 500–03. 
 301. See Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 237–38 (1986). 
 302. See, e.g., REITZE, supra note 86, at 499–500 (outlining a neutral EPA inspection 
scheme). To obtain a warrant for administrative purposes, the inspector must generally have 
some evidence of suspected violations (“reasonable suspicion of a violation”) or must be 
selecting the facility at random using “neutral” criteria. Id. at 499. 
 303. United States v. Tarkowski, 248 F.3d 596, 599–601 (7th Cir. 2001); see also Roger D. 
Schwenke, Regulatory Access to Contaminated Sites: Some New Twists to an Old Tale, 26 WM. & 
MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 749, 754–83 (2002) (surveying case law on ways that 
landowners can impede or file takings claims challenging government efforts to obtain access to 
private land for purposes of sampling and cleanup). 
 304. To enter the site without permission or a privilege would constitute trespass. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 163 (1965). Even the privilege to enter private land to 
abate a private nuisance appears to require the trespasser to possess information of the nuisance 
to justify the entry. Id. § 201. 
 305. Tobacco provides the best example, see generally GLANTZ ET AL., supra note 103; 
HILTS, supra note 35, although important revelations about the safety of products also emerged 
in a variety of other mass tort cases, see supra notes 53–57 and accompanying text. Of course, 
even the most aggressive plaintiffs’ attorneys are sometimes unable to dislodge damaging 
internal documents (without resorting to theft) if the company is willing to resist discovery in 
illegal ways. See, e.g., Henry Weinstein, Judge Imposes $100,000 Fine on Tobacco Company 
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when private cases settle and the plaintiffs are willing—usually as a 
result of a bonus payment—the record of such information can be 
sealed or destroyed.306 This practice has troubled judges and scholars 
because it implies that, simply by paying enough, an actor may keep 
damaging information from public view, even when the actor’s 
products or activities have engendered litigation precisely because the 
actor knowingly failed to disclose the harms.307 
4. Nondisclosure Contracts. Actors also take advantage of 
nondisclosure clauses to conceal adverse information about their 
products.308 When required by law to produce certain studies, 
manufacturers and others often contract the research out to 
university scientists and consultant laboratories.309 These contracts 
typically allow the manufacturer to retain ownership of the results 
and control how the research is reported in the literature.310 Through 
these contracts, firms are sometimes able to suppress research that is 
 
Litigation, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 31, 1997, at D1 (reporting that a court imposed a $100,000 penalty 
against Brown & Williamson for failing to comply with pretrial discovery orders requiring the 
company to turn over internal documents). 
 306. See, e.g., Marty Steinberg, Protection of Proprietary Rights and Trade Secrets, C520 
A.L.I.-A.B.A. 655, 672–74 (1990) (discussing how courts can (but ordinarily are loathe to) seal 
files containing trade secret information or grant protective orders). Firms can also attempt to 
resist sharing these documents by claiming attorney-client and related privileges for much of the 
information. See, e.g., Kelly & Braker, supra note 264 (advocating the use of discovery privileges 
to avoid criminal liability). But see Reitze & Hoffman, supra note 166, at 715–16 (discussing the 
limits of these privilege claims when they concern self-evaluative documents sought by the 
government in environmental enforcement cases). 
 307. See, e.g., Jack B. Weinstein & Catherine Wimberly, Secrecy in Law and Science, 23 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 18–30 (2001) (discussing the problem of secrecy agreements in mass tort 
cases and how they may in fact conflict with the protection of public safety); Keith Schneider, 
Court Rejects U.S. Effort to Keep Exxon Valdez Settlement Agreement Secret, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 
9, 1991, at A9. 
 308. They accomplish this through confidentiality and nondisclosure agreements. See, e.g., 
Steinberg, supra note 306, at 672 (providing overview of these agreements in the context of 
trade secret protections). 
 309. See, e.g., Gayle Charnley & Jacqueline Patterson, Use of Human Subjects Data for 
Regulating Chemical Exposures, 33 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,923, 10,927 (2003) 
(referring to pesticide manufacturers’ use of contract laboratories to conduct required testing in 
course of a larger discussion about the usefulness of private clinical testing); see also supra notes 
125–32 and accompanying text.  
 310. See, e.g., Elina Hemminki et al., The Courts—A Challenge to Health Technology 
Assessment, 285 SCIENCE 203, 203 (1999) (describing several cases in which manufacturers 
mounted legal challenges to prevent the dissemination of data); see also supra note 103 and 
accompanying text. This is such a problem that journals are beginning to require disclosure of 
these conditions as a prerequisite to publication. See infra notes 404–05 and accompanying text.  
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unfavorable.311 Moreover, after suppressing research results, firms 
may even be able to “shop” for other scientists to conduct the same 
research with modifications to the study design or analytical methods 
that, while meeting legal requirements, produce more favorable 
results.312 Typically, outside parties have no way to become aware of 
this trial-and-error approach. It is difficult to know the extent to 
which this “gaming” of scientific research occurs, but the high rate of 
bias in sponsor-financed research suggests significant sponsor 
influence in both study design and the reporting of study results.313 To 
the extent that firms do suppress unfavorable research, of course, this 
practice distorts the scant scientific information that remains. 
5. State Privilege Laws. Over the last decade, several new 
protections have emerged that provide even more opportunity for 
actors to keep adverse information about their products and activities 
to themselves. Some state self-audit laws, for example, provide 
sweeping protections for information relating to externalities. Some 
states not only waive or limit sanctions, but actually provide actors 
with a mechanism for making the contents of their self-audits, 
including the discovery of violations, privileged—in some cases even 
from the state government.314 Although strong opposition from the 
EPA may be eroding these state privilege laws,315 firms have 
 
 311. D. Blumenthal et al., Withholding Research Results in Academic Life Science: Evidence 
From a National Survey of Faculty, 277 JAMA 1224 (1997); Drummond Rennie, Thyroid Storm, 
277 JAMA 1238 (1997); Steven A. Rosenberg, Secrecy in Medical Research, 334 N. ENG. J. 
MED. 392 (1996); see also supra notes 53–58 and accompanying text. 
 312. See, e.g., supra notes 43, 125–32 and accompanying text (providing examples of 
sponsors who have commissioned favorable research, although it is not possible to verify 
directly the use of nondisclosure contracts for these arrangements); cf. Alan Zarembo, Funding 
Studies to Suit Need, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 3, 2003, at A1 (reporting that Exxon terminated a 
contract for research on punitive damages when the research produced undesirable conclusions, 
but that Exxon did not prohibit the researcher from publishing the paper). 
 313. See KRIMSKY, supra note 127, at 141–61 (discussing the “funding effect” in case studies 
of biomedical research and citing to empirical studies, published in medical journals, observing 
that the outcomes of industry-sponsored research is more favorable to the sponsor (statistically) 
than parallel research that is federally funded). 
 314. See, e.g., Rafe Peterson, Environmental Law Update, PROB. & PROP., July/Aug. 2000, at 
63, 63–64 (stating that twenty-six states have adopted environmental privilege laws that make 
voluntary environmental audit reports inadmissible in court proceedings and provide immunity 
from liability or reduction in penalties for violations disclosed as a result of such audit reports). 
These privileges, when adopted by states, are sometimes much broader than the EPA’s 
provisions. Id. 
 315. The EPA does this by threatening to override state protections with federal suits. See 
supra note 264. 
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attempted to use these laws to withhold information from local 
citizens regarding releases of air toxins and contaminants into 
groundwater. In at least one case, this effort was successful.316 A 
hodgepodge of other state laws, particularly those governing 
voluntary cleanup of contaminated land, also provides actors with an 
ability to classify information about potential harms under 
circumstances in which the information ordinarily would be made 
public.317 
6. National Security Legislation. National security legislation 
may provide regulated parties with an opportunity to prevent public 
disclosure and even regulatory use of unfavorable information by 
claiming that the information presents national security risks.318 The 
 
 316. The Review of Activities by the Federal Government Concerning Individuals or 
Organizations Voluntarily Submitting to Environmental Audits: Hearing Before the Senate 
Comm. on Env’t and Pub. Works, 105th Cong. 55 (1997) (statement of Steven Herman, Ass’t 
Administrator, Office of Enforcement & Compliance Assurance, Envtl. Prot. Agency). 
 317. A number of state voluntary cleanup laws reward private parties for conducting 
voluntary cleanups by protecting their cleanup and sampling information from public disclosure. 
See, e.g., Bradford C. Mank, Reforming State Brownfield Programs to Comply with Title VI, 24 
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 115, 173–74 (2000). 
In some states, “any reports or information about the investigation and cleanup of a 
site [containing hazardous substances] remain confidential and are not admissible or 
discoverable in a civil suit or administrative action . . . unless the certified professional 
responsible for reviewing the cleanup finds a ‘threat or danger to public health or 
safety or the environment’ or the state brings a criminal prosecution against the 
volunteer [who cleaned up the site].” 
Id. at 174. Professor Mank observes, based on a survey of state laws governing the cleanup of 
“brownfields” or moderately contaminated sites, that “[m]ost states do not require individual 
notice to residents in the host community or even to contiguous property owners.” Id. 
 318. See generally Rena Steinzor, “Democracies Die Behind Closed Doors”: The Homeland 
Security Act and Corporate Accountability, 12 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 641 (2003) (discussing the 
potential adverse implications of the Homeland Security Act for disclosure of environmental 
information). 
Detailed risk management plans, required under EPCRA to ensure rapid emergency 
response to sudden leaks or plant failures, have been removed from the Internet due to 
concerns that the worst-case scenarios might give terrorists dangerous ideas. See, e.g., Right-To-
Know After September 11th, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Water Res. and Env't of the 
House Comm. on Transp. & Infrastructure, 107th Cong. 20–23 (2001) (statement of Elaine 
Stanley, Dir. of the Office of Envtl. Info. Analysis & Access, Office of Envtl. Info, U.S. Envtl. 
Prot. Agency) (discussing the potential adverse implications of the Homeland Security Act for 
the disclosure of environmental information); see also Joseph D. Jacobson, Safeguarding 
National Security Through Public Release of Environmental Information: Moving the Debate to 
the Next Level, 9 ENVTL. LAW. 327, 387–88 (2003) (criticizing the EPA’s policy and arguing that 
“[n]ot posting this information on the Internet simply forces a would-be terrorist to spend a few 
extra minutes on the computer researching available ‘target’ data that would otherwise be 
conveniently assembled by EPA,” given that terrorist organizations have “already 
demonstrated that they are willing to spend on planning their attacks”). 
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Homeland Security Act,319 passed in 2002, offers the greatest potential 
for this abuse because it provides facilities with the ability to claim 
that information submitted voluntarily to the government—a 
surprisingly ambiguous determination—is “critical infrastructure 
information” with national security consequences.320 These national 
security consequences not only prohibit the federal agencies from 
sharing this information with the public under the Freedom of 
Information Act321 but even bar federal and state agencies from using 
the information to take regulatory action.322 Moreover, much like 
CBI, facilities make the initial determination about what constitutes 
“critical infrastructures” information that must be kept confidential.323 
Such self-classifications are likely to receive only sporadic oversight 
by regulating agencies if the history of CBI is any guide,324 a danger 
exacerbated by the fact that the Homeland Security Act also subjects 
federal officials who disclose information labeled as “critical 
infrastructures information” to criminal charges.325 Less worrisome 
are restrictions, the exact nature of which is still unknown, levied by a 
small cadre of government officials and journal editors on the 
publication of scientific research that they believe to present security 
risks.326 Some commentators suggest that these multifaceted 
 
 319. Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002). 
 320. See id. § 214, 116 Stat. at 2152 (codified at 6 U.S.C.A. § 133 (Supp. 2004)). 
 321. See Procedures for Handling Critical Infrastructure Information, 68 Fed. Reg. 18,524, 
18,528 (Apr. 15, 2003). In this respect, some have argued that the Homeland Security Act simply 
codifies the protections afforded “voluntarily submitted information” under Critical Mass 
Energy Project v. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 975 F.2d 871 (D.C. Cir. 1992), thus adding no 
significant new impediments to the public disclosure of this information. See, e.g., Steinzor, 
supra note 318, at 643, 652. Yet, as discussed, Homeland Security Act regulations interpret the 
Act as barring federal agencies from “using” this information for enforcement actions or even 
for requiring added security protections at critical infrastructures. 
 322. See Procedures for Handling Critical Infrastructure Information, 68 Fed. Reg. at 18,526 
(“Federal agencies shall not utilize critical infrastructures information (CII) for regulatory 
purposes without the written consent of the submitter.”). 
 323. See id. at 18,525 (designating requirements for identifying information as protected 
“critical infrastructures information”). 
 324. For a discussion of the potentially expansive reach of the term “critical infrastructure 
information,” see Steinzor, supra note 318, at 658–63. 
 325. See § 214(f), 116 Stat. at 2152 (subjecting any employee of the U.S. Government who 
“knowingly publishes, divulges, discloses, or makes known in any manner or to any extent not 
authorized by law, any critical infrastructure information protected from disclosure by this 
subtitle” to a possible fine, not more than one year in prison, and termination from 
employment). 
 326. See, e.g., DANA A. SHEA, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, RL31695, 
BALANCING SCIENTIFIC PUBLICATION AND NATIONAL SECURITY CONCERNS: ISSUES FOR 
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protections for information under the ambiguous umbrella of national 
security are only the beginning of a range of methods that industrial 
actors might employ to suppress research on their products and 
activities.327 
C. Providing Opportunities to Manufacture Controversy about 
Public Science 
Existing environmental laws not only discourage actors from 
producing information and provide them with the ability to remove 
from public view some of the limited information they do produce, 
but several laws actually facilitate the ability of actors to disparage 
credible research. The recently enacted Data Quality Act328 and Data 
Access Act,329 as well as regulations governing scientific misconduct 
and the subpoena of third-party information,330 all provide 
opportunities for private actors to contest the quality of research and 
taint the integrity of researchers, even when the actors’ charges are 
without scientific merit. Most of these laws, moreover, operate in just 
one direction: they allow private parties to challenge federally funded 
science but insulate private research from scrutiny. Not surprisingly, 
 
CONGRESS 13–20 (July 9, 2003) (describing measures taken by the executive branch, the 
Department of Defense, Congress, and scientific professional societies to restrict the 
dissemination of research that presents discoveries that could be used against the United States 
by terrorists); see also MASS. INST. OF TECH., IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST: REPORT OF THE AD 
HOC FACULTY COMMITTEE ON ACCESS TO AND DISCLOSURE OF SCIENTIFIC INFORMATION 
(June 12, 2002) (identifying the federal limitations on research posed by national security 
regulations and recommending that MIT not take part in research that involves classified 
research because it conflicts with the open communication principles that are fundamental to 
science and academia), available at http://web.mit.edu/faculty/reports/publicinterest.pdf. 
 327. See, e.g., SHEA, supra note 326, at 25 (identifying some of the concerns with 
classification systems imposed by the government, including overbreadth and unaccountable 
decisionmaking); Eugene P. Skolnikoff, Protecting University Research Amid National-Security 
Fears, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., May 10, 2002, at B10 (same); cf. Stephanie Strom, Small 
Charities Abroad Feel Pinch of U.S. War on Terror, N. Y. TIMES, Aug. 5, 2003, at A8 (reporting 
that new Treasury Department guidelines that recommend the types of information that should 
be provided by nonprofits on their giving and spending—guidelines intended to prevent the 
channeling of funds to terrorist organizations—are so burdensome for small, international 
nonprofits that it might discourage giving to these groups). 
 328. Treasury and General Government Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2001, Pub. L. 
No. 106-554, § 515, 114 Stat. 2763 (2000). 
 329. Omnibus Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 1999, Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681-
495 (1998). 
 330. See generally Responsibility of PHS Awardee and Applicant Institutions for Dealing 
with and Reporting Possible Misconduct in Science, 42 C.F.R. §§ 50.101–50.105 (2003); FED. R. 
CIV. P. 45 (providing authority to subpoena third-party research). 
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the genesis of at least one of the most recent and powerful tools 
enabling actors to manufacture controversy about public science—the 
Data Quality Act331—has been traced to an industry consultant who 
drafted the law and navigated it, in the form of an appropriations 
rider, to enactment.332 Because the Act passed as a rider to a large 
appropriations bill, most members of Congress seem to have been 
unaware of its content or existence.333 
The Data Quality Act and the OMB’s implementing guidelines 
provide interested parties with a formal process both for seeking the 
correction of information that they believe is unreliable and for 
appealing agency denials of such correction requests.334 Under this 
law, actors have a ready-made process for challenging research, 
information, and raw data that suggest their products or activities 
cause adverse effects as long as the agency “disseminates” this 
information, a term that seems to include using information to 
support regulatory decisions.335 At the same time, most of an actor’s 
 
 331. See supra note 328. 
 332. See, e.g., James T. O’Reilly, The 411 on 515: How OIRA’s Expanded Information Roles 
in 2002 Will Impact Rulemaking and Agency Publicity Actions, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 835, 840 n.20 
(2002) (suggesting that a former director of a prominent industry group “had been the principal 
drafter” of the Data Quality Act). This same consultant, and his organization, have been 
relatively busy filing their own Data Quality Act complaints, or co-sponsoring complaints or 
letters threatening action. See generally Center for Regulatory Effectiveness, Data Quality Act 
US, at http://www.thecre.com/quality/index.html (last visited Sept. 15, 2004) (on file with the 
Duke Law Journal). 
 333. The Data Quality Act is devoid of legislative history or debate. See Hornstein, supra 
note 228, at 232–33 (discussing the origin of the law). From the oral history surrounding its 
passage, it appears that most members of Congress were unaware of its content or existence. 
See, e.g., NAT’L ACAD. OF SCIS., ENSURING THE QUALITY OF DATA DISSEMINATED BY THE 
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT, DAY 1, at 32 (2002) [hereinafter NAS, DATA QUALITY TRANSCRIPT, 
DAY 1] (quoting Alan Morrison of Public Citizen that the Data Quality Act “came up as part of 
a very large appropriations act that most people didn’t even know contained this particular 
piece of legislation”), available at http://www7.nationalacademies.org/stl/4-21-02_Transcript.doc. 
 334. See, e.g., Guidelines for Ensuring and Maximizing the Quality, Objectivity, Utility, and 
Integrity of Information Disseminated by Federal Agencies; Republication, 67 Fed. Reg. 8,452, 
8,459 (Feb. 22, 2002) [hereinafter Data Quality Guidelines] (noting that section III.3 of the 
Guidelines provides that “agencies shall establish administrative mechanisms allowing affected 
persons to seek and obtain, where appropriate, timely correction of information maintained and 
disseminated by the agency that does not comply with OMB or agency guidelines”). The OMB’s 
guidelines actually enlarged the reach of the Data Quality Act. See, e.g., NAS, DATA QUALITY 
TRANSCRIPT, DAY 1, supra note 333, at 133 (presenter Dan Cohen) (observing that OMB 
added a substantive appeal process in its guidelines that was not required in the original Data 
Quality Act). 
 335. The Data Quality Act applies only to information that is “disseminated,” a term 
initially interpreted by experts to apply only to information that was made public. See, e.g., 
NAS, DATA QUALITY TRANSCRIPT, DAY 1, supra note 333, at 97 (quoting Alan Morrison) 
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own research is protected from the reach of the Act under one or 
more exclusions introduced by the OMB, the agency selected to 
oversee the Act’s implementation across all other agencies.336 
Moreover, any private research that is subjected to the Act need not 
be identified with conflict disclaimers or other indicia of potential 
bias, even though most scientific journals insist on such measures to 
ensure the objectivity and integrity of the research that they publish.337 
During its first year of implementation, the Data Quality Act was 
used primarily by industry advocates to question models, information, 
and research used by the EPA.338 Industry groups filed complaints 
arguing for the exclusion of pathbreaking endocrine research on a 
 
(suggesting that the requirements kick in only after the agency “puts its own interpretation” on 
studies, because that constitutes a “new generation and hence dissemination of information”). 
 336. In the Data Quality Act guidelines, the OMB exempts from the reach of the Data 
Quality Act all information claimed as a trade secret, an exemption that effectively excludes a 
great deal of industry-produced health and safety information. See Guidelines for Ensuring and 
Maximizing the Quality, Objectivity, Utility, and Integrity of Information Disseminated by 
Federal Agencies; Republication, 67 Fed. Reg. at 8,460 (“Making the data and methods publicly 
available will assist in determining whether analytic results are reproducible. However, the 
objectivity standard does not override other compelling interests such as privacy, trade secrets, 
intellectual property, and other confidentiality protections.”); supra Part III.B.1 (discussing how 
large this category of CBI information is). Research prepared by regulated actors and submitted 
as “public filings” (which arguably could include data required by the TRI under EPCRA or 
routine monitoring data) or used in “adjudications” (which could include information required 
in applications for licenses and permits under the environmental laws) are also exempt from the 
Act under OMB’s guidelines. Guidelines for Ensuring and Maximizing the Quality, Objectivity, 
Utility, and Integrity of Information Disseminated by Federal Agencies, 67 Fed. Reg. at 8,452. 
Depending on how the EPA interprets these terms, OMB’s exceptions may exempt from the 
Data Quality Act a rather large category of industry-prepared information. 
 337. See infra Part IV.B.2. 
 338. Industry has also been the primary beneficiary of this law, filing comments relating 
both to the EPA’s science and to comments offered by public interest groups on the EPA’s 
regulatory programs. Two-thirds of the petitions filed to date against the EPA were filed by 
industry or industry-funded organizations, like the Competitive Enterprise Institute and the 
U.S. Chamber of Commerce. See http://www.ombwatch.org/article/articleview/1419/ for a listing 
of recent data quality charges. Although the correction requests are far fewer than expected, 
most of the industry complaints are quite extensive and target large and important regulatory 
projects, like the model for climate change and a risk assessment for a widely used herbicide. 
See Envtl. Protection Agency, Environmental Information: EPA Information Quality 
Guidelines, at http://www.epa.gov/quality/informationguidelines/iqg-list.html (last visited Sept. 
15, 2004) (on file with the Duke Law Journal). The CEI even filed the first appeal of a Data 
Quality Act petition, asking a district court to require the government to withdraw the climate 
change model until the CEI’s criticisms have been addressed. See Andrew C. Revkin, Suit 
Challenges Climate Change Report by U.S., N. Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 2003, at A21. 
For the most up-to-date status of Data Quality Act petitions, see the EPA’s log at 
http://www.epa.gov/quality/informationguidelines/ (last visited Sept. 28, 2004) (on file with the 
Duke Law Journal). 
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widely used herbicide, atrazine,339 and for the abandonment of climate 
change models developed by the Department of Commerce,340 even 
though most of the issues in dispute concerned policy and value 
choices rather than scientific disagreements.341 In each of these Data 
Quality Act complaints, moreover, the burden is placed exclusively 
on the agency to produce and defend its documentation of the 
externalities that the regulation addresses, notwithstanding contrary 
instructions in the authorizing statute.342 The Act places no 
responsibility on the actors themselves to produce high-quality 
information that documents the safety of their products and 
activities.343 
A second appropriations rider, passed one year earlier—the 
Data Access Act344—provides actors with a second useful mechanism 
 
 339. See supra note 43. 
 340. Letter from Christopher C. Horner, Competitive Enterprise Institute, to Information 
Officer, EPA, Request for Response to/Renewal of Federal Data Quality Act Petition Against 
Further Dissemination of “Climate Action Report 2002” (Feb. 10, 2003) [hereinafter Horner 
Letter], available at http://www.epa.gov/quality/informationguidelines/documents/7428.pdf. 
 341. Indeed, most of the major petitions seeking correction of information take issue with 
underlying policy choices used by the EPA, such as the conservatism of its default assumptions 
in a risk assessment, rather than with the standard features of the information that it employs. 
See, e.g., Horner Letter, supra note 340; Center for Regulatory Effectiveness, Request for 
Correction, supra note 43; Chemical Products Corporation, Request for Correction of the IRIS 
Barium Substance File (Oct. 29, 2002), available at 
www.epa.gov/quality/informationguidelines/iqg-list.html; see also Letter from Paul Gilman, 
Assistant Administrator, EPA, to Jerry Cook, Chemical Products Division (Jan. 30, 2003), 
available at www.epa.gov/quality/informationguidelines/documents/2293Response.pdf. 
 342. See, e.g., Hornstein, supra note 228, at 239 (noting how corporations may now argue 
that “any member of ‘the public’ should be allowed access to any study referenced by agencies 
and that any ‘affected person’ should be allowed to lodge objections to data quality with 
agencies”); O’Reilly, supra note 283, at 10,208 (discussing the possibilities for abuse of data 
quality procedures to delay agency activities). 
 343. See, e.g., Treasury and General Government Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2001, 
Pub. L. No. 106-554, § 515, 114 Stat. 2763 (2000) (specifying that the “agency” shall provide a 
complaint and correction process on all disseminated information, promulgate guidelines 
establishing processes to ensure that the dissemination information is of high quality, and 
maintain logs of complaint requests). 
 344. The Shelby Amendment was passed as a rider to the Omnibus Appropriations Act for 
Fiscal Year 1999, Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681-495 (1998). The author of the bill, Senator 
Shelby, maintains that there were floor discussions of the legislation that took place before the 
requirement became part of the Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Bill for Fiscal Year 
1999. Richard Shelby, Accountability and Transparency: Public Access to Federally Funded 
Research Data, 37 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 369, 378–79 (2000). He also recounts efforts to repeal the 
bill or suspend its entry into force. Id. at 380. He does not explain why it was passed as a rider to 
an appropriations bill, however, rather than as stand-alone legislation. 
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for challenging research used to promulgate regulations.345 The Data 
Access Act requires that all data underlying a federally funded study 
be made available to requesting parties through the Freedom of 
Information Act.346 Studies conducted without the benefit of public 
funds by industries or others are not covered by the legislation’s data-
sharing requirements.347 The Act threatened to provide interested 
parties with access to all data and records underlying research, 
including ongoing research, without any compensation to the 
researcher.348 After an uproar from the scientific community, the 
OMB narrowed the reach of the Act to provide access only to 
completed federally funded research and also requires the requestor 
to compensate the researcher for time and copying costs.349 
Nevertheless, the requirement for release of data underlying third-
party studies, often provided in a readily analyzable electronic 
database, makes it easier for actors to reanalyze studies using 
statistical tests that can be rerun continually until they produce a 
 
 345. The Shelby Amendment (or Data Access Act) requires the OMB to amend Circular A-
110 to require “[f]ederal awarding agencies to ensure that all data produced under an award will 
be made available to the public through the procedures established under the Freedom of 
Information Act.” 112 Stat. at 2681-495. 
 346. Id. 
 347. See Final Revision, OMB Circular A-110, 64 Fed. Reg. 54,926, 54,930 (Oct. 8, 1999) 
(requiring the production of research findings even if they were “produced under an award that 
[was] used by the Federal Government in developing an agency action that has the force and 
effect of law”). 
 348. The original rider was much more far-reaching than the OMB-interpreted Data Access 
requirements. The central purpose of the rider, according to Senator Shelby, was to provide 
interested parties with an opportunity to review and, if necessary, challenge the results of 
regulation-relevant research, regardless of whether it was published or complete. Shelby, supra 
note 344, at 379. 
 349. Vigorous opposition by the scientific community helped persuade the Clinton Office of 
Management and Budget to draft implementing regulations for the Data Access Amendment 
that were far narrower than Senator Shelby intended—requiring the sharing of data only for 
“published studies” rather than for all ongoing research, limiting the data disclosure to data 
needed to “validate the study,” and requiring requestors to pay researchers for reasonable costs 
incurred in responding to data requests. See, e.g., OMB Circular A-100, 64 Fed. Reg. at 54,926; 
Shelby, supra note 344, at 383–89 (discussing, with concern, the various ways in which the OMB 
interpreted the Shelby Amendment narrowly to limit its reach). The regulations finally 
promulgated by the OMB largely duplicate the scientific community’s informal standards for 
data sharing. The act’s formal data-sharing requirements appear at least somewhat more 
onerous, however. For example, data-sharing plans are required as a condition for obtaining 
large National Institutes of Health grants. See NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH, NOT-OD-03-032, 
Final NIH Statement on Sharing Research Data Release (Feb. 26, 2003) (“The NIH expects and 
supports the timely release and sharing of final research data from NIH-supported studies for 
use by other researchers.”), available at http://grants.nih.gov/grants/guide/notice-files/NOT-OD-
03-032.html. 
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more favorable result.350 Moreover, as with the Data Quality Act, the 
Data Access Act has been structured to ensure that scrutiny is 
focused on public science and not on industry-sponsored science.351 
Actors also use more traditional mechanisms, such as lawsuits 
and subpoenas, to challenge the integrity of public science and harass 
researchers, even when researchers are not parties. For example, 
under the power to subpoena third-party information, Philip Morris 
and Exxon both filed overbroad, harassing third-party subpoenas 
against researchers who were not involved in the litigation as parties 
or experts because their research findings were considered 
incriminating.352 Indeed, at least in the breast implant litigation, even 
plaintiffs’ attorneys appear to have used subpoenas to harass 
scientists and delay their research when the research began to suggest 
that breast implants did not cause serious harm to users.353 By filing 
such subpoenas, actors concerned about damaging research are able 
to intimidate scientists and delay research. Subpoenas also offer the 
 
 350. There are some concerns that the Data Access Amendment might still intrude on the 
established norms for data sharing in some fields, such as epidemiology, in which researchers 
are less likely to share elaborate databases until they have published multiple articles based on 
their data collection efforts. Eliot Marshall, Epidemiologists Wary of Opening Up Their Data, 
290 SCIENCE 28, 29 (2000). There are also some concerns that this new data access tool can be 
used to harass researchers doing high-profile work. See, e.g., NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, 
ACCESS TO RESEARCH DATA IN THE 21ST CENTURY: AN ONGOING DIALOGUE AMONG 
INTERESTED PARTIES: REPORT OF A WORKSHOP viii (2002) [hereinafter NRC, DATA ACCESS 
REPORT] (recounting the concerns of both organizations). 
 351. See, e.g., NRC, DATA ACCESS REPORT, supra note 350, at 27 (reporting that the chair 
of the NRC committee, Richard Merrill, expressed concern over the fact that the Shelby 
Amendment “is not bilateral in its application” because it does not apply “to data that are 
generated by private dollars that are submitted to support agency decisions”); id. at 16 
(reporting that panelist David Hawkins, a representative of a public interest advocacy group, 
criticized the Shelby Amendment for being “one-sided” because it applies only to “federally 
funded research” and not to “industry-supported studies that have been submitted on a 
confidential basis”). 
 352. FED. R. CIV. P. 45 (providing authority to subpoena third-party research if it is relevant 
to ongoing litigation). See generally Symposium, Court-Ordered Disclosure of Academic 
Research: A Clash of Values of Science and Law, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 (Fall 1996). For 
example, R.J. Reynolds served third-party subpoenas on Dr. Paul Fischer and his coauthor 
requesting all documents, including confidential records, relating to the ongoing study of the 
effects of the Joe Camel advertising campaign on children. The harassment led Dr. Fischer to 
resign his tenured post at the Medical College of Georgia and return to family practice in a 
nearby community. Fischer, supra note 121, at 162; see also Picou, supra note 123, at 155 
(describing the adverse impact of Exxon’s third-party subpoenas on research on the damages 
resulting from the spill). 
 353. See generally MARCIA ANGELL, SCIENCE ON TRIAL (1996) (describing the abuse of 
subpoena power by plaintiffs’ attorneys attempting to delay research at the Mayo Clinic that 
threatened to substantially weaken their case for causation). 
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potential for dredging up information that may later help actors 
attack the merits of unfavorable research. 
Finally, researchers engaged in federally supported research—
but not privately financed research—can be formally accused of 
scientific misconduct. To ensure that scientific research is conducted 
honestly, federal law provides the Office of Research Integrity (ORI) 
the authority to investigate federally funded researchers who are 
alleged to have engaged in scientific misconduct, which includes 
fabrication, falsification, and plagiarism of data.354 Unless the 
supervising institution has established penalties for the filing of false 
or harassing claims of misconduct against scientists, this tool can be 
and has been abused—at least in the tobacco and lead industries—in 
attempts to discredit researchers whose studies produce unwelcome 
results.355 
IV.  REFORM 
Under current legal rules, not only are actors best off by refusing 
to take responsibility for assessing the harms that they inflict upon 
society, but actors can profit from attacking public science that 
attempts to conduct this research in their absence. A variety of legal 
tools allow actors to carve out worrisome areas of public science with 
surgical precision and discredit both research and researchers, even 
when doing so runs against the existing scientific consensus and the 
public interest.356 To the extent that these attacks succeed, even in the 
short term, they suggest a single, ugly reality: the information on 
externalities that emerges will not reflect the objective work of 
talented scientists, but something less. The greater the private interest 
in thwarting unwelcome research, the more likely it is that good 
science will be eclipsed by biased science and manufactured critiques. 
Even scientific knowledge, in other words, can be contaminated by 
money.357 Although in the long term the merits of the public science 
may win out, both political will and public resources will be needed to 
rebuff the attacks. 
 
 354. Responsibility of PHS Awardee and Applicant Institutions for Dealing with and 
Reporting Possible Misconduct in Science, 42 C.F.R., § 50.102 (2003). 
 355. See Fischer, supra note 121, at 166 (discussing unsupported allegations of scientific 
misconduct brought against himself and his coauthor by scientists who were part-time 
consultants to the tobacco industry); see also supra note 119. 
 356. See supra Part III.C. 
 357. This broader theme is explored in KRIMSKY, supra note 127. 
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Thus, “commons ignorance” is not a minor problem easily 
dismissed. Without accurate information on the harms caused by 
products or activities, it is almost impossible to develop effective 
regulatory programs to address such harms. The gaps in information 
are still so large that most U.S. regulatory programs only address 
cancer risks, leaving little assurance of protection from ecological, 
neurological, reproductive, hormonal, and developmental harms.358 
Democratic processes also fail when decisionmakers, the attentive 
public, and interest groups cannot obtain relevant information 
needed to participate.359 In fact, when potential harms are hidden, 
these groups may be unaware of the need to participate at all. Even 
markets fail in a world where consumers and investors are unable to 
make meaningful choices between companies based in part on the 
safety of their products and activities. Companies that make added 
investments in minimizing harmful impacts will generally not be 
rewarded because their claims cannot be validated, and if their 
investments are large enough they will lose out because they cannot 
compete. Without reliable information for comparing the safety of 
products and activities, the market is bound to favor those products 
and production processes that can be done at the lowest cost, 
regardless of the resulting harms to the public.360 
These political and market failures are even more serious when 
actors control privately held knowledge regarding potential adverse 
 
 358. See supra notes 13–14, 202–05 and accompanying text. 
 359. Professor Komesar provides a conceptual formula that predicts participation based in 
large part on access to information. The extent of an individual’s participation, Professor 
Komesar argues, is based simply on the difference between the benefits that will accrue to the 
person by participating and the costs of participation. NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT 
ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW, ECONOMICS, & PUBLIC POLICY 7–8 (1994). 
 360. Like the used car market, in which the sellers’ superior information about the condition 
of used cars leads buyers to discount the quality of the cars and force down the price, the lack of 
information could cause consumers to discount safer products and processes, making them 
noncompetitive. For the classic articulation of this phenomenon, see George Ackerlof, The 
Market for ‘Lemons’: Qualitative Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 QUART. J. ECON. 
488 (1970). This condition—whereby sellers have superior information regarding quality, but 
buyers are unable to validate their quality claims—can lead to adverse selection, meaning that 
higher quality products cannot survive in the depreciated market. The resulting adverse 
selection thus favors products and production processes that can be done at the lowest cost, 
regardless of the external harms their activities cause to the public. Mary Lyndon makes 
precisely the same argument. See Lyndon, supra note 31, at 1814 (“Buyers’ inability to screen 
products removes any incentive for manufacturers to differentiate between toxic and nontoxic 
products and to screen before production. The result is a higher overall level of toxicity in 
products than would result if toxicity were a visible characteristic.”); see also HISRSHLEIFER & 
RILEY, supra note 60, at 307–12 (providing a fuller account of this “adverse selection”). 
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effects of their products and activities. Knowledge is power. Actors 
who enjoy an asymmetric advantage in accessing and controlling 
information about their externalities can use it to their advantage 
when attempting to influence how regulatory programs are designed. 
Standards set on the basis of information available to the regulatory 
agencies will be skewed when actors succeed in concealing adverse 
information. Similarly, if actors are able to influence the development 
of enforcement programs, one might expect those programs to be 
markedly ineffective in overcoming actors’ superior information, a 
result borne out in practice.361 The greater the actors’ informational 
advantages, the greater are the obstacles to developing effective 
regulatory programs. 
This final Section presents suggestions for dealing with issues 
relating both to the lack of information about environmental harms 
and actors’ asymmetric control over some of the information. This 
discussion presents three parallel lines of reform. First, policy analysts 
and scholars must acknowledge the problem of incomplete 
information, including asymmetric informational advantages, and 
account for these problems in their theories, models, and proposals 
for reforming environmental law. Second, reformers should address 
features of the existing regulatory program that serve only to 
exacerbate problems associated with the lack of information and 
asymmetric control over needed information. Third and finally, 
proactive efforts are essential to produce more information on the 
harms caused by dangerous products and polluting activities. 
 
 361. See supra Part II.B. It is of course possible that the high evidentiary burdens placed on 
regulator-enforcers discussed in Part III.A, supra, are simply a legislative accident and not the 
result of sophisticated legislative and regulatory lobbying. Yet the recurring nature of the 
problem leads to a reasonable suspicion that there are other forces at work. The aggressive use 
and promotion of privileges, such as confidential business information, audit privileges, and 
even national security protections, reinforce a suspicion that regulated parties are eager to limit 
the information that can be used against them. Regulated parties’ efforts to raise the barriers for 
enforcement data also underscore their interest in minimizing the risks of enforcement when 
possible. See, e.g., Credible Evidence Revisions, Final Rule, 62 Fed. Reg. 8,314, 8,317 (Feb. 24, 
1997) (noting that industry filed comments in opposition to the EPA’s proposal to use credible 
evidence in enforcement, arguing in part that the “EPA, states or citizen groups would use 
credible evidence to bring enforcement actions for insignificant violations” and that “the use of 
credible evidence in enforcement actions would violate sources’ constitutional right to due 
process because sources would “not have sufficient ‘fair warning’ regarding potential 
enforcement.”). Regulated parties can weaken enforcement programs significantly by 
demanding that violations be proved with definitive information that they know enforcers will 
be unable to obtain. 
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A. Acknowledging the Problem 
The first step to addressing the pervasive problem of incomplete 
information is to admit that the problem exists and to begin to 
account for it in decisionmaking and regulatory analysis. 
Acknowledging the problem sounds deceptively simple, but it is not. 
Accepting this problem will require rethinking and reexamining 
decades of legal and economic scholarship that has neither accounted 
for the dramatic gaps in current knowledge nor considered the ways 
in which this incomplete information is deeply embedded in multiple 
forms of market and legal failure. 
For its part, thirty years of environmental law scholarship has 
produced countless analyses and accompanying proposals for reform 
of environmental regulation that assume a world of perfect or at least 
optimal information for the circumstances: these analyses and 
proposals neglect the fact that much of the critical information is 
under the significant control of regulated parties. Seminal thinkers 
such as Professors Bruce Ackerman at Yale,362 Richard Stewart at 
NYU,363 and Cass Sunstein at Chicago364 are representative of a top 
 
 362. In both The Uncertain Search for Environmental Quality and Clean Coal/Dirty Air, as 
well as in a famous Stanford Law Review debate with Howard Latin over the wisdom of 
technology-based standards, Professor Ackerman demonstrates his disgust at regulatory tools 
that do not use more fine-tuned, information-dependent methods of deciding policy without 
seeming to consider that the tools actually evolved in this counterintuitive direction for a 
reason—because information was not forthcoming. BRUCE A. ACKERMAN & WILLIAM T. 
HASSLER, CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR (1981); BRUCE A. ACKERMAN ET AL., THE UNCERTAIN 
SEARCH FOR ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 328–30 (1974); Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. 
Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1333, 1335–40 (1985). 
 363. Professor Stewart remains wedded to the errors of the Stanford article that he 
coauthored with Professor Ackerman. Although Professor Stewart does concede the need for 
additional scientific information in subsequent articles, he assigns the task of information 
collection to centralized government, almost as an aside, without pointing out that, without this 
added information, his preferred administrative tools suffer and might fail. See, e.g., Richard B. 
Stewart, A New Generation of Environmental Regulation?, 29 CAP. U. L. REV. 21,  
151–54 (2001). 
 364. Professor Sunstein, the most recent entrant to this genre, endorses highly analytical 
tools like cost-benefit analysis and comparative risk analysis, both of which depend 
fundamentally on a solid information base. See, e.g., Cass Sunstein, Administrative Substance, 
1991 DUKE L.J. 607, 627–42. While acknowledging uncertainties and the ability of regulated 
parties to resist and even impede the production of information, especially in his earlier work, 
Richard H. Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 
103–04, 116 (1995); Cass R. Sunstein, Congress, Constitutional Moments, and the Cost-Benefit 
State, 48 STAN. L. REV. 247, 264, 301 (1996), Sunstein effectively ignores these problems in his 
technocratic solutions to regulation. His endorsement of a form of cost-benefit analysis that 
includes adjustments for uncertainty still lets regulated parties off the hook for producing the 
information (he does not appear to endorse precautionary estimates, see infra note 377) and 
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echelon of scholars who insist, often passionately, on the need to 
implement elaborately information-dependent reforms without 
considering the barriers to producing needed information or 
discussing how to produce it. Economic critiques and analyses of 
environmental law also ignore the forces favoring the 
underproduction of vital information—an oversight that often 
undermines both the critique and the reform proposal. For example, 
Professor Myrick Freeman, an economist, expresses great impatience 
with the inefficiencies of regulating polluters by requiring them to 
install the best pollution control technologies, rather than by 
requiring them to meet environment- or health-based standards for 
each individual pollutant at a given locale. Yet Professor Freeman 
naively assumes the existence of information on the harm and 
environmental effects of each toxic substance, and further assumes 
that polluters with this information will willingly share it with 
regulators.365 Even more contemporary critiques of environmental 
regulatory programs by economists typically assume that conditions 
governing the production of information are much more hospitable 
than they in fact are.366 For example, economists who do account for 
 
thus also is likely to underreport uncertainties and regulated actors’ superior access to 
producing the needed information. His proposals also place a significant burden on the few 
quantified risk estimates that the agency is able to produce, by calculating benefits using best-
guess averages and selecting arbitrary multipliers to account for the universe of remaining 
unknowns. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, The Arithmetic of Arsenic, 90 GEO. L.J. 2255, 2282–83 
(2002) (advocating that in quantifying the benefits of an arsenic standard for drinking water, the 
only available quantitative information (on the risks of bladder cancer) should form the 
quantitative anchor and that nonquantified benefits (which he fails to list, see supra note 223 
and accompanying text) should then be factored in by multiplying the bladder cancer estimates 
times four). Thus, Sunstein develops an approach that creates few, if any, incentives for 
additional information production and encourages actors to obfuscate and challenge what 
information is available. Moreover, the prominence of Professors Sunstein, Stewart, and 
Ackerman might have even served to facilitate other scholars’ uncritical acceptance of their 
assumptions. Cf. Robert K. Merton, The Matthew Effect in Science, 159 SCIENCE 56 (1968) 
(finding evidence that the “greats” in science generally enjoy much more critical acclaim than 
newcomers, even when their contributions are equivalent). 
 365. A. Myrick Freeman III, Air and Water Pollution Policy, in CURRENT ISSUES IN U.S. 
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 12, 49–58 (Paul R. Portney ed., 1978). 
 366. The failure to account for the stubborn problems of incomplete information, which is 
repeated from article to article, seems entirely forgivable when set against the larger body of 
economics literature. See, e.g., Stiglitz, supra note 149, at 1461 (arguing that “much of what 
economists believed—what they thought to be true on the basis of research and analysis over 
almost a century—turned out not to be robust to considerations of even slight imperfections of 
information”). Professor F.A. Hayek, for example, not only overlooked pervasive ignorance 
regarding the existence and extent of externalities in concluding that centralized government 
was inferior in forcing internalization of pollution-related externalities, but also ignored the 
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asymmetries in analyzing environmental regulation still assume that 
pollutant levels translate immediately and easily into quantified 
harms and that victims, rather than regulated actors, enjoy superior 
information regarding these harms.367 In truth, information regarding 
the harmfulness of an activity, if it exists at all, is likely to be 
asymmetrically held by the actor.368 
Even realists who pride themselves on taking incremental or 
pragmatic approaches to addressing environmental issues do not 
adequately acknowledge the problems associated with the lack of 
information about environmental harms.369 When choosing among 
various policy options, pragmatic approaches tend to work 
incrementally from what is known and take for granted that accurate 
and relatively complete information is available.370 The narrow, 
 
actors’ superior access to this information and their disinclination to produce it. Thus, his 
argument that a central authority cannot cope with the complexity of all of the relevant 
information seems to miss the fundamental insight that, without a central authority, there might 
be no reliable information at all. F. A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. 
REV. 519, 524 (1945) (arguing without any awareness of the equilibrium for ignorance on 
externalities that “[w]e need decentralization because only thus can we ensure that the 
knowledge of the particular circumstances . . . will be promptly used”). 
 367. See, e.g., Huber & Wirl, supra note 63, at 71, 83 (assuming that the victims have 
asymmetric information about the harm caused by an actor’s externalities and concluding from 
that assumption that a “pollutee pays” rule (rather than a “polluter pays” rule) could lead to 
more efficient outcomes); Lewis, supra note 63, at 820, 841 (discussing how the public enjoys 
privately held information about the benefits of regulation because it best knows its true 
preferences for health and environmental protection). This erroneous assumption thus neglects 
the most substantial and fundamental problem of environmental regulation—the lack of 
information on the consequences of varying pollutant levels or types of toxic products. 
Economists do seem to appreciate that a polluting firm enjoys superior access to 
information concerning its compliance costs, and in some articles, economists additionally 
recognize that polluters also enjoy superior information about their pollution levels. See, e.g., 
Lewis, supra note 63; Jensen & Vestergaard, supra note 245. 
 368. See supra Part II.B.1. 
 369. See generally DANIEL A. FARBER, ECO-PRAGMATISM: MAKING SENSIBLE 
ENVIRONMENTAL DECISIONS IN AN UNCERTAIN WORLD 178–79, 185 (1999) (noting the great 
uncertainties in environmental science and the complications that they raise for making 
informed regulation, but ignoring the stubborn features of this incomplete information and 
implying that regulatory policy should work to accommodate competing values, without 
acknowledging the difficulty of doing so when one party enjoys superior information and the 
public is more generally uninformed); SHAPIRO & GLICKSMAN, supra note 209 (advocating a 
more incremental and pragmatic approach to regulatory decisionmaking, but not tackling the 
stubborn problems of incomplete information and their effect on incremental decisionmaking). 
 370. See, e.g., Charles E. Lindblom, The Science of “Muddling Through,” 19 PUB. ADMIN. 
REV. 79, 83–84 (1959) (providing a descriptive account of how public officials make decisions 
under conditions of very limited information and proposing a normative strategy for 
decisionmaking, called “successive limited comparisons,” that instructs how officials can select 
among several short-term options). 
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incremental decisionmaking process accepted by most pragmatists 
blind them to large-scale forces that reward ignorance.371 
Environmental scholarship can no longer ignore issues relating to 
the lack of information about environmental harms and regulated 
parties’ asymmetric control over this information. Unless scholars and 
policymakers address information problems explicitly, their 
recommendations and policy decisions are unlikely to be useful and 
risk being counterproductive. For example, information-intensive 
legal reforms generally ignore the fact that regulated actors control 
much of the needed information, leading to idyllic proposals that 
inadvertently rely on the willingness of regulatees to volunteer much 
of the information essential to regulate them. Three particularly 
salient strands of contemporary policy analysis—cost-benefit analysis, 
critiques of the precautionary principle, and good-science initiatives—
provide ready evidence of the types of analytical errors that result 
when stubborn information problems are ignored. 
Scholars and policymakers who promote cost-benefit analysis 
tools routinely fail to consider at least four important information-
related problems in their evaluations. First and most surprisingly, 
these scholars and analysts generally ignore the fact that the 
information on which cost-benefit analyses are based is woefully 
incomplete and is often in the superior control of the regulated actors. 
As previously discussed, under current guidelines cost-benefit 
analyses consider only harms that have been identified and 
quantified.372 Given the dearth of toxicity testing on most chemicals, 
however, even the most basic risks, like acute effects, have been 
quantified for only a fraction of all chemicals in commerce.373 Cost-
benefit analysis as currently practiced nevertheless must pretend that 
 
 371. See, e.g., RALPH L. KEENEY, VALUE-FOCUSED THINKING vii–ix, 29–30, 44–51 (1992) 
(highlighting the benefits of value-focused thinking and discussing how neglecting a universal 
map of the goals, problems, and possible solutions can result in wrongheaded decisions). 
 372. See supra note 227 and accompanying text; see also SHAPIRO & GLICKSMAN, supra 
note 209, at 103 (observing how cost-benefit studies done by the OMB ignore the nonquantified 
environmental benefits and noting that critics of regulation tend to ignore this fact); LISA 
HEINZERLING & FRANK ACKERMAN, PRICING THE PRICELESS: COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS OF 
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 2 (Georgetown Law & Policy Inst., 2002) (arguing that “[m]any 
benefits of public health and environmental protection have not been quantified and cannot 
easily be quantified . . . . Even when the data gaps are supposedly acknowledged, public 
discussion tends to focus on the misleading numeric values produced by cost-benefit analysis 
while relevant but non-monetized factors are simply ignored.”), available at http://www.law. 
georgetown.edu/gelpi/papers/pricefnl.pdf. 
 373. See supra note 23. 
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these untested or undertested chemicals bring society net benefits 
specifically because there is no research on their potential harms.374 
Second, cost-benefit analysis neglects the possibility that some 
information about environmental harms may be unavailable or 
unreliable. As discussed throughout this Article, regulated parties are 
in the best position to assess the scope and nature of the harms 
flowing from their products and activities. However, as evidenced by 
their ability to conduct internal research that can be concealed and to 
classify information on chemical composition and health and safety,375 
it is not at all clear that the publicly disseminated information used to 
support cost-benefit analysis reliably reflects the safety of regulated 
parties’ products and activities. Third, cost-benefit proponents fail to 
come to terms with the fact that private actors are the primary source 
of information on compliance costs, and they have strong incentives 
to inflate these estimates in ways that go undetected. Finally, cost-
benefit analysts fail to consider that their heavy reliance on available 
information might actually discourage actors from producing some of 
this needed information. Because current cost-benefit methods lock 
in existing information, without accounting for gaps in information or 
identifying who is best situated to address them, private actors will 
perceive that contributing information other than that which is 
unambiguously in their favor has only costs, not benefits.376 
Analysts who critique the precautionary principle also routinely 
fail to acknowledge the principle’s capacity for creating strong 
incentives for the private sector to produce information about 
environmental harms.377 Under a precautionary approach, until an 
 
 374. See supra notes 225–27 and accompanying text. 
 375. See supra Part I.B.1. 
 376. See supra Part I.A. 
 377. The information production features have been completely ignored in some critical 
commentary on the principle. See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, BEYOND THE PRECAUTIONARY 
PRINCIPLE 2, 9, 10 (John M. Olin Law & Economics, Working Paper No. 149, 2d Series Apr. 
2002) (arguing that the precautionary principle “is literally paralyzing—forbidding inaction, 
stringent regulation, and everything in between,” and ignoring its benefits to information 
production), available at http://www.law.uchicago.edu/Lawecon/index.html; John D. Graham, 
The Role of Precaution in Risk Management, Remarks Prepared for The International Society 
of Regulatory Toxicology and Pharmacology Precautionary Principle Workshop, at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/risk_mgmt_speech062002.html (June 20, 2002) (on file 
with the Duke Law Journal) (ignoring the information-forcing features of the precautionary 
principle and concluding that “adoption of precautionary measures should be preceded by a 
scientific evaluation of the hazard and, where feasible, a formal analysis of the benefits, risks, 
and costs of alternative precautionary measures,” without accounting for who will produce this 
large body of information). But see Richard B. Stewart, Environmental Regulatory Decision 
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actor can demonstrate that a product or activity is safe, that product 
or activity will be regulated as if it is hazardous.378 Consequently, for 
products and activities governed by this principle, it is very much in 
an actor’s interest to conduct the research needed to show that their 
products and activities are not as hazardous as the principle 
presumes.379 Regardless of whether the precautionary principle is 
ultimately a viable approach to regulation, the principle’s capacity for 
forcing the production of information should not be ignored when 
comparing the principle against other regulatory alternatives. 
Supporters of good-science initiatives also ignore stubborn 
problems of uncertain and asymmetric information in fashioning 
reforms that purport to improve the state of regulatory science. 
Perhaps the most remarkable oversight is the fact that good-science 
laws such as the Data Access Act focus exclusively on assessing the 
quality of federally funded research used for regulation and exempt 
privately funded research from the same scrutiny,380 despite private 
industry’s clear interest in the results of the studies that it funds.381 
Good-science reform proponents also fail to account for the fact that 
the reforms expect the government, rather than regulated parties, to 
bear full responsibility for collecting and defending this good science. 
The reforms thus do nothing to counteract perverse incentives for 
actors to remain ignorant of the potential harm caused by their 
activities or to take advantage of their superior access to some of the 
needed information.382 Finally, analysts favoring current good-science 
initiatives fail to consider whether it is sensible to invest resources in 
 
Making Under Uncertainty, in AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF 
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY: ISSUES IN INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN 71, 102–03, 109, 111 (Timothy 
Swanson ed., 2002) (acknowledging, with some approval, the precautionary principle’s tendency 
to shift information production to the regulated actor, but arguing that this should not be 
required unilaterally across all areas of regulation or else inefficiencies will result). 
 378. See John Applegate, The Precautionary Preference: An American Perspective on the 
Precautionary Principle, 6 HUM. & ECOLOGY RISK ASSESS. 413, 417 (2000) (describing the 
precautionary principle as taking a “foresee and forestall” approach). 
 379. Id. at 420–26 (identifying examples of this general precautionary approach in U.S. law). 
 380. See supra notes 344–47 and accompanying text. 
 381. See Hornstein, supra note 228, at 240–45 (discussing corporate sponsorship of 
university research and the inherent dangers that lie therein). 
 382. See Wendy E. Wagner, The “Bad Science” Fiction: Reclaiming the Debate Over the Role 
of Science in Public Health and Environmental Regulation, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 63, 92–
93 (Fall 2003) (“There is little incentive for a regulated entity to invest in voluntary research 
that could produce results that not only lead to more stringent regulatory requirements, but that 
could impair, rather than improve, the marketability of its products.”); supra notes 342–43 and 
accompanying text.  
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disputing the limited information available when it accounts for only 
a fraction of the information needed to understand the harm caused 
by an activity or to develop a fine-tuned regulatory response.383 
The first step to legal reform is an accurate characterization of 
the problem. To this end, more work is necessary to understand 
actors’ incentives to produce information about the effects of their 
activities on the environment and how current laws affect those 
incentives. Thus far environmental law scholars have been of little 
help in this inquiry, and if anything have reinforced imperfect 
information problems as a result of their pervasive inattention to 
these features of information. 
B. Correctives to Existing Laws 
As this Article has attempted to show, a regulatory program that 
actively deters the production of reliable information about 
environmental harms, in a setting where actors are already reluctant 
to learn of or share such information, is indefensible. At a minimum, 
reform efforts should address the most egregious shortfalls in current 
environmental regulatory programs. The correctives discussed in this 
Section are only a beginning, amounting to little more than tinkering 
with some of the worst legal provisions that perpetuate commons 
ignorance. 
1. Penalties for Concealing Health and Safety Information. 
Actors have considerable information about the health and safety of 
their products and polluting activities, yet they conceal this 
information from public view with the help of various, seemingly 
insignificant legal protections.384 Many of these protections, moreover, 
appear to be the result not of conscious policy decisions, but instead 
stem from the failure of regulatory programs to prevent regulated 
parties from keeping potentially incriminating information secret. 
The most sweeping way to address this problem would be for 
Congress to make it illegal to invoke trade secret and other 
protections to classify information about the adverse effects of 
products and activities that threaten public health and the 
 
 383. See generally Shelby, supra note 344 (discussing the OMB’s policy of providing 
improved access to federally funded research data, but failing to discuss the need for similar 
protections for privately produced research used in regulation, or the need for more aggressive 
funding of environmental science generally). 
 384. See supra Part III.B. 
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environment. A requirement mandating the reporting of all health-
related information (including the chemical compositions of products 
and wastes) could be enforced with both civil and criminal sanctions 
and levied against any party involved in producing or concealing 
information. In instances when disclosure could lead to clear 
competitive losses or national security risks, the government could 
intercede, at the petition of the actor, and either provide 
compensation or classify the information.385 The primary drawback of 
this broad-scale reform—other than its political feasibility—would 
arise at the back end of the reform, if and when actors sought 
compensation for the diminished value of their trade secret. 
Calculating compensation awards would be especially difficult 
because adjudicators would have to separate out the role of 
potentially classified information in the larger setting of competitor 
harm. The appropriate amount of a damage award, moreover, would 
depend partly on the actor’s superior information regarding the 
extent of its competitive harm. It is also unclear how many requests 
for compensation the EPA would receive, leaving open the possibility 
that it might incur substantial administrative costs to process 
compensation requests. Given these uncertainties, the best approach 
might be an incremental one, eliminating all confidentiality 
protections on one category of information—e.g., all information on 
pollutants and wastes—at a time. 
Short of such sweeping legislative reform, the EPA could make 
more incremental, but still meaningful, progress in addressing secrecy 
regarding health and environmental information by limiting existing 
protections. Specifically, revisions to both the EPA’s CBI regulations 
and its adverse reporting regulations could increase the amount of 
health-related information available to the public. The following 
Sections discuss these more incremental reforms. 
a. Confidential Business Information. The EPA, the General 
Accounting Office (GAO), and independent research consultants 
have each concluded that the overbroad regulatory protections 
available for trade secrets are not legitimate, justified, or 
economically optimal.386 A 1999 GAO report on CBI claims 
 
 385. See infra notes 393–94 and accompanying text.  
 386. See, e.g., ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 290 (expressing a commitment to limiting 
overbroad CBI claims); U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFFICE, ENVIRONMENTAL INFORMATION, supra note 
298, at 23–25 (recognizing the EPA’s creation of an information office to address industry 
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pertaining to health and safety information, for example, found only 
weak support for industry claims that the confidential information is 
useful to competitors and could not otherwise be obtained by them.387 
Industry itself seems to acknowledge the lack of competitor interest 
in CBI, touting the infrequency of FOIA claims.388 Recent 
technological developments and other changes in the competitive 
environment further suggest that whatever legitimate benefits 
industry may have derived from trade secret protections in the past 
are becoming obsolete.389 
There is a surprisingly rich body of literature suggesting remedies 
for problems that arise at the intersection of trade secret and 
environmental and public health regulation.390 Two of these reform 
 
concerns with the production of information); U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFFICE, supra note 161, at 54 
(finding that confidentiality claims “limit[] the dissemination and usefulness of the data because 
many interested groups are not allowed access to the data”); Ferguson et al., supra note 290, at 
41 (concluding based on review of CBI claims from 1977 through 1990 that “all available 
evidence supports the proposition that much of the information covered by CBI claims is not 
legitimately entitled to protection as TSCA CBI”). 
 387. U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFFICE, ENVIRONMENTAL INFORMATION, supra note 298, at 15–19. 
In the report, for example, the GAO notes that “competitive intelligence professionals” and 
“industry representatives” disagreed on the value of environmental reporting to secure 
competitors’ secrets. Industry representatives stated that the information “often contains 
valuable details about their competitors while other competitive intelligence professionals said 
that such information is neither sufficient or even necessary.” Id. at 15. The GAO went on to 
note that “[r]egardless of their views on the usefulness of this information, industry officials 
acknowledged that they could do a better job in protecting their sensitive business information 
while still complying with EPA’s and states’ reporting requirements.” Id. 
In the report the GAO also provided other information suggesting that industry might be 
inflating its claims that broad CBI protection in environmental regulation is needed to preserve 
its trade secrets. It noted that in the two states employing materials accounting, “fewer than two 
percent of the facilities . . . made confidentiality claims in 1996” or thereafter even though both 
states (New Jersey and Massachusetts) have permissive CBI procedures. Id. at 18. 
 388. Industry representatives, for example, have argued that the “EPA receives few FOIA 
requests and for a limited number and kind of product, compared to the burden of up-front CBI 
justification for hundreds of thousands of components.” Stickle & Balek Letter, supra note 297, 
at 1. They continue that “[c]oncerning FIFRA, there are approximately 20,000 products with up 
to 400,000 components. Thousands of these pesticide products have never had a FOIA request 
and never will. To require up-front substantiation of all pesticide products would be a waste of 
resources [on registrants].” Id. at 2. Under TSCA, “CBI protection is a right and not a privilege” 
and disclosure of chemical identity would result in “horrendous and irreparable harm for the 
chemical manufacturer.” Id. 
 389. See O’Reilly, supra note 283, at 10,203 (discussing the “obsolescence of industry’s 
fixation on the physical security of regulatory submissions containing their chemical data” in the 
wake of the information age). 
 390. See, e.g., Lyndon, supra note 83, at 50–55 (proposing an alternative to trade secrets that 
will protect industry competitive advantages); McGarity & Shapiro, supra note 83, at 882–87 
(recommending exclusive use periods for health and safety data that have trade secret value, but 
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proposals offer particularly promising approaches to combating the 
abuse of trade secret protections. Professors Thomas McGarity and 
Sidney Shapiro propose the first option, which entails regulators 
exempting any health and safety data or information about 
environmental externalities from trade secret protection. For those 
actors who can demonstrate competitive losses from the disclosure of 
this information, a cost-sharing mechanism could be devised to 
provide compensation.391 Under such a scheme, modeled roughly on 
the data compensation schemes required for pesticide manufacturers 
under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act 
(FIFRA),392 competitors benefiting from a disclosure would be 
required to reimburse the disclosing firm for its costs and competitive 
losses.393 In cases when the beneficiaries of the safety information are 
diffuse, public funds would provide the reimbursement. Prior to 
implementing such a reform, it would be advisable to conduct a 
follow-up to the GAO’s 1999 study to better isolate areas in which 
competitive harm is most likely and develop approaches that directly 
address those potential harms.394 
A second amalgam of reforms could begin by requiring firms to 
provide upfront substantiation for their CBI claims.395 A further 
 
requiring full disclosure); O’Reilly, supra note 283, at 10,208–11 (proposing a narrower trade 
secret protection for protecting information and more effective mechanisms for sharing 
information with the public); see also U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFFICE, supra note 161, at 5 (suggesting 
specific legislative changes to TSCA to reduce the problem of overbroad CBI protections). 
 391. McGarity & Shapiro, supra note 83, at 874–82. 
 392. FIFRA, 7 U.S.C. §§ 136–136y (2000). 
 393. Under FIFRA, subsequent manufacturers that benefit from data previously submitted 
by another manufacturer must compensate that manufacturer for part of the development costs 
if their application occurs within ten years after the original data were produced. See FIFRA, 7 
U.S.C. § 136a(c)(1)(F) (providing the original applicant a right to “exclusive data use” for 
registration of pesticides after 1978). The Supreme Court has upheld the constitutionality of this 
provision, including the use of binding arbitration to determine the amount of compensation. 
See Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prod. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 571 (1985). Under the right 
circumstances, manufacturers can copyright their studies. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000) 
(providing copyright protections to published studies and to unpublished studies provided that 
certain requirements are met). But because the results of a study can be used by regulators 
without having to pay copyright royalties (assuming that the manufacturer shares the study with 
an agency), then other manufacturers are still able to free ride on the regulatory benefits of the 
information. 
 394. See Lyndon, supra note 83, at 50–55 (discussing use of environmental patents to 
provide firms with mechanisms for seeking compensation for disclosure of competitively 
valuable information); McGarity & Shapiro, supra note 83, at 882–87 (recommending full 
disclosure but allowing firms to claim “exclusive use”). 
 395. Public Information and Confidentiality, 65 Fed. Reg. 80,394, 80,395 (Dec. 21, 2000) (to 
be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 2) (discussing a proposal for up-front substantiation of CBI claims 
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corrective would be to set an expiration date—say seven years—on all 
CBI claims, to be extended only upon a convincing showing of need. 
Finally, the EPA could levy penalties for CBI claims found to be 
unjustified based either on an internal agency review or a review 
conducted following a FOIA request. Such sanctions seem 
reasonable, especially in light of the significant penalties that can be 
levied against EPA officials who release trade secret-protected 
information without justification.396 Indeed, eliminating or 
substantially reducing sanctions against government officials for the 
disclosure of CBI also appears warranted. 
Both sets of reforms would involve implementation costs: the 
EPA would incur costs associated with determining damage awards 
for affected businesses, while firms would incur expense in 
substantiating their CBI claims. Although these costs diminish the 
overall gains of the reforms, evidence of current CBI abuse makes 
some form of legal counterpressure seem both inevitable and cost-
justified. 
b. Suppressing Health and Safety Data through Sealing 
Litigation and Nondisclosure Contracts. To limit the opportunities for 
actors to conceal adverse information through nondisclosure 
contracts, sealing litigation records, or by claiming various legal 
privileges, the EPA could require mandatory disclosures of health 
and safety information. Already, four separate statutory provisions 
require actors to report adverse effects under relatively narrow 
circumstances.397 By providing broader and more specific 
requirements for reporting under these same provisions, the EPA 
could minimize opportunities for actors to dodge or delay adverse 
information reporting,398 while simultaneously enlarging the circle of 
actors required to report. For example, requiring any party who 
 
and stating that “[w]e believe this would help reduce the number of overly-broad or non-specific 
claims”). 
 396. See supra note 285. 
 397. See FIFRA, 7 U.S.C. § 136d(a)(2) (2000) (requiring the reporting of adverse effects to 
the EPA); TSCA, 15 U.S.C. § 2607(c), (e) (2000) (same); CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(4), (5) 
(2000) (requiring the reporting of releases into surface waters); CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9603(a) 
(2000) (requiring the reporting of releases of reportable quantities of hazardous substances). 
 398. For example, under the Clean Water Act and CERCLA, reporting requirements could 
be revised to require the reporting of any non-de minimis releases. Legal authority exists for the 
EPA to make this change because Congress clearly delegates the decision about setting 
reportable quantities or threshold levels to the EPA. See CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(4); 
CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9602(b). 
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works with the manufacturer and is aware of adverse effects 
(including scientists hired under nondisclosure contracts)399 to report 
such information would greatly increase the probability that adverse 
information will be disclosed when these provisions are backed by 
civil and criminal penalties. 
2. Penalties for Inappropriately Generating Controversy about 
the Credibility of Public Information. In a society that values open 
communication and free speech, penalties for producing ends-
oriented research and unjustified scientific critiques need to be 
carefully crafted. The best antidote for biased research is a system 
that earmarks the source of bias, thus providing useful signals for 
those trying to understand the source of controversy without chilling 
speech or adversely affecting the ability of actors to perform research 
as they see fit.400 In more dramatic situations, when actors actively 
abuse existing processes in ways intended to harass scientists, 
however, affirmative disincentives for abuse should be imposed. 
a. Stigmatizing Biased Critiques and Research. Under the 
current system, patently biased research and research critiques enjoy 
roughly the same regulatory credibility as research produced by 
scientists with no financial interest in the outcome and no sponsor 
control.401 The EPA does not require conflict disclosures for scientific 
information submitted for regulatory purposes, and it makes no 
apparent distinction between research produced by academics under 
federal contract and research funded and controlled by a regulated 
party and produced as a condition to regulation.402 As a result, 
 
 399. Congress is somewhat vague about who is required to report releases of hazardous 
substances. See, e.g., CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(5) (requiring reporting by an undefined “person 
in charge”); CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9603(a) (same). Under TSCA, however, “any person who 
has possession of a study” is among those required to report relevant health and safety findings 
on a toxic substance to the EPA. 15 U.S.C. § 2607(d). Clearer definition of what constitutes a 
“study” and how to satisfy the statute’s reporting requirements could impose substantially 
greater demands on researchers as well as sponsors. 
 400. See David Michaels & Wendy E. Wagner, Disclosure in Regulatory Science, 302 
SCIENCE 2073, 2073 (2003) (proposing the use of elaborated conflict disclosures to provide the 
government with information on how research independence might have been compromised in 
research used for regulation). 
 401. The argument and reform proposed in this Section are based on Michaels & Wagner, 
supra note 400. 
 402. As discussed, moreover, a significant portion of industry-sponsored research used in 
these regulatory efforts is protected from external scientific review through trade secret and 
confidential business privileges. See supra Part III.B.1. In fact, despite its promise of requiring 
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decisionmakers, the public, and even the media can be misled by 
research findings suggesting that there is scientific controversy about 
important regulatory questions, when in truth there is relative 
unanimity among independent scientists about the subject.403 The 
failure to distinguish between research conducted with no apparent 
agenda and research that has at least the potential for bias can have a 
negative effect on the quality of regulatory decisionmaking. 
The scientific community has flatly rejected the EPA’s 
willingness to treat all science as equal. Scientific journals and 
academic institutions have developed elaborate processes for 
signaling when research has been produced by scientists with conflicts 
of interest. They sometimes even refuse to publish research when the 
sponsor retains control over the reporting and ultimate publication of 
the results. The leading medical journals of the U.S. and Great 
Britain, for example, no longer publish articles based on studies done 
under contracts in which the investigators did not have the unfettered 
right to publish the findings. In a joint statement, the editors of 
thirteen medical journals assert that contractual arrangements 
allowing sponsor control of publication “erode the fabric of 
intellectual inquiry that has fostered so much high-quality clinical 
research [and] make medical journals party to potential 
misrepresentation, since the published manuscript may not reveal the 
extent to which the authors were powerless to control the conduct of 
a study that bears their names.”404 It is particularly instructive that the 
scientific community relies heavily on researchers’ disclosure of 
conflicts of interest despite the fact that, as part of the peer review 
process, scientific editors and peer reviewers are often better situated, 
because of their greater scientific expertise, to identify biased 
research than regulators, the public, or political officials. 
The EPA’s laissez-faire approach to research could be reformed 
by adopting conflict disclosures similar to those used by the 
biomedical journals. Under such a reform, researchers and scientists 
providing critiques, comments, and research submitted to or used by 
an agency would be required to sign a conflict form specifying the 
 
agencies to use and publicize only “good,” “objective” science, the Data Quality Act 
requirements omit any disclosure requirements for conflicts of interest. By ignoring these 
disclosure requirements, the Data Quality Act seems to provide the public with misleadingly 
incomplete information for evaluating the integrity of research used for regulatory decisions. 
 403. See, e.g., supra note 111 and accompanying text. 
 404. Frank Davidoff et al., Sponsorship, Authorship and Accountability, 286 JAMA 1232, 
1233 (2001); see also supra note 127. 
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extent of financial and sponsor influence on the research.405 
Researchers, for example, would be required to disclose financial and 
other conflicts of interest that might bias their work, and they would 
also be required to disclose whether they had the contractual right to 
publish their findings without influence and without obtaining 
consent of the sponsor. If their work was reviewed by a party affected 
by the regulation prior to publication or submission, they would need 
to disclose that review as well. Sponsors would also be required to 
provide this disclosure for all information they submit to the EPA. 
If the EPA mandated disclosures, sponsors relinquishing control 
over the design and reporting of their sponsored research would 
finally be rewarded for their restraint and openness.406 Requiring 
disclosure of the extent of sponsor influence on a project would 
prevent sponsors who only fund, but do not control, research from 
being tarred with the same brush as sponsors who work closely with 
researchers to control the design, methods, and reporting of results. 
Rewards for disinterested research, in turn, should generate 
incentives for doing more of it. In addition, requiring mandatory 
conflict-of-interest disclosures will benefit the public, policymakers, 
and the media by making it easier for them to assess the objectivity of 
individual research projects, especially when a “scientific 
controversy” arises.407 Requiring standardized disclosures should also 
 
 405. For an example of one such form used by the Journal of the American Medical 
Association, see Authorship Responsibility, Financial Disclosure, Copyright Transfer, and 
Acknowledgment (JAMA Form), available at http://jama.ama-
assn.org/cgi/data/292/1/112/DC1/1 (last visited Oct. 11, 2004) (on file with the Duke Law 
Journal), requiring a signature along with submitted articles. 
 406. Currently, because these positive attributes of researcher independence cannot be 
advertised or validated, actors cannot gain reputational advantages or esteem norms from 
relinquishing control over research studies. Cf. Ackerlof, supra note 360 (observing that, in 
general, establishing a strong reputation is one of the primary means to avoid the downward 
forces of adverse selection); McAdams, supra note 142, at 369–72 (arguing that norms work only 
when others can observe the good behavior). 
 407. See, e.g., Cornelia Dean, Editing Science, in Speaker Information, Conference on 
Conflicted Science, supra note 114, at 10 (discussing the challenges to journalists in reporting 
the status of research accurately and in “learning and reporting the financial ties of those 
[scientists] who make the news”). With such a reform in place, the EPA could post all research 
conducted on any given chemical or environmental issue, along with the “objectivity” status of 
each of the studies, based on the extent of sponsor control over the research. See, e.g., Envtl. 
Prot. Agency, Integrated Risk Information System Substance List, at 
http://www.epa.gov/iris/subst/index.html (last visited Oct. 30, 2004) (on file with the Duke Law 
Journal) (providing risk estimates on a chemical-by-chemical basis, with a reference list at the 
end of each chemical-specific report that currently does not but could provide information 
about the independence of each study). This would provide valuable information for scientists, 
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assist journal editors and fellow scientists in evaluating studies when 
they serve on scientific advisory boards or are otherwise involved in 
reviewing regulatory science. 
b. Penalties for Abuse of Process. The current regulatory system 
allows actors to abuse, with impunity, a variety of litigation and 
administrative mechanisms in order to delay regulation and harass 
and discredit public scientists.408 The Data Quality Act, the Data 
Access Act, third-party subpoenas, FOIA requests, and state public 
records statutes have all been used strategically to intimidate 
researchers and delay or halt their research.409 Third-party subpoenas 
and the Data Quality Act arguably invite abuse, because even if the 
underlying petition is ultimately determined to be unfounded, the 
actions still succeed in wearing down researchers and delaying 
proceedings.410 Deterrents to abuse, by contrast, are nonexistent. Few 
sanctions are in place to deter abuse of any of these procedures, not 
 
regulators, and the public. If, for example, the only positive studies on a new pesticide 
registration application were “controlled by” the pesticide manufacturers or users, this 
information would help in weighing all of the information, particularly if the adverse studies 
were produced by parties free of sponsor control. 
 408. This is a concern that has been expressed by the scientific community, a group that is 
historically reluctant to take part in policy deliberations. See, e.g., Frederick R. Anderson, 
Science Advocacy and Scientific Due Process, ISSUES IN SCI. & TECH., Summer 2000, at 71, 74 
(advocating a balanced approach to ensuring the credibility of scientific information because of 
the dangers of actors abusing legal tools “to harass and intimidate researchers by impugning 
their integrity or motives, chill new research, increase the costs of research, and deter volunteers 
for research”); NRC, DATA ACCESS REPORT, supra note 350, at 2 (reporting that scientists 
oppose the Data Access Amendment “on the grounds that it would invite intellectual property 
searches by industry and scientific competitors, jeopardize the privacy of research subjects, 
decrease the willingness of research subjects to participate in studies, expose researchers to 
deliberate harassment, and increase costs and paperwork”); id. at 14 (reporting that Dr. Bruce 
Alberts of the National Academy of Sciences expressed concern that “there is a danger that the 
[Data Access] [A]mendment could be used to harass scientists whose work is found 
objectionable by anyone, for any reason”); id. at 20 (recounting similar concerns from an invited 
speaker, Judge Jack Weinstein). 
 409. See Bert Black, Research and its Revelation: When Should Courts Compel Disclosure?, 
59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 169, 175 (Summer 1996) (describing the use of subpoenas to 
harass scientists and chill research); Robert M. O’Neil, A Researcher’s Privilege: Does Any 
Hope Remain?, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 35, 36 (Summer 1996) (describing the harm to 
research and researchers from compelled disclosure and the lack of meaningful attention to the 
problem by the courts); supra Part III.C. 
 410. See Hornstein, supra note 228, at 244–45 (discussing threats arising out of new lawsuits 
brought under the Data Amendments); supra notes 338–43 and accompanying text. 
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even sanctions against those who file frivolous allegations of scientific 
misconduct.411 
A very straightforward reform would be to impose hefty 
sanctions for abuse of these processes, similar to—but more effective 
than—the sanctions levied for litigation abuse.412 Moreover, regardless 
of the merits, complainants could also be required to pay the 
reasonable costs incurred by researchers, attorneys (if needed), and 
supporting institutions in responding to each and every misconduct 
allegation or request for information correction.413 Absent such 
reforms, those researchers whose work has immediate impact on 
regulatory policy may be forced to halt or reduce their ongoing 
research to respond, at their own expense, to each information 
request, irrespective of its merits. Delaying research, in fact, may be 
precisely the objective that entities requesting the information are 
trying to achieve.414 
If these proposed sanctions do not significantly curtail the 
harassment of scientists, stronger legislative or regulatory remedies 
 
 411. See generally Scientific Misconduct Regulations, 42 C.F.R. pt. 50 (2003) (failing to 
provide safeguards against trivial lawsuits). Like scientific misconduct charges, petitions against 
the quality of an agency’s science under the Data Quality Act can be filed at any time, by 
anyone, and can include as many complaints and challenges as the petitioner desires. There are 
no costs or sanctions for filing meritless complaints under the DQA or for requesting data and 
reanalyzing it in problematic ways. See NAS, DATA QUALITY TRANSCRIPT, DAY 1, supra note 
333, at 99 (“[One] can file as many correction requests as [one wants. One does not] have a 
quota on correction requests. . . . What the agency would or should do with them is of course a 
more difficult situation.” (quoting the observations of Alan Morrison)); cf. Black, supra note 
409, at 183 (recommending that, to provide some disincentives for filing harassing third-party 
subpoenas, the moving party should be required to pay the attorneys’ fees for that expert “if a 
compromise offer is made to the party seeking disclosure and the court’s ruling requires no 
disclosure beyond the offer”). 
 412. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c). Accordingly, if there is no good faith basis for a good-science 
challenge, penalties should be levied against the challenger. Such sanctions, consistent with the 
assumption of good faith, would penalize only the very worst abuses, but the threat of sanctions 
could also help deter marginal abuse of these processes. 
 413. Currently, the only costs that might be passed on to the party filing the complaint or 
data access request are the “reasonable” costs of producing data under the Data Access Act. 
OMB, Final Revision, OMB Circular A-110, 64 Fed. Reg. 54,926, 54,930 (Oct. 8, 1999) 
(allowing, but not requiring, the federal awarding agency to “charge the requestor a reasonable 
fee equaling the full incremental cost of obtaining the research data” and explaining that “[t]his 
fee should reflect costs incurred by the agency, the recipient, and applicable subrecipients”). 
This approach should be extended to other good-science laws as well. See supra notes 408–09.  
 414. See NRC, DATA ACCESS REPORT, supra note 350, at 14 (reporting that presenter 
Bruce Alberts of the National Academy of Sciences expressed concern that the data access 
provision could be abused in ways that might ultimately “discourage the best young people from 
choosing careers in science”). 
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may be in order. Researchers at the receiving end of abusive scientific 
misconduct charges, subpoenas, public records requests, and good-
science complaints should have available a set of counterclaims 
providing not only damages for their time and expenses, but also 
punitive awards for any delays or adverse impacts on the progress of 
their research. To provide incentives for public sector groups to bring 
such challenges on behalf of affected scientists, the availability of 
attorneys’ fees is also critical.415 
C. Proactive Reform 
Correcting the tendency of current laws to exacerbate problems 
associated with the lack of information about environmental harms 
will make it somewhat easier to collect needed information, but this 
correction alone will not address the overarching need to increase 
substantially the amount and quality of information that is available. 
It is unquestionable that considerably more information is needed.416 
There is less consensus, however, with regard to the specifics—what 
types of information are needed most and how to determine 
priorities. Several different National Academy of Science expert 
panels have attempted, unsuccessfully, to develop elaborate systems 
for prioritizing information needs.417 Economists similarly have 
struggled to develop formulas that calculate the appropriate  
 
 
 415. For a similar suggestion, see Anderson, supra note 408, at 76, who proposes a nonprofit 
to defend harassed scientists using good-science tools. 
 416. Indeed, a series of recommendations and reports by expert scientific panels convened 
to address the subject reveals a strong consensus that far more information is needed. See supra 
note 10 and accompanying text. Despite this consensus, research funding at the EPA appears to 
be shrinking, or at best remaining steady over the decades. See POWELL, supra note 15, at 149–
50 (recommending based on a book-length study of science at the EPA that the EPA’s science 
budget should increase substantially provide it with needed research support); COMM. ON 
RESEARCH AND PEER REVIEW IN EPA, supra note 211, at 35–36 (identifying that research 
funding at the EPA through the EPA’s research arm—the Office of Research and 
Development—is approximately 7 percent of the agency’s total budget and showing graphically 
how the funding has remained relatively flat from 1980 to 2000, even though the EPA’s larger 
budget has fluctuated). 
 417. See, e.g., NRC, BUILDING A FOUNDATION, supra note 10, at 45 (identifying criteria for 
prioritizing needs for environmental research, which include timing, novelty, scope, severity, 
visibility, and probability); NRC, TOXICITY TESTING, supra note 10, at 207–26 (establishing a 
framework for prioritizing the testing of chemicals). 
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investment in information given the expected returns,418 but they 
generally concede that these formulas are of little practical utility.419 
Scientific and economic experts who endeavor to identify 
immediate information needs ultimately converge upon the same 
conclusion: determining when and whether to produce more 
information is, at its core, a social question that cannot be resolved 
exclusively by experts and technical analysis. The difficulty that 
scientists and economists face in specifying the ideal level of 
information for environmental and public health regulation derives in 
large part from uncertainty about what information new research will 
produce.420 At the same time, the question “How much information?” 
carries with it a large set of social considerations that should not be 
answered by experts, even if the experts were capable of determining 
the benefits of research in advance. These complications are twofold. 
First, some of the benefits, particularly the benefits to advances in 
scientific knowledge and spillover benefits to the public from the 
additional knowledge, defy quantification or monetization. As a 
result, the only rational or legitimate way to answer the question is to 
employ some democratic-based process for finding the answer. 
Second, the benefits of having additional information will vary from 
setting to setting and ultimately depend in part on whether the 
information facilitates regulation or whether, on the other hand, 
 
 418. See, e.g., Roy Radner & Joseph E. Stiglitz, A Nonconcavity in the Value of Information, 
in 5 BAYESIAN MODELS IN ECONOMIC THEORY 33, 34 (Marcel Boyer & Richard E. Kihlstrom 
eds., 1984) (attempting to model the value of information to decisionmakers relative to its cost 
and concluding with proof that “the demand for information will not be a continuous function 
of its price”). 
 419. The models have been largely written off as involving an “infinite regress of 
economizing on economizing on economizing,” and the effort to develop an economic model to 
predict when information production efforts have reached optimality—at which point no 
additional research is cost-justified—remains “a fundamental source of bounded rationality in 
economic decision making.” J. Barkley Rosser, Jr., A Nobel Prize for Asymmetric Information: 
The Economic Contributions of George Akerlof, Michael Spence and Joseph Stiglitz, 15 REV. 
POL. ECON. 3, 9 (2003). 
 420. Recent research in endocrine effects caused by very low exposures to chemicals, for 
example, suggests watershed developments in the science of toxicology that could, at least for a 
time, generate more questions than answers with each new basic research project. See John P. 
Myers et al., Endocrine Disruptors—A Controversy in Science and Policy: Session III Summary 
and Research Needs, 22 NEUROTOXICOLOGY 557, 557–58 (2001) (discussing the new discoveries 
and resulting research needs that flow from research on endocrine disrupters). 
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regulatory approaches can be devised to circumvent the need for new 
information.421 
Accordingly, recommendations for information needs and 
priorities are beyond the purview of a law review article. Even 
without specifying directions with regard to what information is 
needed, however, it seems possible to devise methods to facilitate 
information production. To this end, this final Section offers 
suggestions for how information can be produced under various 
circumstances once information needs have been determined. The 
three mechanisms for producing information presented here vary 
primarily by the nature of the actors’ asymmetrical advantages over 
relevant information. In all three cases, this Article consistently 
assumes that actors will be responsible for producing any necessary 
information on the harms created by their products and activities 
because it is they who create the externalities in the first place.422 
Naturally, if instead the government carries the burden of producing 
such information, it will need to expend the added costs and confront 
the possible barriers associated with securing information that 
regulated actors hold. 
1. Ensuring Standardized Information Requirements. For 
information about manufacturing or disposal activities that require 
on-site access or take place in the early stages of product 
development, the actors themselves are in the best position to 
produce the information at the lowest cost. This is primarily because 
the actors control much of the information about their products and 
their manufacturing and disposal activities.423 Regulatory approaches 
seeking this information, then, will obtain it at the lowest cost if they 
require actors to perform the information collection.424 Not only is this 
 
 421. Because some regulatory tools can be devised to address externalities without the need 
for information in the short or in the long term, the benefits of added information may be 
reduced, perhaps substantially. Absolute bans on some activities, if the activities themselves are 
perceived as socially valueless (like the spread of anthrax, for example), can resolve the 
information problem by making additional research superfluous for purposes of regulation. 
Although it might still be beneficial to understand the toxic mechanisms of anthrax and even to 
determine whether some levels can be tolerated without adverse reactions, this research is no 
longer answering any immediate social question. 
 422. See supra notes 31–33 and accompanying text. 
 423. See supra notes 63–80 and accompanying text. 
 424. For example, in the case of the cow herders on Professor Hardin’s commons, the 
herders would be required to count their cattle (using specific methods) and report the number 
regularly in exchange for continued use of the commons. If government officials attempted to 
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the lowest-cost approach, it may be the only way to collect the 
information given the extent of the actors’ control. 
As long as it is possible to specify information production 
requirements with precision, leaving little room for actors to 
manipulate results based on their asymmetric advantages, effective 
strategies can be devised for requiring actors to collect and report 
information on externalities associated with their products or 
activities.425 There are already several programs that require on-site 
monitoring, specify methods for collecting data, and detail protocols 
for conducting prescribed tests.426 These approaches could be 
expanded to require actors to collect additional information.427 For 
example, facilities could be required to install on-site ambient air 
monitors when added information on pollutant levels is needed.428 
 
collect this information, they would need to invest in regular visits to the commons. They might 
need to count cattle throughout the day, and they might still lack the needed information to 
trace the total number of cattle back to their respective owners if more restrictions became 
necessary to protect the commons. This government-based approach to counting and tracing 
cattle on the commons would likely be a much costlier approach to collecting the needed 
information. 
 425. Ideally, these more precise information requirements could be accomplished by 
combining the rigid protocols for testing described in Part II.A.1, supra, with the conflict 
disclosure requirements discussed previously in notes 405–07 and accompanying text, supra. 
 426. See supra Part II.A. 
 427. The National Academy of Sciences made a similar recommendation, now nearly thirty 
years old. See 2 NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, COMM. ON ENVIRONMENTAL DECISION MAKING, 
DECISION MAKING IN THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY: A REPORT TO THE U.S. 
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY FROM THE COMMITTEE ON ENVIRONMENT AND 
NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL 50–58 (1977). 
Whether the information is needed, of course, depends on the initial, bracketed decision 
regarding information priorities. Incremental schemes for producing information (that similarly 
dodge the overarching question and need for priorities), for example, generally require actors to 
produce certain information as a condition to operation when there are reasons to suspect that 
their activities could cause harm. See, e.g., Applegate, supra note 33, at 324–25 (discussing 
surrogate factors used for new chemicals under TSCA, such as chemical structure, that could be 
used to determine whether or how much additional data should be required); Polasky & 
Doremus, supra note 85, at 42–43 (discussing occasions under which developers should be 
required to prove that a development will not harm endangered species). Professor Applegate 
also argues that, in this more incremental approach to requiring the production of information, 
a more flexible testing authority “can reduce the absolute cost of testing by permitting a tiered 
or staged testing program that requires more expensive or long-term testing only on the basis of 
earlier tests that indicate some likelihood of effects.” Applegate, supra note 33, at 318. 
Basic research, as discussed in Part IV.C.3, infra, would also be essential to ensuring that 
perverse incentives for information production and innovation do not emerge from surrogate 
factors that are too narrow or become entrenched over time. 
 428. See Blais et al., supra note 19, at 28 (advocating the use of ambient monitors for air 
toxins because of the lack of assurance against violations and other unmonitored releases that 
cause recurring upsets). 
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Actors could also be required to conduct additional safety research 
on their wastes and products, especially if there is reason to suspect 
potential hazards or harms are not being caught by existing 
regulations. Such an approach could be modeled on the testing 
required under FIFRA.429 Actors who experience recurring and 
unauthorized releases of pollution from their facilities might be 
required to install new or additional monitors on problematic sources 
to keep better, more accurate records of excessive emissions and 
cumulative releases of pollutants into the environment.430 
Shifting the burden of producing such information to regulated 
parties will force them to internalize more of the costs associated with 
their activities. Consistent with economic theory, requiring actors to 
internalize these costs would help ensure that more of the external 
harms imposed on society were reflected in actors’ business 
decisions.431 Indeed, even when actors do not enjoy asymmetrical 
control over information, public policy should require some 
information production as a precondition to engaging in activities that 
create externalities. Requiring the production of information as a 
prerequisite to operating would ensure that actors internalize the cost 
of producing this information. 
 
 429. See 40 C.F.R. § 158.240–158.740 (2003) (providing a table of testing requirements). For 
a proposal of what the data call-in authority could look like legally, at least in the case of toxic 
products, see Applegate, supra note 33, at 322–23. The recommended call-in authority is similar 
to FIFRA’s broad mandate, but it is reinforced with specific agency guidelines. 
Actors could be required to conduct regular, specified tests of wastes, in contrast to the 
more ambiguous requirements for hazardous waste testing under RCRA. For example, actors 
could be required to test every barrel of waste or to provide certain documentation that their 
periodic sampling is representative. See supra notes 252–55 and accompanying text (discussing 
the limitations of current requirements governing hazardous waste testing and compliance 
under RCRA). 
 430. Emergency reporting requirements under CERCLA and the CWA cover only 
conditions in which (1) the releases are continuous, 42 U.S.C. § 9603(f)(2) (2000); or (2) the 
releases are sudden, substantial, and isolated (like a spill), id. § 9603(a); 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(5) 
(2000). In truth, some releases, especially into air and water, are likely the result of equipment 
malfunctions, power outages, and the like, which may recur with some regularity even though 
they are not continuous. Yet even though they may occur more frequently, there is typically no 
additional monitoring of these periodic “upsets.” To address this situation, the EPA could 
require more regular monitoring at facilities where there are unauthorized releases of hazardous 
substances. See CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a) (2000) (providing the EPA with broad authority 
to respond to releases and threatened releases of hazardous substances). 
 431. See Applegate, supra note 33, at 308 (describing how licensing can create incentives for 
information production and can shift the burden of producing information to the actor). 
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2. Producing Incentives for Information Production. For cases 
in which actors enjoy advantages over information so substantial that 
it becomes difficult to devise standardized information production 
requirements, incentive programs seem the most promising approach 
to producing useful information.432 Such an approach is consistent 
with findings relating to securities regulation, which conclude that 
regulated entities are more inclined to produce a full range of 
credible information when they are rewarded rather than penalized 
for the results.433 Rather than condition incentives for divulging 
incriminating information on rewards of amnesty, as state audit laws 
do,434 the incentives that this Section proposes do essentially the 
opposite—imposing penalties until actors can show that they are 
actually causing fewer adverse effects than originally supposed.435 In 
this sense, then, the incentive assumes the worst (rather than the best, 
as amnesty arguably does) about actors and creates incentives for 
actors to contradict this assumption. The incentives are thus akin to 
the “penalty defaults” proposed by Professors Ian Ayres and Robert 
Gertner, which encourage actors to reveal superior information by 
assuming the worst about them as a default.436 
Incentives for information production in environmental 
regulation could be accomplished by basing regulatory standards on 
worst-case predictions and reducing regulation when credible 
information suggests that harms have been overestimated. The 
amorphous precautionary principle, when employed with the 
 
 432. Cf. Lewis, supra note 63, at 840 (advocating a “game of disclosure or persuasion” in 
which the actor cannot operate or pollute until regulatory approval is obtained; this game 
entices an actor with asymmetrical information to disgorge that information to obtain the 
license). 
 433. See Lowenstein, supra note 149, at 1341 (lauding the success of American capitalist 
markets as a function of comprehensive disclosure requirements). 
 434. See supra Part III.B.5. 
 435. It is also unclear how strong the incentives are for information production under state 
and federal audit laws. In the abstract, the extent to which amnesty or reduced penalties provide 
an incentive for facilities to disclose incriminating information depends in large part on the 
probability that these facilities would be caught in violation in the first instance. Given that in 
many environmental regulatory settings this probability is low, the extent to which amnesty 
serves as a reward depends both on the probability of being caught and the costs of compliance 
associated with turning oneself in. See supra notes 268–69 and accompanying text.  
 436. See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic 
Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 91 (1989) (“[P]enalty defaults are purposefully set at 
what the parties would not want—in order to encourage the parties to reveal information to 
each other or to third parties . . . .”). 
WAGNER FINAL.DOC 2/9/2005 11:06 AM 
1742 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 53:1619 
appropriate bells and whistles, seems to aspire to this result.437 To 
make sure that these information incentives are real, regulators would 
need to develop a system that in fact reduced regulatory burdens 
when a regulated party volunteered credible exculpatory 
information.438 Under this approach, actors would bear the primary 
burden for producing exculpatory information. However, they would 
do so only when they perceived that research results would 
demonstrate that their activities were less harmful than assumed.439 
Because actors have superior information about their products and 
activities, they are best positioned to know whether additional 
information might ultimately reveal that the externalities resulting 
from their products and activities are significantly less harmful than 
supposed (and that, accordingly, regulatory requirements should be 
lowered). Moreover, given that there will always be uncertainty about 
the harms that a product or activity causes, this approach promises to 
ensure that at least part of the burden of resolving this uncertainty 
falls to the actors whose products and activities create the uncertainty 
in the first place. 
 
 437. See generally Carl F. Cranor, Asymmetric Information, the Precautionary Principle, and 
Burdens of Proof, in PROTECTING PUBLIC HEALTH & THE ENVIRONMENT: IMPLEMENTING 
THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE 74 (Carolyn Raffensperger & Joel A. Tickner eds., 1999) 
(discussing the precautionary principle in the context of considering what information is needed 
to protect against the health risks posed by toxic substances). 
 438. See Wagner, supra note 382, at 127–32 (arguing for a more precisely defined rebuttal 
point for the conservative default options and other precautionary policies in environmental 
regulation). Any information an actor produces to rebut protective assumptions would require 
rigorous validation. See Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market 
Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549, 594–609 (1984) (discussing the importance of verification costs 
for information production requirements). In cases of more basic research, this might require—
beyond disclosure—validation of the result and peer review by expert panels (although facility 
audits might need to be conducted by third-party professionals, with attending liability and civil 
penalties for bias or fraudulent reports). Cf. Lowenstein, supra note 149, at 1355 (conceding that 
even with the rigid information requirements of financial disclosures under securities laws, 
regulated parties still manage to “jiggle” the numbers). 
 439. This is precisely the approach taken by Proposition 65, Safe Drinking Water and Toxic 
Enforcement Act of 1986, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 25249.5–25249.13 (West 1999), in 
California, which requires industries to disclose chemicals present in their products and 
polluting activities when these chemicals cause cancer and birth defects. The statute also 
provides incentives for firms to produce information; disclosures are not required for low levels 
of harm if a “business responsible for the exposure can show that the level of exposure in 
question is below a scientifically based, statutorily defined threshold of risk.” Roe, supra note 
46, at 10,235. This incentive system led industry to cooperate closely with California regulators, 
leading to the publication of “risk-based standards for 282 individual chemicals in less than five 
years, without any legal mandate” and on a small budget relative to that of the U.S. EPA. Id. 
WAGNER FINAL.DOC 2/9/2005 11:06 AM 
2004] COMMONS IGNORANCE 1743 
A similar approach could be used to improve information on the 
environmental harms created by a single facility. Incentives for actors 
to audit and report information on these individualized harms, for 
example, could be created by developing a worst-case estimate of the 
extent of the polluting activities and the resulting harms (not simply 
the name and total pounds of chemicals released).440 These worst-case 
estimates of harms would then be available to investors, community 
groups, and the public at large. Under such a scenario, facilities might 
have a strong incentive to produce validated information rebutting 
one or more of the worst-case assumptions.441 For example, worst-case 
projections of the expected level of air toxins at a facility might be 
rebutted if the facility made use of regularized ambient air monitors 
(employed in ways specified by regulators).442 In addition to ensuring 
accurate reporting of information about environmental harms, this 
approach would provide actors with incentives to reduce harmful 
activities as some academics have argued with respect to the Toxic 
Release Inventory (TRI).443 It is critical to such an approach, however, 
 
 440. These worst-case projections could be based on permit data, TRI data, and other 
facility-specific information; for unquantified potential harms, conservative or worst-case “fudge 
factors” could be added to the estimate as placeholders pending further research. The worst-
case estimate of harm would include factors adjusting facility estimates of the amount of 
hazardous chemicals in products and pollutant streams to reflect credible, worst-case scenarios. 
Risk analyses, using uniformly conservative estimates, would then be used to calculate the 
harms and nonquantifiable, potential harms that could result from these worst case loading 
estimates. The resulting information would produce an accounting of the cumulative impacts 
that might be imposed on health and the environment by a facility, which would be much more 
informative than the TRI (which does not translate such information) and the very primitive 
scorecard tool. Envtl. Defense Network, Scorecard, at http://www.scorecard.org (last visited July 
30, 2003) (providing basic data comparing pollution levels in various U.S. locales). 
 441. Dr. David Roe’s study of the effects of Proposition 65 disclosures on firm behavior 
suggests that disclosures may in fact be a powerful tool to encourage this type of exculpatory 
research. Roe, supra note 46, at 10,235–37; see also Bradley Karkkainen, Information as 
Environmental Regulation: TRI and Performance Benchmarking, Precursor to a New 
Paradigm?, 89 GEO. L.J. 257, 346 (2001) (arguing that Proposition 65 provides firms with “an 
incentive to produce and disclose as much credible toxicity and exposure data as may be 
necessary to persuade state regulators to establish the ‘no significant risk’ regulatory thresholds 
for substances they emit”). 
 442. This could be also done with a certified, third-party audit, much like the use of 
intermediaries and auditors in securities regulation. See Bernard S. Black, The Legal and 
Institutional Preconditions for Strong Securities Markets, 48 UCLA L. REV. 781, 793–96 (2001) 
(describing the use of these certified intermediaries or auditors). 
 443. See Applegate, supra note 33, at 295–96 (noting how even the approximate data 
disclosed under EPCRA regarding the use and disposal of annual amounts of hazardous 
substances “can be used to establish and revise laws and regulations, to influence lawmakers 
and regulators, and to negotiate or litigate with emitters” (footnotes omitted)); Karkkainen, 
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that the worst case be identified with some precision, or at least not 
be too optimistic lest the facility find it can cause adverse effects that 
are in reality worse than the assumed worst-case conditions. 
3. Subsidizing Government Research. Given the powerful 
incentives actors have to remain ignorant about any adverse 
consequences associated with their products and activities, it is not 
realistic to expect them to ignore these interests when it comes to 
conducting basic or applied research that cannot be constrained with 
carefully crafted protocols. As a result, most basic research used for 
regulation, as well as applied research that cannot be constrained with 
government-blessed protocols or rigorous oversight, should be 
performed by disinterested government or federally funded academic 
scientists not influenced by sponsors or financial incentives. This 
approach also makes sense because regulated actors rarely enjoy 
asymmetrical  access to non-facility-specific research; thus assigning 
responsibility for conducting basic research to regulated actors yields 
few if any cost advantages.444 Currently, the federal government is 
already the primary benefactor of most basic and innovative applied 
research in the environmental sciences, making this proposal more a 
plea for continued support than one for reform. 
Although this is a more controversial suggestion, to the extent 
that greater funds are needed to support research and that actors are 
responsible for creating at least some of the research needs, asking 
actors to pay a fee or a modest, added tax (flat or graduated) to 
support a portion of such research might be appropriate.445 The 
underlying logic of this suggestion is that if actors are creating at least 
some of the need for environmental research, they should assist it 
financially. The resulting facility-based revenues could then be used 
 
supra note 441 (discussing the strong incentives that the TRI creates for actors to reduce their 
use and release of listed hazardous chemicals). 
 444. In fact, especially for some basic research, such as research on toxicogenomics, the 
research challeges are so extensive that it will not be cost-effective for different parties to 
conduct the research simultaneously and may risk duplicating efforts. See, e.g., Envtl. Prot. 
Agency, Draft: Potential Implications of Genomics for Regulatory and Risk Assessment 
Applications at EPA 40–45, at http://www.epa.gov/OSA/genomics-external-review-draft.pdf 
(Mar. 2004) (external review draft, on file with the Duke Law Journal) (discussing the research 
challenges presented by toxicogenomics). In such cases, the government will be able to conduct 
the research more cost-effectively because of its better-equipped laboratories and diverse 
scientific staff. 
 445. See Lyndon, supra note 31, at 1835–41 (proposing a tax on companies that produce 
toxic substances to finance government production of information on such substances). 
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to support federal development of improved screening tests and 
assessment methods and to finance basic environmental research. 
CONCLUSION 
Environmental regulatory programs have failed to come to terms 
with the fact that much of the information needed to support 
regulation will not be produced voluntarily or emerge spontaneously 
over time. On the contrary, parties whose activities and products 
create environmental harm have strong incentives to remain ignorant 
about the nature and extent of these harms. For these actors, 
“ignorance is bliss.” This Article has explored these incentives and 
how they lead most rational actors whose activities and products 
create externalities not only to avoid sharing this information, but 
also to actively resist third-party efforts to investigate their activities. 
As a result, even when the public is willing to subsidize research on 
the harms that various externalities impose on society, this research 
may be eclipsed by biased research and manufactured critiques 
prepared by those actors who stand to lose if the truth about the 
harmful effects of their activities comes to light. The only appropriate 
response to this propensity for ignorance is to adjust legal rules in 
ways that penalize actors when they conceal adverse information or 
inappropriately attack damaging public research, and reward actors 
for producing needed information. 
 
